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CIVIC RENEWAL AND THE REGULATION OF NON-PROFITS
Miriam Galston*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a renaissance of interest in
civic life in the United States.  In the view of many, civic life is an untapped, or
insufficiently tapped, resource capable of addressing many of America’s most serious
ills, whether political, social, economic, or even medical.  
If you were to ask these commentators about the current condition of civic life in
America, you would get a wide assortment of views as to its strength or weakness.1   If
you were _________________________                                                                         
                                                                            
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School. Ph.D. The
University of Chicago.  J.D. Yale Law School.  Funding: GW Law School, Woodrow
Wilson International Center, Bradley Foundation.  Thanks to WAG, CB, PH, RT, CL,
                    
     1  The most well known argument in support of the view that civic life needs dramatic
improvement because it has declined significantly in the last three decades is developed
in  ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF COMMUNITY
(2000) (hereinafter BOWLING ALONE).  See also CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC
RENEWAL (Robert K. Fullinwider ed. 1999) (hereinafter CIVIL SOCIETY); DON E. EBERLY,
AMERICA’S PROMISE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE RENEWAL OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1998)
(hereinafter AMERICA’S PROMISE).  The Putnam book is an expansion of a previous
article with a similar name: Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining
Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 70 (1995) (hereinafter Bowling Alone).  At the opposite
end of the spectrum are MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CIVIC LIFE 294 (1998) (concluding that citizenship in America has added new forms but
has not declined); James A. Morone, The Corrosive Politics of Virtue, 26 AM. PROSPECT
30 (1996) (arguing that we do not have a moral crisis, a divorce culture, or a crime rate
higher than it was in 1970); Michael Schudson, What If Civic Life Didn't Die? 25 AM.
PROSPECT 17, 18 (1996) (arguing that “the decline of the civic in its conventional
forms...does not demonstrate the decline of civic-mindedness”); Everett C. Ladd, The
Data Just Don't Show the Erosion of America's “Social Capital”, 7 PUB. PERSP. 1 (1996)
(hereinafter Data Just Don't Show Erosion) (arguing that the level of civic participation
has actually increased).
research assistants Mayte Cabada, Allison Clements, Sharmese Hodge, Michelle
Mattis, Gardner Miller, Mike Passey.
to ask about the reasons for the current condition of civic life in America, you would also
get a wide assortment of differing responses.2
If, however, you were to ask about the importance of participation in voluntary
associations3 for producing, maintaining, or strengthening the quality of civic life, you
would discover a substantial consensus that, for civic life to be strong, there must be an
active citizenry,
and that participation in “voluntary associations” is one of the principal methods for
assuring an active citizenry.  As a consequence, a significant part of the civic renewal
debate revolves around issues such as the nature of voluntary associations, the
reasons people join them, the bonds among members fostered by such associations,
and the ways in which these entities promote the well-being of the communities within
which they reside.
                    
     2  See infra Part II.
     3  For the meaning of this phrase, see infra Part III.A and note 302.
According to civic renewal advocates, the effects of broadening and deepening
participation in voluntary associations would go beyond the immediate impact of the
specific activities and purposes of individual associations.  They reason that a person
with (presumably positive) experiences in one association is likely to become disposed
to involvement in other organizations and, as a result, to acquire over time an attitude of
trust toward and ability to cooperate with people outside his or her circle of friends and
acquaintances.  However, the provisional empirical findings discussed in this Article
suggest that the hoped-for ripple effects of participation in voluntary associations have
3been greatly overstated.  Although empirical research focusing specifically on
comparisons between pre-joining self-selection by and post-joining transformative
effects on association members is still in an embryonic state, the larger part of the
available evidence suggests that attitudes, habits, and traits acquired prior to joining an
association form the core of the causal explanation for many of the correlations
documented between participation in voluntary associations and subsequent civic
activities and civic activism.
This Article explores the implications of different perspectives on civic health for
the regulation of voluntary associations as “exempt organizations” under the Internal
Revenue Code (the “Code”).4  It analyzes how the different assumptions and purposes
of different theories suggest different, sometimes incompatible, recommendations for
civic reform. Based upon empirical data, the Article also seeks to clarify important limits
to the fruitful uses of voluntary associations to achieve these goals.  Finally, the Article
applies this analysis to the Code’s regulation of voluntary associations, both to clarify
the ways in which existing tax rules further or undermine one or more civic goals and to
recommend changes to make tax law more effective in promoting the goals for which it
is best suited.
                    
     4  All references to the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
Part II distinguishes and elaborates four perspectives on civic health that, alone
or in combination, inspire most of the discussions about civic renewal.  These
perspectives emphasize the primacy of (1) cooperation and effective collective action,
(2) self-governance (3) equality and representative institutions, or (4) the moral
4character of the community as the core element of civic health.  This Part elaborates the
idea of civic health developed by each perspective and examines the claims made by
each to have captured the critical element of any conception of a civic health.  The
analysis contrasts the four perspectives along several dimensions and identifies areas
in which their priorities may be different or their policies in conflict.  I argue that both the
cooperation and representative institutions perspectives are consistent with political
theories predicated upon the priority of the private and self-interested purposes of
individuals of societal or communal claims.  Both seek to invigorate civic life to promote
such interests more accurately and effectively.  However, the immediate agendas of the
two perspectives are likely to differ because of the belief on the part of the
representative institutions perspective that inequities in political influence have to be
tackled directly and urgently rather than indirectly through the medium of greater
participation.
In contrast, the self-governance and community character perspectives are each
predicated upon substantive assumptions about the attributes of individual and societal
well-being rather than individual, subjective preferences as the baseline for public policy
decisions.  For the self-governance perspective, individual autonomy and reasoned self
governance are critical ingredients of civic health.  For the community character
perspective, a commitment to moral and public spirited civic norms and practices is a
necessary, and often overlooked, prerequisite of civic health.  Although many policies
would be endorsed by proponents of both of these perspectives, the Article discusses
potential conflicts between them traceable to the emphasis of the former on reasoned
5decision making as contrasted with the emphasis of the latter on the moral character of
individuals and communities.
Part III reviews the empirical findings of social scientists to assess the degree to
which and ways in which voluntary associations may contribute to the goals of the four
perspectives on civic health.  In brief, active participation in them may well promote
coordinated and effective collective action in the first instance and, under certain
conditions, lead members to engage in additional participation in civic life.  The reason
is primarily because associations provide occasions for the recruitment and mobilization
of like-minded individuals and are themselves vehicles that enable such groups to
engage in effective group activity or influence others who can help them.  Associations
do not, however, as a rule seem to generate a norm of cooperation among their
members that is generalized to persons outside the group, as civic renewal advocates
hope and as some of their theories presuppose.
Part IV examines the current regulation of one important class of voluntary
associations, namely, those that qualify as exempt organizations under the Code and
the implementing Treasury regulations.  This Part discusses the usefulness of a wide
range of existing and proposed tax rules regulating the lobbying and electoral activities
of exempt organizations for furthering the four versions of civic health discussed in Part
II in light of the empirical findings explored in Part III. It also identifies tax law provisions
likely to further the goals of one perspective while simultaneously posing a threat to the
goals of one or more of the others.  I argue that legislative and regulatory tax rules are
best suited for supporting the cooperation and representative institutions perspectives,
6whereas the objectives of the community character perspective are the least amenable
to legislative or regulatory tax interventions. 
The Article raises the question whether, given the empirical evidence in our
possession, it is reasonable or useful for civic renewal advocates to continue to portray
associational life as an important potential source of increased public spiritedness or the
attributes necessary for reflective self-governance.  The alternative is for those who
emphasize the latter two aspects of civic health to recognize that certain substantive
civic values must be nurtured in areas outside of civic life rather than as its automatic or
likely outgrowth.  Although laws can sometimes assist and accelerate this process, the
potential for participation in associational life to further such values is extremely limited.
II.  PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIC HEALTH
The expression “civic life” can be used in several ways.  It can be defined
narrowly to refer to direct involvement in politics (such as voting, working for political
parties and committees, attending political rallies, and registering or leafleting voters)
and indirect involvement (such as reading newspapers or having discussions about
public issues).  In this sense, “civic life” can be equated with engagement in the political
process or political institutions, whether federal, state, or local.  Construed in this
fashion, “civic life” is distinct from “civil life,” which is commonly understood to include
group activity, whether of ad hoc or informal associations, on the one hand, or formal
and organized organizations, on the other.  In general, authorities exclude commercial
entities from the purview of civil society.5  In addition, some commentators consider the
                    
     5  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 22-23 (arguing that most
economic entities lack the personal loyalty, spirit of cooperation, or capacity for self-
7family as too private an association to be part of civil society.6  This exclusion, however,
is controversial, especially among those who are concerned about the moral dimension
of civic life.7
                                                                 
sacrifice associated with civil society).  For the opposite view, see FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995).
     6  See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Not a Cure-All, 15 BROOKINGS REV. 13, 14 (1997)
(stating that the family fits “rather clumsily” in the idea of civil society).
     7  For a review of the civil society literature that classifies the family as a voluntary
association and part of civil society, see Jean Cohen, Trust, Voluntary Association and
Workable Democracy: the Contemporary American Discourse of Civil Society, in
DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 208, 232-33 (Mark E. Warren ed. 1999).
The term “civic” can also be used more broadly to include both the political and
civil domains.  The following discussion will use civic in this generic sense.  The term
"civil" will be used in contradistinction to both political and economic, but it will include
family life.  The phrases "civic decline," "civic renewal," “civic engagement,” and “civic
disengagement” will thus be used with reference to the entire spectrum of moral, social,
cultural, civil, and political aspects of communal life, without differentiating among the
component parts.
A.  The Cooperation Perspective
8Several discussions of civic renewal converge in the view that many economic8
and social9 problems persist primarily due to the failure of individuals, groups, and
communities to engage in cooperative and effective collective action to solve them,
although the authors posit different foundational reasons for that failure.  Robert
Putnam, a champion of this view,10 attributes the failure to a decline in “social capital,”11
                    
     8  The primary economic ills discussed are poverty, child poverty, unemployment,
and underemployment.  Although poverty and child poverty appeared to be at historic
lows in the United States in 2000, there were still more than 30 million people, many of
them children, still living in poverty.  The downward trend was reversed in 2001.  See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
2001 (P60-219) (September 2002), available at
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty01/html> (last visited 6/1/03).  For the view
that the decline was overstated in the first place, see Robert Kuttner, The Boom in
Poverty, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1999, at E7 (arguing that homelessness and hunger
have increased and the real purchasing power of the poor was less in 1997 than in
1979 despite the improvement in poverty reported in the media).
     9  Social problems range from the high rates of divorce and crime to the persistence
of racial discrimination into the twentieth-first century.  Although the rate of crime,
including violent crime, improved in the 1990s, the absolute levels of crime are
excessive even after the decline: between 1960 and 1998, the total crime index
increased almost threefold and the violent crime rate increased 350%.  See U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Percent Changes in Total Crime Index
Rates and Violent Crime Rates, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE
301 (2002) (hereafter FBI SOURCEBOOK), available at 
<http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t3120.pdf>; Estimated Number and Rate
(Per 100,000 Inhabitants) of Offenses Known to Police, FBI SOURCEBOOK, at 275, 276,
available at  <http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t3109.pdf>.  Despite the
disappearance of legal obstacles to citizenship in the United States and the apparent
nationwide consensus about the fundamental equality of races, minorities continue to
experience discrimination daily, e.g., when they buy a home, purchase a car, drive a
car, or try to hail a cab.  For example, see Diana B. Henriques, Review of Nissan Car
Loans Finds that Blacks Pay More, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001; Taxi Discrimination, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1999.
     10  See Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 1, at 67, The Prosperous
Community: Social Capital and Public Life, 13 AM. PROSPECT 35, 35-37 (1993), Tuning
In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 28 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 664 , 664-5 (1995) (hereinafter Tuning In, Tuning Out).
9a term often used as a shorthand for a cluster of relationships among members of a
community that motivate how they behave toward and with one another, the
expectations they have of one another, and the range of feelings or bonds that account
for these relationships, behaviors, and expectations.12  Authors who believe in the
importance of social capital for civic health argue that it makes collective action both
more likely and more efficient because, in the presence of social capital, people
                                                                 
     11  The belief that social capital has declined is based largely on a comparison of
national survey findings in the 1960s or 1970s with those in the 1990s.  The
measurement of social capital was based upon the General Social Survey question:
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't
be too careful in dealing with people?"  Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 10,
at 681, note 2. But see Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn, Understanding the Decline
in Social Capital, 1952-1998, unpublished paper, May 9, 2001 (finding a minimal
decrease in some measures of volunteering during the last three decades of the
twentieth century, a slightly larger decrease in memberships in associations, and a large
decline in those who entertained at home or ate dinner as a family); Pamela Paxton, Is
Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator Assessment, 105 AM.
J. SOC. 88, 114-16 (1999) (hereinafter Is Social Capital Declining?) (arguing that social
capital can be disaggregated into interpersonal trust and associational activity, that trust
in specific institutions has declined but the general level of trust in institutions has not,
and that the level of associations remains unchanged).
     12  On the meanings of social capital, see Dietlind Stolle and Jane Lewis, Social
Capital–An Emerging Concept, in KEY CONCEPTS IN GENDER AND EUROPEAN SOCIAL
POLITICS 195 (B. Hobson J. Lewis, and B. Siim, eds., 2002); Kenneth Newton, Social
Capital and Democracy in Modern Europe, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN
DEMOCRACY 3, 3-8 (Jan W. van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Kenneth Newton and Paul F.
Whiteley eds., 1999) (hereinafter Social Capital and Democracy); Paxton, Is Social
Capital Declining?, supra note 11, 12, at 90-97; Andrew Greeley, Coleman Revisited:
Religious Structures as a Source of Social Capital, 40 AM. BEH. SCI. 587, 587-90 and
sources cited (1997); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 300-21
(1990); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 138 (1961) (stating
that continuity in a neighborhood's networks is necessary because the "networks are a
city's irreplaceable social capital").  For a critique of the use of the term by Putnam and
certain other authors, see Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, Editors’ Introduction:
Escape from Politics?  Social Theory and the Social Capital Debate, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCI.
550, 550-54 (1997).  
10
cooperate with one another based upon trust rather than the threat of legal or other
formal sanctions.13  The lack of social capital, in contrast, results in collective action and
free rider problems and, relatedly, to excessive reliance on government and public
entities to solve community problems.14  Taken together, this complex of conditions is to
a large degree responsible for the persistence of economic and social ills.
                    
     13  See, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, The Role of Trust in Civic Renewal, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 209-10.
     14  See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at [288]; Edward L. Glaeser, The
Formation of Social Capital, in THE CONTRIBUTION OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL TO
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WELL-BEING 381, 383 (2001).  See also James S.
Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. (Supplement)
S95, S118 (1988) (arguing that because social capital is itself a public good, subject to
free rider problems, it typically emerges as a “by-product of other activities”).
11
Some civic renewal advocates attribute an important part of the fragility and
ineffectiveness of civic life in America today to the fact that large numbers of people do
not participate in decisions that determine the conditions of their everyday lives, relying
instead upon government officials, government institutions and government funded
institutions, and other outsiders to provide for their well being.  They trace this situation
primarily to the expansion of the welfare state in the second half of the twentieth
century.  Not only has the welfare state, according to these authors, failed in its stated 
goal of wiping out poverty and its consequences such as hunger, bad or non-existent
healthcare, inferior education, and substandard housing.15  More insidiously, these
critics argue, it has altered the behavior and attitudes of welfare recipients in ways that
reinforce a cycle of poverty, e.g., by creating expectations of entitlements and providing
incentives for economic dependency and political passivity.16
                    
     15  See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 135
(1984).
     16  See Michael J. Horowitz, Law and the Welfare State, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE:
FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY 67, 68-71  (Peter Berger & Richard J. Neuhaus eds., 2d
edition 1996) (hereinafter TO EMPOWER PEOPLE); MURRAY, LOSING GROUND, supra note
12
                                                                 
15, at 178-91.  Some critics have also argued that welfare benefits encouraged the
increase in unwed mothers and fatherless homes.  Given the statistical predictions of
impoverished life chances for children raised in single parent homes (all other things
being equal), this ripple effect of welfare benefits, if true, would be among the  most
destructive consequences of the welfare state because of its intergenerational
consequences.  For the contrary view, namely that welfare benefits have not been
shown to encourage illegitimacy, see Charles Murray, Does Welfare Bring More
Babies?, 94  PUB. INT. 17 (1994).
13
Civic decline has also been traced to what some civic renewal advocates refer to
as the “therapeutic state.”  As it is used in the civic renewal literature,17 the term refers
to the proliferation of therapeutic professionals and the increasing tendency to explain
or justify behavior in psychological terms.18  Critics believe that these developments
have contributed to a “culture of narcissim and self-indulgence19 and that the medical
metaphor which provides the conceptual foundation for the legitimacy of the therapeutic
state undermines people’s sense of responsibility for their actions and even for their
situation in life.20  When used properly, therapeutic interventions and attitudes have the
potential to motivate people to take control of and assume responsibility for their own
behaviors.  When therapeutic insights are misused, however, the result may be to
                    
     17 The phrase was initially coined in response to the growing practice of the medical
and other professions to characterize socially undesirable or illegal behaviors as
products of mental illnesses with organic (brain) causes.  See THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE
THERAPEUTIC STATE: PSYCHIATRY IN THE MIRROR OF CURRENT EVENTS (1984).  For Szasz,
this tendency arose, in part, to lessen the severity of criminal sanctions for such
behaviors and “to expand the scope of noncriminal social controls (to compensate for
the inadequacy of criminal sanctions as a means of controlling distressing conduct,
such as depression).”  See Thomas Szasz, Myth of Mental Illness, 2 ENC. OF MENTAL
HEALTH 743. 745 (1998).
     18  See Michael S. Joyce, On Self-Government, 90 POL’Y REV. 41, 44 (1998).
     19  See JAMES L. NOLAN, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT AT
CENTURY’S END 1-21 (1998); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM
REVISITED (1990).
     20  These critics single out members of the therapeutic professions who encourage
their clients to see their situations or problems as caused by illegitimate familial,
institutional, or moral authorities See NOLAN, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE, supra note 19, at
2-4; see also id. at 15-17; William A. Schambra, By the People 69 POL’Y REV. 32 (1994)
(deploring the assumption. that people are “helpless, pathetic victims of social forces
that are beyond their understanding or control”).
14
deprive people of a moral compass or erode their sense of personal responsibility for
their actions or the quality of their lives.21 
                    
     21  See Derek L. Phillips, Authenticity or Morality?, in THE VIRTUES: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS ON MORAL CHARACTER 23 (Robert B. Kruschwitz & Robert C. Roberts, eds.,
1987). In addition, when superficial versions of therapeutic concepts and strategies
come to permeate popular culture, as they do in many parts of the U.S. today, the
potential for their misuse is magnified because such concepts derives from and
perpetrate a questionable theory of human identity.
15
Contemporary lack of civic engagement has also been linked by some civic
renewal theorists to the excessive regard it is commonplace to have for the opinions of
experts, even in situations where the judgments of citizens are more useful.  Deference
to experts dates to the Progressive era,22 when the judgements of experts who were
informed by the sciences, especially the social sciences, came to be valued over
judgments grounded in experience and common sense.23   At the same time, the
Progressives entertained the hope that experts would govern in the national interest, in
contrast to ordinary citizens, the latter being too uninformed, disorganized, or selfish to
govern properly or too timid to counter the influence and  self-serving interests of others,
particularly powerful corporations.24  The theoretical ground for these developments has
been attributed to contemporary expansion of rights doctrines,25 the preference for
                    
     22  For the ideas expressed in this and the next paragraph, see Michael S. Joyce &
William A. Schambra, A New Civic Life, in TO EMPOWER PEOPLE 11, 15-18 (Peter Berger
& Richard J. Neuhaus eds., 1996). 15-18; William A. Schambra, Progressive Liberalism
and the National ‘Community’, 80 PUB. INT. 31, 36 (1985); William A. Schambra, By the
People, supra note 20.  See also THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
AMERICA 35 (1978).  For a concise description of the ascendancy of rule by experts as a
public policy ideal and as a political reality, see SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN, supra
note 1, at 211-19; see also id. at 219-23 (describing the efforts made during the period
between the two world wars to preserve face-to-face communities).
     23  See Joyce & Schambra, A New Civic Life, supra note 22, at 20.
     24  See Joyce & Schambra, A New Civic Life, supra note 22, at 11, 14, 16-17; see
also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900-1915, 11, 14 (1963). The
national government was also expected to facilitate social justice, for example, by
redistributing national wealth and income through a progressive tax system. 
     25  See, e.g., FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY, supra note 5,  at 314-16 (arguing that American’s uncompromising “rights-
based individualism” and “rights” culture” are greater threats to a healthy civil society
that is the welfare state); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 5 (1991) (asserting that the entrenchment of
16
solutions involving centralized, big government,26 and the ascendency of the idea of a
national community that vies with local communities for citizens’ loyalty.27
                                                                 
rights doctrine in America is one reason for the weakening of  local government, political
parties, and political participation since World War II).
     26  See MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL
SOCIETY (1996); David Frum, DEAD RIGHT (1994).
     27  See William A. Schambra, Is There Civic Life Beyond the Great National
Community?, in   CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, infra note 177; Joyce, On
Self-Government, supra note 18, at 43 (quoting Herbert Croly's call for a genuine
national community); Schambra, Progressive Liberalism and the National Community,
supra note 22, at 33-34 (arguing that the idea of a national community also inspired the
presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy and reached its heyday with
the programs proposed by Lyndon Johnson).  By “national community,” these two
authors do not mean simply the existence of a strong national government.  Rather,
they are referring to the idea popularized by Progressives at the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth century in America of a community at the national level
that mirrors--and rivals-- small, local communities in demanding citizens' sense of
belonging, loyalty, and sacrifice.
17
Whatever their view of the cause, many civic renewal advocates concerned with
civic apathy believe that increases in people’s participation in voluntary associations will
be useful, even critical, to counter the collective action problems America currently
faces.28  Viewed from this perspective, civic participation is sought instrumentally, for
the sake of enabling private parties to work together to improve living conditions in their
neighborhoods, cities, regions, and states.29
Cooperation perspective authors have been at pains to explain how voluntary
associations impact collective action problems.  Putnam’s account of the manner in
which participation in voluntary associations contributes to the genesis of cooperation
and well-being is instructive.
                    
     28  See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, infra note 190, AT 140-41, 148-49,
BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at XXX.
     29  Not all analysts concerned with the impoverishment of civic life agree that the
federal government and its policies are the primary cause of civic decline or that civic
decline can be reversed by eliminating big government. See Don E. Eberly, Building the
Habitat of Character, in CONTENT OF AMERICA'S CHARACTER: RECOVERING CIVIC VIRTUE 41
(Don E. Eberly ed., 1995); EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 66-67; John
Dilulio, The Lord's Work: The Church and Civil Society, in COMMUNITY WORKS: THE
REVIVAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 50, 52, 55, 56 (E.J. Dionne Jr., ed. 1998) (accord,
and citing Lester M. Salaman, Sen. Dan Coats, and William Bennett, who argue that
government and non-government sectors must work together).
18
[S]ocial capital undergirds good government and economic progress[.] 
First, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized
reciprocity: I'll do this for you now, in the expectation that down the road
you or someone else will return the favor.  “Social capital” is akin to
what Tom Wolfe called the "favor bank" in his book The Bonfire of the
Vanities, notes economist Robert Frank.30
For Putnam, then, participation in groups produces norms disposing people to repeated
acts of working with others toward their mutual or respective goals.  The bonds thus
created and the networks of active citizens thus formed together comprise a collective
resource–social capital.     
         Putnam’s account also makes clear that the conditions of civic health are grounded
in  personal or mutual benefit, and to a community benefit insofar as it furthers personal
or mutual benefit.31  An association member’s expectation of a future benefit underlies the
habit of cooperation ultimately formed, and it supplies the psychological basis for the
habit to endure.  The end result is a society characterized by generalized reciprocity or
interpersonal trust, in which people associate their private interests with the private
                    
     30  Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Growth, supra
note 10, at 37, Putnam, The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Economic
Growth, 356 CURRENT 4, 5 (1993).  See also COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY
306-08 (1990) (describing reciprocity in terms of “credit slips” created by helping others
and assumed to entitle the bearer to assistance in the future).  In BOWLING ALONE,
Putnam repeats most of the passage quoted from two of his earlier works, but he omits
the adjective “generalized” and the phrase “down the road.”  This may mean that by
2000, he had come to believe that the dynamic described in the quotation accounts only
for the specific form of reciprocity that anticipates a benefit in the short-term.
     31  Putnam’s earlier work emphasizes the importance of economic prosperity and
governmental integrity as the primary goals of civil society.  See Putnam, The
Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Economic Growth, supra note 30, The
Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Growth, supra note 10, and note 190.
 In BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, Putnam discusses a broader range of individual and
social goals, such as physical and mental health and stable families.
19
interests of others and with the interest of the community in cooperation among the
various groups and individuals.
The portrait of civic life suggested by the passage from Thomas Wolfe may at first
seem a somewhat crass formulation of the golden rule.  At one level, there is an
overarching sense of quid pro quo.  Civil society theorist Robert Wuthnow, however,
argues that the reciprocity-based sense of community common at earlier times in
America’s history was in fact superior to notions of sacrifice advanced by some today
because it gave rise to a deep and natural sense of caring and comraderie.32  According to
Wuthnow, people’s willingness formerly to take time off from work to help a neighbor,
attend weddings and funerals, and in general participate in small-town life was not only
better because it was natural; it also had the effect of “restrain[ing] individual greed and
ambition.”33  He argues that because caring was mutually beneficial, it was neither egoistic
nor altruistic.  In contrast, community activities and volunteering today have acquired a
moral symbolism that, in Wuthnow’s view, arose because of, and makes sense only
against the backdrop of, a materialistic and individualistic baseline.34   Thus, he argues
that the generalized reciprocity of former times promoted a stronger, purer sense of
                    
     32  Robert Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, 31 VA. SOC. SCI. J. 1 (1996).
     33  Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 1-2.
     34  See Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 2, 4-5, 7.  In former
times, caring was normal, something people did naturally; now, it is “intentional,
deliberate, a matter of choice.”  Id. at 4.  According to Wuthnow, “serving the community
through volunteer work takes on added significance today because work itself is
generally regarded as a place where caring is absent.”  Id. At 7.
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community than do community activities today, which are tainted by their origins in a
sense of emotional neediness and guilt.35
                    
     35  See Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 7-8.
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If Wuthnow is correct,36 the reflexive sense of cooperation that Putnam applauds
would be desirable because of its impact on people’s character as well as for its economic
and social consequences. As a conceptional matter, however, Wuthnow’s conclusion is
problematic because, to reach it, Wuthnow equates “self-interest rightly understood”37 with
“caring for others...[which is] valued just for its own sake.”38  However, the concept of self-
interest rightly understood, like the concept of reciprocity, does not imply the desire to do
something for its own sake, i.e., because it is the right thing to do.  Wuthnow appears to
base his equation of the two concepts on the  naturalness or spontaneity of old-style
                    
     36  Some aspects of Wuthnow’s discussion raise questions.  First, he frequently cites
June Cleaver and at-home housewives in his anecdotes about people who used to be
available to take care of neighbors’ children, help the sick, and have personal
knowledge of goings-on in the neighborhood (although he also mentions working
activists and people who stay home from work to help others).  See Wuthnow,
Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 1-4.  Cf. William Galston, Won't You Be
My Neighbor, 26 AM. PROSPECT 16, 18 (1996) (observing that "I cannot help thinking
that, as a matter of history, the term "social capital" refers in significant measure to the
uncompensated work of women outside the domains of both home and market." 
Second, Wuthnow states that most people today “vehemently deny that guilt has
anything to do with their community service activities.”  Wuthnow, Rediscovering
Community, supra note 32, at 8.  This statement seems to be contrary to the facts as I
know them.  Above all, Wuthnow’s argument depends upon a preference for what is
natural (understood as spontaneity) over what is chosen as the basis for behavior. See
id. at 4. This is an important philosophical perspective; yet its superiority to philosophic
perspectives ranking virtues that are chosen as superior to those that are natural is not
self-evident.  Without some justification (which Wuthnow does not provide), this part of
his argument for a reciprocity-based sense of community is weak.
     37  Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 1.  The phrase originated
with the French political and social theorist, Alexis de Tocqueville.  See ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 500-03 (tr. & ed. Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop 2000).
     38  Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 5.  Fukuyama, in contrast,
argues that as a practical matter enlightened self-interest, which can be an important
source of association, is not as effective a basis of association as mutual trust and
shared ethical values.  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
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caring and community participation,39 as contrasted with much new-style charitable and
volunteer activity that, in his view, is calculated to counter our emotional voids or driven by
guilt.  Even if his assessment of the origin of contemporary volunteering is accurate, he
may be wrong about the past.  At least for some theorists, a habit of helping that originates
in self-interest would fall short of the ethic of caring Wuthnow seems to attribute to it.40
                                                                   
PROSPERITY, supra note 5, at 26-27.
     39  Wuthnow, Rediscovering Community, supra note 32, at 2 (normal, natural), 6
(basic to our nature).
     40  A habit ultimately based upon notions of reciprocity, in other words, is not the
same thing as a habit based upon beliefs about what is right for its own sake (or
because of a divine command).  Actions based upon both appear to be sought for their
own sake; only in the latter case, however, is the origin of the habit also a belief about
the intrinsic rightness of actions of a certain kind.  Wuthnow seems to acknowledge this
point elsewhere, in discussing the etiology of trust, when he says that “trust is not simply
a matter of making rational calculations about the possibility of benefitting by
cooperating with someone else.” Robert Wuthnow, The Foundations of Trust, 18 PHIL. &
PUB. POL’Y 3, 7 (1998) (contrasting trust based upon calculation with trust based upon a
moral belief in the intrinsic goodness of trust).
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A third cooperation theorist, Francis Fukuyama, also views an active civic life as a
means to achieve an end that is not fundamentally civic in nature.  His emphasis on
interpersonal trust as a condition of civic health is derived almost exclusively from his
insight that trust is necessary to achieve economic efficiency first and foremost because
economic markets that must police compliance is less efficient than those in which
cooperation is a product of shared values or norms.41  Fukuyama arrived at his
understanding of the integral relation between trust and prosperity empirically.  Using
comparative statistics from several countries, he found a positive correlation between
economic and social development, on the one hand, and a country’s traditions of trust and
cooperation, on the other, based upon.42  As a consequence, he argues that strong civic
traditions of interpersonal trust and cooperation are essential for reducing transaction
costs and increasing economic efficiency and prosperity.43  In Fukuyama’s view,
Americans today risk losing their economic prosperity because of certain intellectual trends
                    
     41  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY,
supra note 5, at 27.  He includes among these social norms such things as the work
ethic and communal activism.  Similarly, a culture in which litigation, rather than
negotiation, is viewed as the best way to resolve disputes among parties to a
transaction will, in the long run, be less prosperous since litigation is a less efficient
vehicle for arriving at solutions to such disputes than is negotiation, especially
negotiation based upon attitudes of cooperation and trust.  See id. at 151, 310-11. 
Further, a litigious culture will itself generate a higher level of distrust among citizens. 
Id. at 51.
     42  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY,
supra note 5 (arguing that the prosperity in the United States, Germany, and Japan is a
consequence of the three countries’ strong civic traditions as compared with the less
prosperous economies of China, France, and Italy, which have less robust civic
traditions).
     43  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY,
supra note 5, at 27.
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and cultural developments that have lessened people’s spontaneous feelings of trust for
one another.44
                    
     44  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY,
supra note 5, at 51, and supra note 25.   Fukuyama uses the phrase “spontaneous
sociability,” a generalized form of trust, to describe people’s willingness “to form new
associations and to cooperate within the terms of reference they establish.”  Id. at 27.
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The cooperation perspective authors concentrate on two aspects of human
character, namely, the capacity for trust and the desire for comfort, and on a structural
aspect of civil society, namely, the possibility of coordinated and effective collective
arrangements.  They appear to assume that cooperation and collective action will tend to
produce good outcomes, especially in the areas of greatest concern to them.45  An active
civil society is thus sought primarily as a condition of and means to these private
outcomes, the latter of which have intrinsic value.
                    
     45  Nonetheless they do acknowledge that there may on occasion be voluntary
associations dedicated to violence or other harmful purposes that make use of the
cooperative and collective
effects of participation in voluntary associations to achieve their purposes.  See infra
notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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The assumption of cooperation theorists that interpersonal trust within an
association will lead to interpersonal trust among members of different groups within a
larger community (“generalized interpersonal trust” or “community-wide social capital”46)
has generated much commentary and criticism.  In addition to challenges based upon
empirical data,47 some authors have pointed to the failure of cooperation theorists to
explain, or to explain convincingly, the genesis of interpersonal trust that transcends the
boundaries of a particular group.48  According to one commentator, interpersonal trust “is
by definition specific and contextual,” and is qualitatively different from the “impersonal
phenomenon” that Putnam, for example, labels “generalized trust.”49   In his later writings,
Putnam attempts to address this issue by distinguishing between “bonding” groups, which
can achieve their objectives without interacting with outsiders, and “bridging” groups,
which facilitate the formation of interpersonal trust across group lines because they seek a
goal that is unattainable without the help of outsiders.50  Not a few commentators have
described Putnam’s “bonding” groups less charitably than he does, noting that they can
                    
     46  The term “community” can be ambiguous, since a single group constitutes a
community in one sense.  As used in the following discussion, “community” will refer to
relatively large aggregates of groups having potentially different interests, such as a
ward, precinct, town, county, state, region, or nation.  Communities are not necessarily
based upon geography.  See BENDER, COMMUNITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 22,
at 7, 10, 144-145.
     47  See infra Part III.C.
     48  Cohen, Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy, supra note 7, at
219-223 and sources cited.
     49  Cohen, Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy, supra note 7, at
221.
     50  See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 22-24, 134-44.
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“foster invidious stereotypes” and engage in “subordination” of outsiders.51  Such critics
point out that a significant number of traditional associations were exclusionary and at
times created bonds among their members in part by encouraging hostility toward outsider
groups such as women or blacks or everyone who was not Irish (or Italian, or Jewish, or
Armenian).  There is thus the possibility that membership in the type of small voluntary
associations usually seen as fertile grounds for the growth of social capital and trust could
well have the opposite effect, i.e., it could reduce the level of trust toward people outside
the group at the same time that it increases the trust among members of the group.52 
Other authors have recognized a distinction similar to that of Putnam’s bridging and
bonding groups and, like him, they fail to explore the relationship between the two forms of
social bonds arguably in tension with each other.53
                    
     51  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 106,
106 (1986) (Symposium: Freedom of Association) and infra note 52.
     52  See Margaret Levi, Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert
Putnam's “Making Democracy” Work, 24 POL. & SOC’Y 45, 476-48 (1996).  See also
Peter Y. Hong, Bowling Alley Tour Refutes Theory of Social Decline, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1996, at A1; Robert W. Jackman & Ross A. Miller, Social Capital and Politics, 1
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 47 (1998) (noting that there are “thriving” voluntary associations in
ethnically divided societies engaged in activities that are not socially desirable); Rhode,
Association and Assimilation, supra note 51, at 108 (discussing all-male associations
and their deleterious effects, such as discrimination, fostering social stereotypes, and
denying individual women opportunities that go with membership; early all female
organizations some of which challenged while others reinforced women's traditional
roles); Alejandro Portes & Patricia Landolt, The Downside of Social Capital, 26 AM.
PROSPECT 18, [19] (1996) ("The same strong ties that help members of a group often
enable it to exclude outsiders."); MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986) (noting
that cooperation and solidarity within a group imply rejection and mistrust of outsiders)
(cited in Clark, Shifting Engagements, infra note 109, at 13).
     53  For example, Dietlind Stolle and Thomas Rochon acknowledge a distinction
between “private social capital” and “public social capital.”  They describe private social
capital as the “capacity for collective action, cooperation, and trust within the group,
enabling the collective purposes of the group to be achieved more easily.”  Public social
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A question thus remains whether participation in voluntary associations in fact
produces any norms of community-wide social capital or generalized interpersonal trust
with regard to people outside the group.54  If they do not, participation in traditional
voluntary associations would not necessarily turn members’ hearts and minds outward
toward collective action with other groups much less toward public welfare, and it might
even reinforce conflicts that inhibit cooperation among heterogeneous groups.  This
possibility, coupled with the other difficulties discussed in this section, constitute serious
practical impediments to constructing coherent public policies that will invigorate and
elevate the level of civil society.
                                                                   
capital, in contrast, facilitates such things as tolerance and working toward community
based goals.  See Dietlind Stolle & Thomas R. Rochon, Are All Associations Alike? 
Member Diversity, Associational Type, and the Creation of Social Capital, 42 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 47, 48-50 (1998) (hereinafter Stolle & Rochon, Are All Associations Alike?).
 These two authors do not assert a causal (or other) relationship between the two forms
of social capital. 
     54  This question is examined infra Part III.C.
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Political theorist Nancy Rosenblum attacks the assumptions of cooperation theorists
from a different direction.  Unlike other commentators who have observed that
participation in voluntary associations could promote social bonds and cooperation among
criminals and malcontents,55 Rosenblum argues that, unless a group engages in illegal
activities, the psychological benefits to members of secret societies and some paramilitary
groups may have a positive societal effect by reducing the members’ most extreme
tendencies.56  She maintains more broadly that even exclusionary groups, such as
homeowners’ associations, are desirable, although the cooperation they foster does not
coincide with the interests of the larger communities in which they reside, because all
groups engaged in lawful activities contribute to the “moral uses of pluralism.”57
             Sociologists Michael Foley and Bob Edwards criticize the social capital/effective
collective action thesis from another perspective. They argue that the “cooperation
theorists” have a tendency to “suppress the conflictive character of civil society, seeking in
society and its inner
workings the resolution of conflicts that politics and the political system, according to other
understandings, are charged with settling or suppressing.”58  This challenge amounts to a
frontal attack on one of the most basic principles of the first perspective in the civil society
                    
     55  See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS 21, 30 (1998).
     56  See ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 55, at 273-75.
     57  See Nancy Rosenblum, The Moral Uses of Pluralism, in CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note
1, at 255; see also Peter Swords, Pluralism As A Public Good (paper on file with the
author).
     58  Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, Escape from Politics? Social Theory and the
Social Capital Debate, 40 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 550, 551 (1997), The Paradox of Civil
Society, 7 J. DEMOC. 38 (1996).
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debate, namely, that the proper forum for airing and settling what are essentially public
disputes should be outside the boundaries of legal and formal political institutions.  So
conceived, the disagreement is profoundly theoretical.  Curiously, however, it calls to mind
a practical shift in attitude voiced by increasing numbers of teenagers and young adults,
namely, that for them formal political structures have become less and less relevant to
democratic input and resolution of community problems than are local, community-based
institutions, charities, and informal local initiatives and events.59
                    
     59  See, e.g., LAKE SNELL PERRY & ASSOCIATES, THE TARRANCE GROUP, INC., SHORT-
TERM IMPACTS, LONG-TERM OPPORTUNITIES: THE POLITICAL AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT OF
YOUNG ADULTS IN AMERICA 41 (2002) (noting that young adults tend to see political
activism and community activism as separate categories and to prefer the latter).
B. The Self-Governance Perspective
31
A second perspective animating portions of the civil society literature emphasizes a
different aspect of collective action undertaken through voluntary associations.  Civic
health is depicted by this perspective as the aggregate conditions that make possible or
encourage self-governance, freedom, and autonomy.  According to this view, people
engage in self-governance when they have control over their own lives by taking part in
decisions that will affect how they live.  The emphasis is on taking part in the decisions, as
contrasted with merely participating in a group’s efforts to implement goals assumed by
the group to be desirable.  This perspective also posits that the process of reaching
decisions should be deliberative, as well as participatory, in the sense that “a wide range
of competing arguments is given careful consideration in small-group, face-to-face
discussion.60
                    
     60 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
34 (1995) (hereinafter VOICE OF THE PEOPLE).
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Self-governance can, however, admit of a variety of meanings, ranging from the
idea of negative freedom, or freedom from external interference or constraints,61 to the
idea of positive freedom, or freedom to pursue an affirmative goal such as self-fulfillment
or self-realization.62  Self-governance can be understood from an individualistic or
collective perspective, and it can be seen as intrinsically worthwhile or as desirable
instrumentally, i.e., for the opportunities or results they make possible.63  For civil society
authors negative freedom is not the solution to society’s problems.  Rather, they argue that
self-governance entails personal self-mastery and civic responsibility.64  As a
consequence, “[d]ecentralization alone will not automatically lead to a revival of civic
virtue; it is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition thereof.”65   If autonomy over one’s
life without more were sought, the result could  be to legitimate and reinforce the push
toward atomism, privacy, and separation–which prevent or tear down social and
communal bonds.66
The civil society authors who celebrate autonomy and self-governance look to a
robust civil society to provide occasions for people to join together to deliberate about local
or community affairs.  Thus, they emphasize the importance of local governing boards,
                    
     61  As long as it is consistent with the same freedom for others.
     62  See Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM
175, 176-77 (Alan Ryan ed., 1979).
     63  See Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, supra note 62, at 176.
     64  See Joyce, On Self-Government, supra note 18, at 46-47; see also EBERLY,
AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 13, 135, 164-65.
     65  Joyce, On Self-Government, supra note 18, at 47.
     66  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 140, 154.
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town hall meetings, and neighborhood associations for developing an active citizenry.67 
Purely private voluntary organizations are also considered essential because they provide
opportunities for people to learn the skills needed in decision-making contexts in general.68
                    
     67  See Joyce & Schambra, A New Civic Life, supra note 22, at 20.  The authors
mention "small groups, family, neighborhood, church, and ethnic and voluntary
associations" as components of the type of "face-to-face, participatory community" that
citizens need.
     68  See infra notes 174, 178, 264, 178, 264-179 (describing the types of skills learned
by participating in voluntary organizations).
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This understanding of civic health is espoused by civic renewal advocates who are
politically conservative as well as those that are politically liberal.  The politically
conservative disparage the welfare state, the idea of a national community, and central
government micro-managing local affairs”69 because they promote institutional and legal
barriers to individuals taking part in public decisions affecting their lives.  Self-governance
is also valued by critics of therapists and the therapeutic orientation of our legal,
educational, and popular cultures on the grounds that these promote psychological or
internal barriers that may discourage people from taking an active part in the control of
their lives.70
The emphasis on informed deliberation and civic responsibility as essential
components of autonomy is characteristic of conservative social theorists, such as Michael
Joyce, William Schambra, and Don Eberly.  Their belief that individuals cannot be
autonomous unless they recognize and aspire to certain moral standards71 strikes some
thinkers as repressive and antithetical to the very idea of freedom.72  Yet theorists who
advance views to the left of center politically have also rejected the identification of
autonomy with freedom from interference, arguing that the idea of  purely negative
freedom is inherently incoherent73 and that a liberal state devoid of affirmative purposes is
neither possible nor desirable.74
                    
     69  See supra pp. 9-12.
     70  See Joyce, Self-Government, supra note 18, at 45.
     71  See Joyce, On Self-Government, supra note 18, at 46-48.
     72  See Morone, The Corrosive Politics of Virtue, supra note 1.
     73  See Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, supra note 62, at 179, 181-87,
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191-93 (arguing that the idea of negative freedom itself presupposes valuations about
purpose).
     74  See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN
THE LIBERAL STATE 81-82 (1991); Russell Hittinger, Varieties of Minimalist Natural Law
Theory, 34 AM. J. JURISP. 133, 149-52, 163-167 (1989).
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The centrality of self-governance for some civil society theorists is consistent with
their centrality for certain liberal political and legal theorists.75  For example, James
Fleming has argued that “deliberative autonomy”–which he equates with “citizens...
apply[ing] their capacity for a conception of the good to deliberating about and deciding
how to live their own lives”–is one of the “bedrock structures” of the American
constitution.76  And most commentators agree that the classical doctrine of contract in
American law is premised upon the autonomy of the individual and his right to obligate
himself to others, or obligate others to himself, when the parties to the contract consent.77 
The perspective embodied by the strand of the civil society literature that focuses on
autonomy and self-governance is thus consistent with and compliments an important
aspect of American jurisprudence.
                    
     75  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 72 (1859; 1985) (asserting that “[t]he only
freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain
it”).
     76  See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1995).
     77  See Chad McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV.
719, 729-30 and sources cited (1999).
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Many civil society authors have concluded that private groups, such as voluntary
associations, are well suited to the development of publicly responsible and deliberative
policies and agendas because they are located somewhere between purely public and
purely private objectives.  In a public, yet non-political sphere, people can come together
and debate contested issues in an open and collective forum without the pressure, felt by
official political officials, to reach a final decision capable of attracting a legislative majority.
 As a consequence, voluntary associations are more likely than formal political institutions
to be the locus of frank and deliberative discussions and to govern through compromise
and consent.78
In addition, their role of providing a forum for collective decision making outside
formal political institutions enables associations (through their members) to act as a check
upon actions contemplated or taken by formal political institutions and actors.  In
particular, because of the skills, confidence, and other resources their active members
acquire, voluntary associations have the potential to empower their members to make
salutary demands on decision makers, such as requiring them to justify their decisions
publicly and in terms acceptable to diverse groups.79  Finally, it has been argued that the
need for officials to convey explicit and public justifications of their actions has a tendency
to induce them to articulate their actions in terms of public purposes.  Even in situations
                    
     78  See Jean Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND
CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 1, at 55, 71 (arguing that deliberation plays a greater role in
the “civil public” than in the “political public”).
     79  See Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, supra note 78, at 74.
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where this public articulation is largely rhetorical, it may still have what one commentator
calls the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”80
                    
     80  See Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, supra note 78, at 74 (quoting Jon Elster,
Arguing and Bargaining over the Senate at the Federalist Convention, in EXPLAINING
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 16 (Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds., 1995)).
 When civic health is understood as revolving around the conditions for self-
governance of citizens, two courses of action are appropriate.  First, it is necessary to
maximize the situations in which citizens act as lawmakers, i.e., there should be a
presumption that members of a community should make the decisions that impact their
community whenever possible.  Relatedly, citizens need to deliberate in an informed and
careful way as part of the local decision making process.  Second, private and public
measures should be adopted to encourage individuals to join voluntary associations,
where they will learn or reinforce attitudes and skills necessary for the active exercise of
self-government.
In sum, this perspective advocates civic engagement so that citizens will be
equipped to enjoy freedom through self-governance.  The focus of this perspective is on
informed and responsible  participation in decision making in addition to the goal of
coordinated and effective collective action–the hallmark of the first perspective.  As a
result, the self-governance perspective differs from the first by conceiving of civic
engagement as both the means to and an ingredient of civic health.  The cooperation
perspective sees civic life as predominantly instrumental, whereas the self-governance
perspective values civic engagement both instrumentally and as an intrinsic good.  Finally,
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the cooperation perspective is consistent with either an interest-group or a more
deliberative model of political life, whereas according to the self-governance perspective,
part of the essence of civic activity is its potential to transform individuals into thoughtful
decision makers who, in the best case, will be the architects of their own freedom.
C. The Representative Institutions Perspective
A third perspective on civic health centers on the goal of strengthening
representative institutions and democratic practices and values.  At a minimum, the
democratic idea of political equality entails the right on the part of all adult citizens to
participate in making decisions likely to affect their lives in a material way, the right to
equality of representation, or some combination of these two.  Advocates of civic renewal
writing from this perspective emphasize the extent to which and the ways in which
political equality so understood is currently lacking in the United States and is unlikely to
be achieved through minor adjustments to existing political arrangements.  All the data
show that there are large disparities in political participation that track people’s
socioeconomic status.81  Although voting is currently the least unequal form of political
participation, voting rates also tend to reflect socioeconomic differences.82  The disparity
between the participation rates of the more and less affluent is even greater with forms of
                    
     81  See infra notes 82-85.
     82  See the sources cited in Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman
Schlozman, Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation, 89 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 271, 271 n.4 (1995); see also SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, & HENRY E.
BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 1,189-90 (1995)
(hereinafter VOICE AND EQUALITY) (citing statistics showing that those who earned
$15,000 or less in 1988 were roughly 3/5 as likely to vote as those earning $75,000 or
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political participation other than voting than with voting.83  Considering that constituent
influence is an important factor affecting the agendas set by public officials, the
asymmetry in participation rates creates the danger that decision makers will be more
concerned with taking actions responsive to the views of those who participate most.84 
This danger matters for the possibility of representative institutions because there is
evidence that different socioeconomic groups voice different concerns: those at the
lowest part of the socioeconomic spectrum “are more than twice as likely . . . to discuss
concerns about basic human needs such as poverty,  jobs, housing, and health,”
whereas those at the high end are more likely to be “inspired by economic issues such as
taxes, government spending, or the budget, or by social issues such as adoption or
pornography.”85 
                                                                  
more).
     83  This is partially due to the circumstance that contemporary political campaigns
increasingly seek contributions of money rather than time.  See Louis J. Ayala, Trained
for Democracy: the Differing Effects of Voluntary and Involuntary Organizations on
Political Participation, 53 POL. RES. Q. 99, 101 (2000); Sidney Verba, Schlozman, &
Brady, The Big Tilt: Participatory Inequality in America, 32 AMER. PROSPECT 74, 75
(1997); Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (1997) (noting that public financing could eliminate this
source of inequality).
     84  This is the case even assuming decision makers act for a variety of motives,
including the public interest (as they understand it).
     85  Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, The Big Tilt, supra note 83, at 78; see also VERBA,
SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 247-51, 263-64; Lijphart,
Unequal Participation, supra note 83, at 4-5.  But see Michael M. Gant and William
Lyons, Democratic Theory, Nonvoting, and Public Policy, 40 AM. POL. Q. 21 (1993)
(arguing that, at least at the level of electing Presidents, research suggests that the
views those who are eligible to vote but stay home mirror the views of those who in fact
vote); RUY A. TEIXEIRA, THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 100 (1992); RAYMOND
WOLFINGER & STEVEN ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980) (finding no significant
difference between the candidates favored by voters and nonvoters).  Arend Lijphart,
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Thus, low levels of political participation can contribute to as well as reflect civic
decline by skewing public policies toward the interests of those classes with high turnout
and participation rates.  In addition, asymmetries in representation violate one of the
basic axioms of democratic theory, which presupposes the equal worth of every citizen,
namely, that “[t]he needs and preferences of no individual should rank higher than those
of any other.”86  According to this perspective on civic health, therefore, persistent
political inequalities undermine the moral legitimacy of democracy in America.87
                                                                  
who agrees with the point of view expressed in the text, specifically challenges several
aspects of Teixeira’s analysis.  Lijphart, Unequal Participation, supra note 83, at 4.
     86  See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 10. 
     87  See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 10-15. 
See also Samuel Issacharoff, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political
Process, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1588-89 (1999) (concluding that the consequence of
“wealth driven political inequality” is a “democratic process that is formally equal in
theory, but dramatically unequal in practice”).
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Representative institutions are also problematic to the extent that democratic
political processes aim at reflecting the will of the people.  Although voting for candidates
for public office is typically the primary mechanism for transmitting the will of the people in
a representative system, it conveys little specific information about the content of the will
of the people because of the fact that most candidates campaign by declaring their
support for a wide range of policies.  A vote for a particular candidate thus underspecifies
the popular support for each of the policies raised during the campaign, not to mention
the positions a candidate adopts after being elected.88 Civic renewal thus also requires
citizens to take advantage of additional ways of communicating their ideas and
preferences to lawmakers, e.g., writing letters to members of Congress or state or local
officials, attending and speaking at hearings, submitting grass roots testimony, inviting
representatives to a town hall meeting or roundtable, writing an opinion piece for a
newspaper and forwarding a copy to an official’s office, and requesting a meeting with the
official’s staff to discuss certain issues (including preparing materials to send in advance
of the meeting).  Because voluntary associations are established to promote one or a
few goals common to their members, they have the potential to convey more concrete
and detailed information about the will of their members than is possible through
elections alone.  Voluntary associations thus have the potential to serve an important
                    
     88  For other critiques of the adequacy of the system of representation judged by
democratic principles that have been put forward independent of the current civil society
debate, see ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 236, 255, 260, 263 (arguing that
the will of the people is not expressed during ordinary representative politics because
during ordinary politics, the People do not speak) (1993); Jean, Voluntary Association
and Workable Democracy, supra note 7, at 216 (arguing that the “deliberative genesis
and justification of public policies or decisions deeply affecting the public...must be seen
as constitutive of the modern form of democracy”).
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democracy-enhancing function, namely, to enable citizens who make use of these
nonpolitical vehicles of civil society to communicate with lawmakers in a more precise
manner than is possible when they vote.  Regardless of whether one believes that
lawmakers are obligated to promote constituents’ preferences to the greatest extent
possible or that their input is rather part of the total mix of considerations a lawmaker
should consider when deliberating about issues on the public agenda, representation will
be more reflective of the equal worth of citizens if measures like those sketched in this
paragraph become widespread.
In addition to expressing concerns about political equality, observers of American
political life emphasizing the representative institutions perspective have also argued that
the health of such institutions depends as much on the existence of dispersed, non-
governmental centers of power as it does on governmental institutions such as majority
rule, the separation of powers, and the system of checks and balances.89  Dispersed
sources of power, according to this view, are essential to a strong democracy, because
the quality of democratic processes depends in part upon citizens’ ability to monitor the
performance of governmental entities and demand transparency and accountability.
Voluntary associations are well suited to promote these goals by keeping their members
                    
     89  For the ideas in this paragraph, see RICHARD A. COUTO AND CATHERINE S.
GUTHRIE, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK BETTER: MEDIATING STRUCTURES, SOCIAL CAPITAL,
AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT (1999); VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND
EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 30-31.
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informed and providing a vehicle for them to influence or hold government actors to  
account more effectively than can isolated individuals.90
                    
     90 See supra notes 28-44 and accompanying text.
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Finally, a democracy must be stable for its institutions to operate effectively. 
Although concern about the stability of democracy is more frequently expressed in
relation to emerging democracies than for the United States, it is not uncommon for
political and social scientists to argue that the creation and survival of democratic
institutions depend, in important part, upon both the existence of social and attitudinal
factors and a certain level of economic prosperity in addition to the formal structure of
political institutions.  The causal sequence between economic development, civic
attitudes, and the stability of democratic institutions is contested. According to some,
interpersonal trust and other civic attitudes are necessary preconditions of a stable
institutions and processes.91   Others have isolated the preference for gradual political
reform as the critical civic attitude for ensuring democratic stability, and they argue that
there is no relationship between that preference and the possession of interpersonal
                    
     91  Ronald Inglehart, The Renaissance of Political Culture, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1203, 1214, 1216-18 (1988) (based upon cross-cultural data, defending the proposition
that in countries with the lowest levels of interpersonal trust and overall life satisfaction,
people tend to support antisystem parties such as those on the extreme Right or the
extreme Left and that countries with high levels of satisfaction and trust are “linked with
the persistence of democratic institutions”); Inglehart, Trust, Well-Being, and
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST, supra note 7, at 88, 89; GABRIEL A. ALMOND AND
SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE (1963) (based upon cross-cultural empirical data,
arguing that a cluster of attitudes–a “civic culture”–was a necessary condition for the
survival of democratic political institutions).  According to Inglehart, overall life
satisfaction is a far more important determinant of democratic stability than political
satisfaction, although the latter attitude may be “a better predictor of the popularity of a
given government”).  Inglehart, Renaissance of Political Culture, supra, at 1209.  Overall
life satisfaction is influenced by economic development, but it is not determined by it. 
Id. at 1209.  But see Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, Civic Culture and
Democracy: the Question of Causal Relationships, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635, 637
(1994) (based upon their causal model and cross-national data, the authors found that
years of continuous stable democracy produce "high levels of civic culture and that
economic development fosters civic culture indirectly, by virtue of producing stable
democracy").
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trust.92  Interpersonal trust, for these authors, is an effect, not a cause, of the longevity
and level of democracy.93
                    
     92  Muller and Seligson, Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal
Relationships, supra note 91, at 639.
     93  Muller and Seligson, Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal
Relationships, supra note 91, at 645, 646-47.
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 Some research affirming the causal role of civic attitudes in producing democratic
stability has simultaneously confirmed a causal relationship between economic conditions
and civic attitudes.  According to this research, economic conditions have a causal
relationship with the stability of democratic institutions through their impact on civic
attitudes.  In particular, poverty has been shown to be conducive to distrust because
“[u]nder conditions of extreme poverty, the loss incurred from misplaced trust can be
fatal.”94  According to the same analysis, economic development stabilizes democracy by
contributing to the spread of cultural orientations that support democracy.95  Other
studies have similarly concluded that interpersonal trust decreases with increases in
unemployment and that economic disparities–such as the fact that those with the most
wealth received almost all of the increase in total household wealth in America in the last
two decades96--may be an additional source of instability for the country’s democratic
institutions.97  To the extent that economic factors are a condition of or contribute
significantly to the stability or instability of democracy, the representative institution
perspective argues that the civic renewal debate must address issues of economic
                    
     94  Inglehart, Trust, Well-Being, and Democracy, supra note 91, at 88, 89.  See also
Pablo R. Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, Inequality and Violent
Crime, 45 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (2002).
     95  Inglehart, “Trust, Well-Being, and Democracy,” supra note 91, at 97, 112. 
Examples are people’s trust that no individual or group will be able to retain political
power in violation of legal limitations and rules and people’s deep-seated belief in the
legitimacy of the regime.  Id. at 89.
     96  See S. LANCE DENNING, FINDING VIRTUE’S PLACE: EXAMINING AMERICA’S CIVIC LIFE
16-18 (1999).
     97  Caroline Hodges Persell, Kurt Seidel, Liena Gurevich, and Adam Green, Civil
Society and Economic Distress: Possible Causes and Consequences of Associational
Memberships, paper prepared for The American Sociological Association annual
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prosperity and economic justice, e.g., inequalities in income, wealth, and the allocation of
national resources, if its diagnosis and recommendations are to be effective.98
                                                                  
meeting, July 16, 1998, 23-24.
     98  For the argument that there is no empirical evidence supporting the view that civic
attitudes are linked in a systematic way with democratic stability or economic prosperity,
see Robert W. Jackman and Ross A. Miller, A Renaissance of Political Culture?, 40 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 632 (1996).
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The representative institutions perspective on civic health emphasizes the
importance of creating, reinforcing, and popularizing a wide range of values traditionally
associated with democratic forms of government.  Civil society authors writing from this
perspective give pride of place to the value of equality in many forms, including equality of
educational and other opportunities and equality of respect for individuals regardless of
their ethnic, religious, or national background or socioeconomic status in addition to
political equality.99  As ethnic backgrounds, religious affiliations, races, and life styles
have become increasingly diverse, pluralism and tolerance have become recognized as
central among the values that promote and reinforce democratic institutions and
practices.100  Other values, such as optimism and interpersonal trust have also been put
forward by some civic renewal advocates as basic democratic values.101
                    
     99  See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 1-2, 10-
15.
     100  It is beyond the scope of this essay to attempt a comprehensive discussion of
democratic values.  Without question, the objectives of effective collective action,
autonomy, and self-governance by an informed and deliberative citizenry, which I have
distinguished conceptually in the preceding two sections, fit well under this heading, as
do various other notions of freedom.
     101  For optimism and generalized trust as core democratic values, see Eric M.
Uslaner, Democracy and Social Capital, in DEMOCRACY & TRUST, supra note 7, at 121,
50
                                                                   
140-44.
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 Some features of the representative institutions perspective on civic health are
potentially in tension with one or both of the first two perspectives discussed.  This third
perspective endorses the goal of cooperation and collective action, but in a qualified way.
 Given the current relatively high status composition of people active in civic life, simply
increasing the level of civic activity, without more, could leave intact or even increase
existing inequalities in representation.102  Although authors who stress cooperation and
collective action hope for socially beneficial and just outcomes as well as efficient
processes, they appear to assume that a more robust civic life will necessarily bring such
outcomes in its wake.  From the vantage point of the third perspective, in contrast,
democracy presupposes more than formally democratic institutions and an invisible civic
hand. 
In addition, in contrast to both of the previous two perspectives, the representative
institutions perspective is much more concerned with participation in the political process
and influencing lawmakers than with nonpolitical, i.e., civil, forms of civic activity.  This
emphasis can be traced to several considerations.  First and foremost, “politics is the
realm for which democratic norms seem to promise a level playing field.”103  Second,
status-skewed participatory disparities appear to be significantly greater for political
activities than for some other forms of civic activity.104  Third, because some critical
                    
     102  The actual operation of associations and the composition of their memberships is
far more complicated than can be conveyed in this section.  For a discussion of the
ways in which they reinforce, rather than weaken, political inequalities, see infra Part
III.C.
     103  VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 513.
     104  See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at  74-79,
513.
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prerequisites of enhanced participation by populations currently unlikely to participate,
such as more and better educational and economic opportunities, may well require the
active intervention of governmental authorities, it is important, according to this
perspective,  not to minimize the role of politics and government in enhancing civil society
nor to overstate the potential achievements of cooperation and collective action by citizen
groups.
Finally, in contrast to the self-governance perspective, the representative
institutions perspective of civic health does not inquire, or ask citizens to inquire, into the
justification for their preferences as claims on public resources.  The legitimacy of each
claim derives from the equal respect owed to its originator.  The self-governance
perspective, in contrast,  rests upon the view that individuals owe themselves as well as
their communities the obligation to deliberate about their goals, taking into account the
goals of others and the needs of the community at large, before concluding that their own
goals as they initially conceived them make legitimate claims on others.  As a
consequence, situations could arise in which giving equal weight to the input of all citizens
would meet the standards of the representative institutions perspective while failing to
satisfy those of the self-governance approach.  The failure to consider these differences
may lead to public policies that are politically palatable but conceptually problematic or
counterproductive.
D. The Community Morality Perspective
The civic renewal literature contains a fourth perspective, one that considers
people’s character and their moral values and practices to be constitutive elements of 
civic health.  According to this perspective, healthy civic life is impossible without
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widespread acceptance of a core of moral norms and a sense of moral obligation toward
oneself, others, and the community as a whole.
Although the authors for whom these concerns are central agree with proponents
of the other three perspectives that participation in civic life is generally important for civic
health, many take the view that its role has been exaggerated.  According to Don Eberly,
for example, contemporary declines in civic engagement are the symptom of a deeper
problem than a lack of participation; they are ultimately attributable to the fact that
American culture has lost its moral compass.105  Similarly, for Christopher Beem, civic
engagement is a necessary but not sufficient condition of civic health.106  In his view, the
internal dynamic of contemporary voluntary associations, including families, fails to foster
in people the moral norms and core democratic values they need to contribute to an
orderly and stable society.107  Consistent with their views is that of Eric Uslaner, who
accepts the view that expectations of reciprocity based upon experiences in civil society
                    
     105  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 15, 155, 157.
     106  See Christopher Beem,  Civil Is Not Good Enough, 6 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 47,
47-50 (1996).  Beem includes the family and all organizational life other than
government and the market in his notion of civil society.  See id.   Because he includes
families as well as organizations, Beem prefers the term “civil” life to "civic" life.
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are important to build interpersonal trust and cooperativeness, but also argues that
possessing a strong moral sense is essential for maintaining interpersonal trust and for
translating ties to one’s community into stable, cooperative behavior.108 
                                                                   
     107  See Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 53.
     108  Eric M. Uslaner, Morality Plays: Social capital and moral behavior in Anglo-
American democracies, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at
215-16 (hereinafter Morality Plays).
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Many commentators recognize that voluntary associations can further undesirable
as well as desirable purposes.109  Residential community organizations may be
cooperative, but they can also be seen as  “organized and oriented around a barely
hidden segregationist, even secessionist, agenda.”110  In addition, families and their
values are not necessarily sources of civic strength, especially when families impart to
their children excessively individualist or materialistic values.111  In principle, then, the
existence of strong social bonds is in and of itself morally neutral unless it derives from or
is accompanied by moral values.112  According to these authors, it is the possession of
moral values that enables people to “look beyond our own self-interest and to longer-term
                    
     109  Militia groups and racist organizations are usually mentioned in this connection. 
See Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out, supra note 10, at 665 (stating that whether the
goals of voluntary associations are praiseworthy or not is “of course, entirely another
matter”); Elshtain, Not a Cure-All, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that local attachments can
take “unpleasant forms”); Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 50;
EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 24.  Ironically, there is evidence that the
conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing belonged to the same bowling league.  See
John Clark, Shifting Engagements: Lessons from the “Bowling Alone” Debate, 196
HUDSON BRIEFING PAPER: SHAPING THE FUTURE 1, 13 (1996) (basing his observation
upon a report by the New York Times, Aug. 13, 1995, p. 25).  See also Beem, Civil Is
Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 54 (stating that “more mainstream groups” like
the Christian Coalition, the National Rifle Association, AARP, and The National
Organization for Women “have come to reflect the belligerence and inflexibility
associated with this militaristic orientation”).
     110  Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 50.
     111  See COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC’Y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS
MORAL TRUTHS 19 (1998) (hereinafter “COUNCIL, CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY”).
     112  For a contrary view, see ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 55, at
15-17, 50-53, 55, 61-64, 319-27 (arguing that there may be a moral aspect to
engagement in groups even when the character and purposes of the groups is offensive
to democratic values and that a healthy pluralism does not presuppose congruence
between group purposes and public purposes).
56
stakes.”113  Moral values, in short, are critical to ensure that a more robust civil society is
more public spirited, not just more spirited.
                    
     113  Uslaner, Morality Plays, supra note 108, at 216.  Uslaner also argues that in the
United States, Canada, and the U.K., “values and expectations of reciprocity reinforce
each other.”  Id. at 234.
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Almost all civic renewal authors believe that civil society cannot survive in the
absence of a certain level of moral commitment, if not agreement, on the part of individual
citizens.  Representative is the Final Report of The National Commission on Civic
Renewal (the “Report”), a document endorsed by a wide range of political and social
scientists, philosophers, and members of the nonprofit community.114  The Report
laments the country’s moral as well as its civic ills, deplores the “vulgar” aspects of
popular culture, especially popular music, movies, and television, criticizes the easy
availability of liquor and pornography, and in general decries contemporary sexual and
material self-indulgence and gratification.115  Further, the Report identifies the weakening
of America’s moral culture as a key cause of the country’s civic deficiencies.116  As a
consequence, the Report advocates measures to strengthen personal moral standards
                    
     114  See THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: HOW
CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 5-21 (1998)
(hereinafter “NAT’L COUNCIL: NATION OF SPECTATORS”) for the Report.  For the
participants in the Commission and in its deliberations, see id., at 65-66.
     115  See NAT’L COUNCIL,  NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 5, 6, 7, 17-18. 
See also COUNCIL,  CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 5-8.
     116  See NAT’L COUNCIL,  NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 6-8. 
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and the conduct of individuals, including public officials, as part of the civic renewal
agenda.117
                    
     117  See NAT’L COUNCIL, NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 11-12, 13, 14-17,
18.   See also COUNCIL, CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 12-13 (arguing that
moral truths “underwrite” the civil and political goals of American democracy and that
they inform and ensure the Nation’s commitment to individual and political freedom).
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There has been considerable controversy surrounding the idea of core or common
moral beliefs accepted by all or most citizens, especially when the core beliefs  are cast
as “moral truths.”118  Critics fear that some of the core beliefs could well conflict with many
citizens’ own religious or secular beliefs or that some civic renewal advocates are simply
confounding moral truth with traditional morality.119  To attempt to inculcate moral norms
as part of the civic renewal agenda would, according to this view, amount to the coercive
imposition of subjective moral views on the public at large under the ostensibly neutral
banner of civic morality.  In addition, commentators have questioned whether the moral
norms typically endorsed by certain segments of the civic renewal community are in fact
likely to create “civic virtue in the sense of the disposition to care about the common good
of the whole polity and the capacity to deliberate about it” rather than merely addressing
standards of personal mortality.120  If so, the core of moral norms arrived at might not be
useful for promoting a culture of public spiritedness or communal values such as
                    
     118  See COUNCIL, CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 6, 12.
     119   See, e.g., Linda C. McClain and James E. Fleming, Symposium: I. Introduction.
Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists , in 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 310 (2000);
Morone, The Corrosive Politics of Virtue, supra note 1; Nick Gillespie, Truth Squad: The
Coercive Agenda behind the “Civil Society” Movement, REASON ONLINE (Aug./Sept.
1998).
     120  See McClain and Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, supra
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tolerance.
                                                                   
note 119, at 310-11.
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The conceptual center of the civil society movement claims, in contrast, claims to
be committed only to a secular and reasoned elaboration of foundational moral
principles.121  For Don Eberly, for example, there exist “certain universal ideas of right and
wrong” evident in the writings of diverse peoples, eastern and western, ancient and
modern.122  Christopher Beem argues that there are moral norms that transcend
particular epochs, nations, and cultures.123  The fact that the Judaeo-Christian religious
tradition supplied such values for most of the history of the United States does not in and
of itself make them intrinsically religious or subjective.
William Galston’s understanding of the source and content of the core moral norms
differs from  that of Eberly or Beem.  Galston argues that the common moral norms and
virtues that are necessary to ground civil society in America are those that make possible
                    
     121  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 189, 194-95; see also Beem,
Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 56.  Beem argues that to be healthy, civil
society must have a core of common values that link citizens together sufficiently to
ensure social harmony in the face of diversity.  In Tocqueville's time, there was such a
network of common "regulative principles...to help Americans distinguish between good
and bad civil society."  Christopher Beem calls these truths moral and philosophical
principles.  That the founding documents were inspired by some kind of belief in
transcendence is not, in his view, a coincidence; on the contrary, a purely particularist
moral commitment will have difficulty surviving the pressures that threaten it.  See
Beem, Civil Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 57 (stating that a moral consensus
must be grounded in the universal features of human existence and not merely in the
belief that they are good for Americans).  Eric Uslaner adds “being married” as a source
of moral commitments (based upon 1981 survey data).  Uslaner, Morality Plays, supra
note 108, at 229. He also states that in the U.K., secular morality is the main source of
what he calls “self-obey” commandments.  Id.
     122  See Don E. Eberly, The Quest for America’s Character, in CONTENT OF AMERICA'S
CHARACTER, supra note 29, at 19.  Eberly calls these “values that are universally found
in successful societies,” although he discusses approvingly the approach of C.S.Lewis,
who considered certain moral values transcendent, and that of Ben Franklin, who
considered certain virtues the values that “nourished human civilization.” Id., at 19-21.
     123  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 12, 183, 187.
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and sustain “liberal democracy,” “self government,” and “citizenship.”124  Such norms and
virtues are “functional or instrumental,”125 and thus knowable by practical reason, not
theoretical philosophy or revelation.  As a consequence, to discern the appropriate norms
and practices requires a practical understanding of constitutional democracies and the
American system of government as well as an analysis of the observations of
empiricists.126  
The Report approved by the members of the National Commission on Civil Renewal
largely implements this functional approach. It identifies as moral virtues: parents putting
the well-being of their children ahead of their “self-gratification,” acknowledging the
spiritual capacity of human beings and circumscribing our personal conduct and that of our
children in light of this human possibility, acknowledging that we have obligations to people
outside of our families and being willing, if necessary, to sacrifice some of our own self-
interests to the interests of others, and acting with moderation and self-restraint in sexual
                    
     124  William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, 75 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 603, 604-06 (2000).  For a fuller discussion, see WILLIAM A. GALSTON,
LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 217-28 (1991).
     125  Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, supra note 124, at
606.
     126  See Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, supra note 124,
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matters, alcohol consumption, and the satisfaction of physical desires in general.127 
                                                                   
at 606.
     127  See NAT’L COUNCIL,  NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 12.
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These precepts are clearly moral in character, but they are advanced because of
their usefulness for America’s civic goals.  For example, the Report urges people who
chose to become parents (or who fail to make choices to prevent becoming parents) to
assume the moral responsibility of raising, caring for, and loving their children so that the
children become educated, caring, and willing participants in civil society.  However,
people are not expected, much less exhorted, to become parents in the first place, as
they would be by the commands of certain religious traditions.  Again, the Report appears
to urge moderation in the satisfaction of sexual and other physical and material desires 
because of the importance of some forms of self-restraint for the self-governance upon
which self-government depends.128  To that end, it recommends that potentially
destructive (legal) substances and activities be located at a distance from schools and
that their availability in poor neighborhoods be limited.129  But there is no suggestion in
the Report  that totally abstaining from, rather than moderate indulgence in, such things is
superior to moderation, as might be the case according to some religious teachings. 
                    
     128  See NAT’L COUNCIL,  NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 8.
     129  See NAT’L COUNCIL,  NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 17.  Presumably
illegal substances would be discouraged in any amount because they are illegal.
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Some civil society commentators refer to the moral norms necessary for civil
society as moral truths, presumably because they are the product of reasoning about the
foundational morality necessary to sustain a democratic society.  The term “truth” is
preferred  to “values” because in contemporary America, moral values are portrayed as
products of individuals’ belief systems or personal and subjective preferences rather than
the product of reasoned arguments open to public scrutiny and discussion of their
validity.130  Nothing in the civil society literature precludes the existence of moral beliefs
and practices peculiar to one or more religions or to non-religious ethical traditions.  In
fact, most authors assume that such beliefs and practices will be possessed by most
citizens in addition to, and in part overlapping with, the moral precepts necessary for a
healthy civil society.131  For civic renewal to succeed, however, such beliefs and practices
                    
     130  See, e.g., Eberly, The Quest for America’s Character, supra note 122, at 11-13.
     131  See NAT’L COUNCIL, NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 12 (observing
that in general, morality is reinforced by religious beliefs, but asserting that the moral
foundation upon which civil society depends “does not require any particular
denominational creed”).  See also COUNCIL,  CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 111, at
12 (stating that the moral truths that make possible democratic self-government “are in
arge part biblical and religious”).  However, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, unlike A NATION OF
SPECTATORS, adds that various non-religious sources also “strongly” inform the moral
truths necessary for a democratic civil society, citing the classical (Greek) natural law
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must be in a more or less peaceful coexistence with one another and with the moral truths
necessary for a healthy civil society in America.
                                                                   
tradition, the ideas of the Enlightenment, documents from America’s founding, speeches
by Abraham Lincoln and George Washington, and the concept of higher law endorsed
by and materials authored by Martin Luther King.  Id.
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In contrast to the point of view just sketched, some civil society authors concerned
about moral values believe that, for the most part, moral norms are likely to be created
and reinforced  because of certain structural features of the American system.  For
example, William Schambra has argued that because America is a large commercial
republic, it will have such a multiplicity of interests that local majorities will not be able to
suppress minorities.132  He also maintains that because of the size of the commercial
republic, no local community can "seal itself off completely from the moderate habits and
values of the outside world."133  To illustrate this point, he observes that, as a rule,
merchants will have to be polite to strangers because strangers may in the future become
customers.134 
Schambra readily concedes that in a large commercial republic the marketplace
will tend to encourage greed and materialism in citizens. However, he also believes that
surely our churches, neighborhoods, and civic associations
have over time managed to temper and moderate the
harshest aspects of the marketplace's self-interest and
materialism.  Generation after generation, Americans have
been taught that there are obligations beyond mere
personal gain and the pursuit of wealth--obligations to
family, community, and faith--and behave accordingly.135
                    
     132  See Schambra, Beyond the Great National Community, supra note 27, at 11.
     133  Schambra, Beyond the Great National Community, supra note 27, at 12.
     134  See Schambra, Beyond the Great National Community, supra note 27, at 12
(noting also that there is unlikely to be ethnic or religious warring factions because the
commercial character of the United States has permeated it with "sober, stolid values");
see also MICHAEL NOVAK, BUSINESS AS A CALLING (1996) (arguing that “[business] has a
vested interest in virtue”).  For a contrasting view, see GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB,
DECIPHERING AMERICAN MORALITY (1999) (arguing that the capitalistic ethic was an
important cause of the moral decline in the second half of the twentieth century).
     135  Schambra, Beyond the National Community, supra note 27, at 12.  But see id. at
14 (conceding that the large commercial republic has not always been successful in
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On balance, he concludes, the potential mischief of the excesses of the marketplace
have always in the past been successfully offset by the individual freedom, civic vitality,
and moral community that characterizes life in America.136
                                                                   
curbing people's immoral sentiments).
     136  See Schambra, Beyond the National Community, supra note 27, at 15 (arguing
that it is because of the "tension between civil society and the marketplace" that the
United States has survived in as good a condition as it has).
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Similarly, as was discussed previously, many civil society theorists argue that
participation in voluntary associations tends to generate civic virtues, such as
interpersonal trust, social capital, and generalized reciprocity, in those who
participate.137  The civic participation/social capital thesis is also a structural account of
the genesis of virtue because it asserts that some virtues are likely to arise
automatically, as an incident of a certain kind of behavior.  However, as noted earlier,
those who advance this point of view fail to explain how civic virtue developed in the
service of private interests will also be exercised in the public interest when that
becomes necessary.138
                    
     137  See supra pp. 12-14.
     138  See supra Part III, C.
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Civic renewal advocates promoting the fourth perspective reject the structural
approach of Schambra to the emergence of moral norms, and many have reservations
about the structural approach of Putnam, so well.  Their claim is that the current
weakening of civic life cannot be ameliorated simply through legal, policy, or economic
reforms, nor by transforming the contemporary organization of people’s social and
political lives so as to maximize occasions for associational interaction or
decisionmaking through old style voluntary associations, town councils, and small
citizen meetings.  In particular, as Christopher Beem argues, participation in civil life in
general and voluntary associations in particular is unlikely to generate moral norms
unless the greater part of those who join them already possess these values.139 
Implicit in this view is the conviction that people’s actions or behavior are in large part
determined by their values and beliefs, rather than the reverse.  These theorists thus
reject the view that the interactions of individuals within associations or the structural
relationships among associations will, without more, impart the kind of morality to
members that a decent civil society presupposes.
Several civic renewal authors have asserted that the contemporary American
culture of  rights has contributed to the breakdown of moral values and behavior.140 
While not denying that the two phenomena are related, Eberly argues that the causal
                    
     139  See Beem, Civil Society Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106; and infra Part
IV.D. See also Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue, and Liberal Democracy, supra note
124, at 605 (arguing that “the artful arrangement” of institutions such as checks and
balances is insufficient to sustain liberal democracy); Don E. Eberly, Correspondence:
Intellectuals Prefer Culture, 1 WKLY STANDARD 6 (Feb. 5, 1996) (hereinafter Intellectuals
Prefer Culture).
     140  See, e.g., supra note 25.
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sequence between rights and moral value runs in the opposite direction, at least
initially.  For him, if morality, custom, and culture in a society no longer distinguish
between right and wrong, law and the coercive arm of the state will gradually become
the primary way to constrain  behavior.  Once that happens, “citizens are at the same
time more prone to resort to law than voluntary conflict resolution in sorting out their
differences, and they are dismayed by the overreach of the law.”141
                    
     141  EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 112, 115.  Eberly also asserts that
if people do not have fundamental moral beliefs to ground their actions, they will turn to
economics or science to supply them with  fundamental beliefs.  Id. at 195.
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At the deepest level, therefore, the moral virtue strand of the civil society debate
attributes defects in contemporary civic life to changing attitudes toward specific moral
codes and to the legitimacy of moral claims altogether.  The embodiment of this
transformation is the contemporary tendency of people toward self-absorption, as
reflected in the American "ideology of self-expression, self-interest, and individual
entitlement."142  To reverse this development, according to this strand of civil society
theory, civic renewal must begin by building, or rebuilding, a public moral consensus.143
 For moral values to be recovered and accepted, however, people must abandon their
cynicism and moral skepticism.144  Finally, for this last change to occur people must
recognize, repudiate, and seek to roll back “the demise of character-shaping
institutions."145 
The centerpiece of Eberly's civic renewal recommendations is thus
reinvigorating character-shaping institutions, most importantly, the family.  The family is
a potentially  important character building institution because it is often the first
institution, chronologically and psychologically, to imbue children with moral beliefs and
                    
     142  EBERLY, THE CONTENT OF AMERICA'S CHARACTER, supra note 29, at xii; see id. at
28 (contrasting public spiritedness with self-absorption).
     143  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 12, 196; see also Beem, Civil
Is Not Good Enough, supra note 106, at 50. Eberly calls the combination of moral and
civic renewal, with the moral renewal triggering and informing the civic renewal, "civil
society plus.”  See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 5, 15-16.
     144  See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 12.
     145  See EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 1, at 11; see also Don E. Eberly,
Question: Can Government Play a Significant Role in Restoring U.S. Families? No: New
Laws Can't Remedy the Nation's Profound Cultural Crisis, WASH. TIMES, INSIGHT ON THE
NEWS MAGAZINE, Jan. 29, 1996, 25 (hereafter Can Government Play a Significant
Role?);  Eberly, Quest for America's Character, supra note  122, at 6.
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social attitudes such as caring about the well-being of others and interpersonal trust. 
He implies that the more successful families are in building their children's moral
character, the less important is participation in voluntary associations for creating the
shared moral norms that support civil society.146  Other key character-shaping
institutions are schools and faith based institutions.  At the same time, Eberly does not
see the role of character formation as wholly private. Rather, in his view, "The job of
politics is to 'shape the public sentiments,' as Lincoln put it, without which policy
reforms will be of little effect."147
                    
     146  EBERLY, AMERICA'S PROMISE, supra note 1, at xiii.  Eberly focuses on what people
think or believe insofar as it affects how they behave; thus, he applauds campaigns to
encourage teen abstinence, parental responsibility, the sacredness of marriage, and so
on.  See Eberly, Can Government Play a Significant Role?, supra note 145, at 26.
     147  Eberly, Correspondence, supra note 139, at 6.
E. Conclusion
This Part has elaborated four conceptually distinct perspectives that figure
prominently in the civil society debate.  The writings of individual civic renewal authors
may incorporate concerns identified with more than one of the perspectives sketched
above since some of the perspectives can be harmonized with others.  However, when
conflicts arise, those who prize a particular perspective more than others will
subordinate the latter to the former.  Distinguishing these perspectives is, therefore,
useful because each perspective is based upon a view of the primacy of a distinctive
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value (or cluster of values) over competing, possibly desirable, but nonetheless
subordinate values.  As a policy matter, it may not be possible for all of these values to
be public priorities at the same time.  Where there are internal conflicts, the pursuit of
some  values may impede the pursuit of others.  Thus, it is important to understand
which civic renewal proposals reflect which perspectives and values as a prelude to
evaluating such proposals both for public policy and theoretical purposes.
Underlying the cooperation perspective sketched above is a version of modern
liberal political theory that has as its conceptual foundation the primacy of maximizing
individual freedom and government neutrality with respect to individual preferences and
pursuits.  As a consequence, many of the civic recommendations stemming from this
perspective are purely instrumental, i.e., in the service of ends that are not necessarily
themselves civic.  The self-governance perspective reflects the concerns of another
strand of liberal political theory, one that contains a particular view of the nature of
human well being, namely, the belief that in the best case, individuals should be rational
and autonomous in their own lives and should assume some responsibility for the well-
being of the larger community.  Insofar as autonomy is identified with self-governance,
the civic recommendations based upon this perspective are viewed as intrinsic goods. 
Insofar as the self-governance of individuals promotes collective self-governance, the
recommendations are instrumental.  According to the representative institutions
perspective, democracy, and especially equality, are constitutive of civic health. Thus,
one immediate goal of this perspective is equalizing the quantity and quality of citizen
input reaching political leaders (“voice”) across educational, socio-economic, and other
status groups.  Like the cooperation perspective and unlike the self-governance
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perspective, the third perspective does not assume the substantive content of individual
or collective well-being, with the important exception of the belief in the  equal worth of
individuals and the political imperative of equal representation..  Finally, the community
morality perspective views the moral well-being of individuals and the moral character of
their social and communal relationships as paramount.  Similar moral concerns may be
urged by proponents of the other perspectives on civic health, sometimes under the
Tocquevillian rubric of “self-interest rightly understood.”148  For some proponents of the
fourth perspective, however,  people should have an interest in doing what is right
because it is right, and not because of a calculation that moral behavior  or public
spiritedness might eventually inure to their private benefit.  For these theorists, then,
civic life can be intrinsically worthwhile, but only insofar as it reflects and perpetuates
moral norms.   In addition, some authors who emphasize this perspective may also
believe in the intrinsic value of moral life, but they recognize clearly that, to serve as
public norms, moral values must be exclusively derived from and justified in terms of
their functional dimension.
                    
     148  See supra note 37.
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III.  THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Before drawing out the implications of the differences among the four
perspectives for the regulation of voluntary associations, it is useful to examine how and
under what conditions associations can perform the types of the citizen-enhancing work
attributed to them.  At a minimum, this involves appreciating that "voluntary
associations" are not monolithic: they have different attributes, and some are better
suited than others to nurture civic spirit or perform community-oriented functions.  It also
entails examining the empirical research devoted to investigating the conditions under
which such associations have the hoped-for outcomes.
A.  Classifications of Voluntary Associations
Voluntary associations can be classified in a variety of ways.  They are often
divided into market and non-market organizations, and the latter are further divided into
families and non-kinship groups formed voluntarily.149  For-profit entities are typically
excluded, even though they are voluntary associations, on the ground that they do not
create or reinforce social capital or promote civic engagement.150  Large bureaucratic
voluntary associations with enormous membership rolls are sometimes bracketed
because they require little of their members beyond writing a check151 even though the
                    
     149  See supra notes 5-7.
     150  Some scholars have argued, however, that workplaces can contribute to civic
engagement by giving workers skills, experiences, and networks of associates that
facilitate civic involvement. 
     151  See Theda Skocpol, Associations without Members, 45 AM. PROSPECT 66, 68-69,
71-73 (1999); see also PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 51.  AARP is one
such organization.  Organizations that require check-writing as the primary mode of
participation need not be huge, but very large organizations on average tend to want or
need less in the way of direct participation on the part of their members than do their
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organizations  are civically active to promote the interests of their members among
lawmakers at the local, state, or national levels.  Their political leverage derives from the
ease with which they can, through newsletters and other communications, inform their
members about the substance and status of legislation under consideration, mobilize
them to favor particular positions on issues, and encourage them to register, vote, and
otherwise become politically active.    
                                                                  
smaller counterparts.
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For purposes of state and federal regulation, the most basic distinction among
formal voluntary organizations is between the treatment of for-profit and nonprofit
entities.  Voluntary business organizations may be for-profit companies or nonprofit
groups such as trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other professional
associations.  Although the primary purpose of these nonprofit organizations is
commercial,  they are regulated as nonprofits under the business and tax laws of most
states and under the Internal Revenue Code because they do not contribute directly to
the profitability of any specific firm and do not themselves generate profits for distribution
to members or shareholders.152  Instead, such groups further the interests of an industry
or profession by collecting and providing information relevant to an entire class of
businesses, establishing standards, and lobbying government officials or the public at
large on behalf of industry positions.153  Some types of veterans groups, fraternal
beneficiary societies, and labor organizations are also treated as nonprofits under state
and federal law.154  Although some of these voluntary associations may engage in ad
hoc or ongoing charitable activities, their primary goal is to improve conditions for their
                    
     152  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (1994), which identifies the organizations listed in
the text as candidates for exemption from federal income taxation.  For elaboration of
the characteristics required of such organizations in order to gain federal exemption,
see Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1.
     153  Such groups are sometimes referred to as mutual benefit organizations.  See
Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305-06 (1976).
     154  See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(5) (unions and other labor organizations), 501(c)(8)
(fraternal beneficiary societies operating under a lodge system and providing life, health,
and related benefits tot he members), and 501(c)(23) (certain organizations for present
and past members of the Armed Forces of the United States that provide insurance-
type benefits).
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members, e.g., by organizing social activities, providing insurance or other benefits to
their members at discount rates, and lobbying.  By virtue of being classified as
nonprofits, these organizations receive tax benefits and other favorable treatment under
state and federal law.155
                    
     155  For state law benefits for noncharitable nonprofits, see Miriam Galston, Lobbying
and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue Code’s Treatment of
Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1296-1302 (1993).  An organization that has
nonprofit status under state law will not necessarily be exempt from federal or even
state income taxation.  The reverse is often true: states tend to make federal exemption
from income tax a condition of receiving state income tax exemption rather than relying
upon their own grant of nonprofit status.  For example, the District of Columbia grants
an automatic exemption from the income and franchise tax to any organization exempt
under §  501(a) of the Code except those exempt under §  501©)(3).  (In order to be
exempt from the income and franchise tax as a charity in the District of Columbia, an
organization must have both a federal tax exemption and demonstrate that a certain
percentage of its activities or expenditures benefits District of Columbia  residents.  See
Instructions for Filing Application for Exemption (Form FR 164); see also D.C. CODE
ANN. §  47-1802.1 (1990) (listing organizations exempt from District of Columbia
income and franchise tax).) Revenues of noncharitable exempt organizations that would
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constitute unrelated business income under §  511 of the Code are not exempt in D.C. 
Similar laws exist in many states.  See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-205(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1991); MD. TAX-GEN. CODE ANN. §  10-104(2) (1988).  For a discussion
of tax and nontax benefits associated with exempt status, see Bazil Facchina et al.,
Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations: A Catalog and Some
Thoughts on Nonprofit Policymaking, in TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY (New York
University School of Law, The Program on Philanthropy and the Law No. 3, 1993).
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In contrast to mutual benefit nonprofits, charitable entities must be operated to
help charitable classes--such as the poor, homeless, sick, or handicapped–or engaged
in a category of activity that state or federal law has determined contributes to the public
interest.  Examples of the latter type of charity are educational groups or institutions,
health care organizations, houses of worship, and museums.  In addition to the tax and
other benefits granted to noncharitable nonprofits,156 charities are entitled to receive
contributions that are deductible from the income of the donors, subject to certain
restrictions.157  The charitable contribution deduction tax benefit has been variously
explained as compensating for charities’ lack of access to capital markets, lessening the
burdens of government, taking advantage of charities’ efficiency in providing charitable
services, or deriving from a "sovereignty" view of the charitable sector.158
                    
     156  See supra note 53.
     157  See I.R.C. § 170(a).  Other exempt entities may be entitled to receive deductible
contributions.  See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1), (3), (4), (5).
     158  See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 585 (1998).
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From the perspective of sociologists, a fundamental distinction should be made
between expressive and instrumental associations, or between associations that members
join for expressive as against  instrumental reasons.159  In their pure form, expressive
associations provide activities that create the "satisfactions of personal fellowship" and that
members engage in simply or primarily because they are enjoyable.160  The members derive
"immediate and continuing gratification" merely from taking part in the association's activities;
the activities of such organizations are wholly or largely contained within the organization;
and the activities are ends in themselves.161  Examples are recreational clubs, choirs, little
league teams, and many other kinds of social organizations. 
In their pure form, instrumental organizations enable their members to accomplish
goals outside of the organization.  In particular, members may seek to effect changes to
the social, economic, or political order162 or to maintain the status quo against a threat of
                    
     159  See C. Wayne Gordon & Nicholas Babchuk, A Typology of Voluntary
Associations, 24 AM. SOC. REV. 22, 25-26, 27-28 (1959), reprinted in THE GOVERNMENT
OF ASSOCIATIONS: SELECTIONS FROM THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 24 (William A. Glaser &
David L. Sills eds., 1966).  Even if an association is predominantly expressive in its
mission, some people may join for instrumental reasons; conversely, a person may join
a fundamentally instrumental organization for expressive reasons.
     160  See Gordon & Babchuk, A Typology of Voluntary Associations, supra note 159,
at 25, 27.  In sociological jargon, "integration of the personality system is often held to
be the major reason for the existence of the group."  Nicholas Babchuk and John N.
Edwards, Voluntary Associations and the Integration Hypothesis, 35 SOC. INQUIRY 149,
151 (1965).
     161  See Arthur P. Jacoby, Some Correlates  of Instrumental and Expressive
Orientations to Associational Membership, 35 SOC. INQUIRY 163, 163-64 (1965)
(hereinafter Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations).
     162  See Babchuk & Edwards, Voluntary Associations and The Integration
Hypothesis, supra note 160, at 149, 151.  However, the authors also mention a study
finding that "upper-class women" emphasized personal satisfaction as their reason for
joining instrumental associations.  In contrast, "middle-class women" emphasized
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change – goals that are frequently long-term and depend upon influencing individuals,
groups, or public officials outside the group.  People thus join instrumental organizations
primarily as means to some other end or ends.163  Examples are the NRA, the League of
Women Voters, and the Sierra Club.  Some associations may serve both expressive or
instrumental purposes depending upon the reasons members join.164
                                                                  
association goals as their reasons for joining voluntary associations, even though they
"were mostly affiliated with expressive associations."  Id. at 152.
     163  See Gordon & Babchuk, A Typology of Voluntary Associations, supra note 159,
at 25-26; Jacoby, Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations, supra note
161, at 164.  See also John Wilson and Marc A. Musick, Work and Volunteering: The
Long Arm of the Job, 76 SOC. FORCES 251, 253 (1997) (dividing social participation into
expressive, self-interested, and benefitting the needy or community problems).
     164  See Gordon & Babchuck, A Typology of Voluntary Associations, supra note 159,
at 28 (mentioning Kiwanis and the American Sociological Society as examples of mixed
purpose associations).  The authors also call Alcoholics Anonymous a mixed purpose
organization, presumably because of the camaraderie that develops among those who
go regularly to the same chapter, even though the primary purpose remains
instrumental.  The distinction between expressive and instrumental groups is similar to,
and to some extent overlaps with, the distinction between bonding and bridging groups
made by Robert Putnam. See supra pp.19 -21.
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It is also common for sociologists and political scientists to distinguish between
voluntary associations that seek to promote some aspect of the self-interest of the
members and those that cast their goals in light of the public interest.  The term “public
interest" can be used in a variety of ways.  For some, the term refers only to
commitment to or involvement in one's community, as contrasted with purely private
activities.  So understood, an organization’s activities may be in the public interest even
if its members do not join for altruistic or public spirited reasons.  Rather, they would be
in the public interest if their members see public life as the means to secure private
economic goals, e.g., tax reform.  If “public interest” is used in this way, advocacy
groups are inherently public interest groups, regardless of whether they pursue the
personal goals of their members.165
                    
     165  See Frank J. Sorauf, The Conceptual Muddle, in THE PUBLIC INTEREST 183, 184-
85 (Carl J. Friedrich, ed. 1962) (noting that some identify the public interest with “the
democratic political process of compromise and accommodation” and observing that, so
understood, the term refers to a means rather than an end and has “little to do with the
wisdom or morality of public policy itself”).  See also Jane Mansbridge, On the
Contested Nature of the Public Good, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3, 7 n.8
(Walter W. Powell & Elisabeth S. Clemens, eds. 1998) (noting that “interest” in the
sense of benefit evolved from its original meaning as interest charged by lenders), 9-10
(distinguishing aggregative meanings of the public good from collective meanings)
(hereinafter “The Contested Nature of the Public Good”).
85
Others reserve the term public interest for efforts to assist others because of a
belief that this is the right thing to do and regardless of whether they expect a private
benefit.166  Used in this way, both pro-choice and pro-life groups might be properly called
public interest groups because they are based upon a profound belief in the correctness
of their respective missions rather than upon personal advantage or utility.  Even if the
members of such groups can be seen as seeking a self-interested goal, theirs are self-
interested civic goals rather than self-interested private, material goals–a distinction that
“matters for the political life of the community.”167
B.   Why People Participate in Voluntary Associations
Many commentators--both those who believe in and those who reject the idea of
civic decline--agree that people who participate in one voluntary association are more
likely to participate in other aspects of civil life, broadly defined to include neighborhood
involvement and other types of informal helping or social participation, as well as in
political activities.168  Thus, much study has focused on what motivates people to get
involved in voluntary associations in the first place. 
1.  Education. The most consistently documented finding in this area
                    
     166  See Mansbridge, On the Contested Nature of the Public Good, supra note 165,
at 9-10.  See also Alan Wolfe, “What Is Altruism?, in PRIVATE ACTION AND PUBLIC GOOD,
supra note 165, at 36, 37 (quoting J. Phillipe Rushton’s definition of altruism as “social
behavior carried out to achieve positive outcomes for another rather than for the self”).
     167  VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, AND BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 23.
     168  See David Horton Smith, Determinants of Voluntary Association Participation
and Volunteering: A Literature Review, 23 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR
QUARTERLY 243, 253 (1994).  In some formulations, this belief risks becoming a
tautology.  See infra p. 78.
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is that there is a strong positive correlation between formal education and civic
engagement: people with some college participate in voluntary associations and vote
significantly more than less educated groups.169  To some extent, this correlation is
related to the correlation between civic engagement
                    
     169  See ON GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN AMERICA: A SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL
DATA, prepared for the Inaugural Meeting of the National Commission on Philanthropy
and Civic Renewal,  2 (Washington, D.C. 1996) (according to 1993 data collected by
Independent Sector, people with a high school diploma or less made up 12% of all
volunteers, while those with some college or graduate school made up 52% of all
volunteers); see also M. MARGARET CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 22-23 (1991).  See also J. Miller McPherson, A Dynamic Model of Voluntary
Affiliation, 59 SOC. FORCES 705, 711, 712, 715 (1981) (agreeing that education is the
"most important exogenous variable in almost all studies of affiliation," but noting that in
countries other than the United States education does not play as important a role in
predicting affiliation).  In the 1950s and 1960s, people with a grade school education
voted at the same rate as people with high school educations do in the 1980s and
1990s; in the 1950s and 1960s, people with a high school education voted as much as
people with college educations in the 1980s and 1990s. See CONWAY, POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION, at 22, Table 2-1.
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and socioeconomic status.  However, even when researchers control for income, those
with more formal education participate more in civil society.170 
                    
     170  See CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 169, at 22; Christopher J.
Anderson, Political Action and Social Integration, 24 AM. POL. Q. 105, 116 (1996).  For a
discussion of the relationship between education, social class, and civic engagement
(“participation in noninstitutionalized politics”), see Ronnelle Paulsen, Education, Social
Class, and Participation in Collective Action, 64 SOC. OF EDUC. 96 (1991) and infra note
250.   By noninstitutionalized politics, the author means forms of collective action that do
not involve formal political institutions, e.g., “protest demonstrations and community
problem solving.”  Id. At 96.
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Education also has an impact on the manner or type of civic engagement that
people choose.  According to one study, "[t]hose with more formal education are more
likely than those with less to direct their [volunteering] activities not only to their own
communities but also to other communities."171  Further, there is evidence that people
with college degrees or more education show greater interest than other people in
working with serious social problems relating to disabled, disadvantaged, abused,
troubled, or neglected children and youth.172 In the realm of political activity proper,
education is most highly correlated with voting, demonstrating, signing a petition,
boycotting, and contacting public officials.  The correlation is substantially weaker for
working with others and attending meetings and rallies.173
There are numerous reasons why education fosters civic engagement.  Education
makes certain forms of engagement easier by imparting useful information and skills,
e.g., how to write a member of Congress a letter, participate in an association, work for a
political campaign, or register to vote.174  In addition, education also helps motivate
                    
     171 See SURVEY ON VOLUNTEERING FOR SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS, document
prepared for the Points of Light Foundation and made public at the Inaugural Meeting of
the National Commission on Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, at 5 (Washington, D.C.,
September 1996) (noting that among volunteers for serious social problems, 69% of
college graduates volunteered, whereas 57% of those with a high school diploma or
less volunteered) (hereinafter VOLUNTEERING FOR SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS). 
     172  See VOLUNTEERING FOR SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS, supra note 171, at 5. 
     173  Anderson, Political Action and Social Integration, supra note 170, at 114.
     174  See Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, Beyond SES, supra note 82, at 283. 
According to Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, the impact of education on voting turnout
has been overstated.  Based upon an analysis of data from over 15,000 phone
interviews conducted in 1989 and 1990, they concluded that “the impact of education on
voting is funneled entirely through political interest.” Id.
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people to become civically engaged, presumably by socializing students to value civic
involvement and providing them with networks of people who are civically involved and
invite them to join  specific organizations, projects, or events.175  Since people with
“higher levels of education tend to come from families in which the parents had higher
levels of education as well,” values imparted by these students’ parents are an additional
source of motivation for civic engagement.176
                    
     175  See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE AND JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION,
PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 76-77, 135-36 (1993); Brady, Verba, and
Schlozman, Beyond SES, supra note 82, at 283.
     176  CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 169, at 23.  See also infra notes
219, 234.
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2.  Religion.  Religion, whether in the form of membership in a religious
organization or attendance at religious services, is a close second predictor of civic
involvement.177  The correlation between religion and civic engagement has been
explained, in part, by the likelihood that involvement in religious organizations can
develop communication and organizational skills useful for effective participation in
voluntary associations of whatever kind.178  Churches have been found to be especially
critical for teaching skills in African-American communities.179
This explanation does not necessarily shed light on the source of motivation for
civic engagement, however.  For example, the development of communication and
organizational skills may facilitate participation in civic life among people who already
want to participate, but would feel inadequate if they lacked these skills, by making
them more comfortable in or confident about pursuing civic involvement. The
development of such skills does not, however, explain the desire for civic engagement
                    
     177  See Robert Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of
Religious Involvement, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 331, 333 (Theda
Skocpol & Morris P. Fiorina eds. 1999) (citing sources) (hereinafter “Wuthnow,
Mobilizing Civic Engagement”); see also Wilson & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion
to Volunteer Work, infra note 180, at 138-39 (making the same point with respect to
volunteering).
     178  See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 305-06,
310-11, 313; see also Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 177, at 346.
     179  See Peter Dobkin Hall, Vital Signs: Organizational Population Trends and Civic
Engagement in New Haven, Connecticut, 1850-1998, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, supra note 177, at 211, 237.  See also VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY,
VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 320-30 (noting that participation in politics is
highly correlated with socio-economic status except that participation in churches
increases the level of participation of poor blacks and white fundamentalists; however,
participation in churches does not increase the participation levels of Catholics).
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on the part of these people in the first place.
Robert Wuthnow addresses the motivational link between religious and civic
involvement.  He argues that
[a]ctive church members are likely to be exposed to religious teachings
about loving their neighbor and being responsible citizens, they are more
likely to have social capital in the form of ties to fellow congregants that
can be used to mobilize their energies, and they are more likely to be aware
of needs and opportunities in their communities as a result of attending
services in their congregations.180
Based upon similar reasoning, some civic renewal writers have attributed the decline in
civic participation in important part to the decline in traditional forms of religious
commitment.181
                    
     180  Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 177, at 334; see also John
Wilson & Thomas Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, 56 SOC. OF
RELIGION 137, 137-38 (1995).
     181  See Putnam, Bowling Alone, supra note 1, at 69 (arguing that people joined or 
went to church or other religious institutions less in 1970 (41%) than they did in 1950
(48%)), 70 and Figure 12 .
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This connection has been challenged on several grounds.  As a threshold
matter, there is data showing that the level of religious engagement in the United
States, measured by beliefs, practices, or a combination, has remained quite stable for
at least five decades.182  Some commentators, in fact, see an upswing in religious
observance.183  To some extent, the disagreement reflects different evaluations of
changing forms of religious practice and expressions of religious identity that have
occurred in the last several decades.184  If, as Robert Wuthnow argues, spirituality has
undergone a significant shift from “habitat-based” to “seeker-based,”185 it stands to
reason that measures of religious identification based upon attendance at or
                    
     182  See Bill Broadway, Poll Finds America 'as Churched as Ever', WASH. POST, May
31, 1997, at B7 (basing his claim  that Americans are "as churched as ever” on a Gallup
Poll done for the Princeton Religious Research Center); Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic
Engagement, supra note 177, at 331, 334-35 (1999) (arguing that religious involvement
has been stable for at least five decades, with a temporary increase in the 1950s, and
that the way some surveys phrased the question about religious involvement may be
responsible for the decrease that Putnam asserts) The Solitary Bowler, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 18, 1995, at 21 (claiming that church attendance in America shows the weakest
decline; it has been stable at 40% since 1939); Ladd, Data Just Don't Show Erosion,
supra note 1, at 21 (basing his claim on data from colonial times through 1990, he
concludes that the rates of religious "adherence" have been stable and about 55% since
the 1920s).
     183  See Bill Broadway, Christian Pollster and Analyst Sees Country at Spiritual
Crossroads,  WASH. POST, May 31, 1997, at B7 (noting data collected by the Barna
Research Group to the effect that born-again Christians in the Catholic and Baptists
churches have increased significantly as has Sunday school attendance by both
children and adults).
     184  See supra note 182.
     185  ROBERT WUTHNOW, AFTER HEAVEN: SPIRITUALITY IN AMERICA SINCE THE 1950S  3
(1998).  This is not the first time in the history of religion in America that people have
turned away en mass from formal, ritually oriented forms of religious worship to more
individualistic, spiritually or mystically oriented forms of worship. See generally RICHARD
KYLE, THE RELIGIOUS FRINGE: A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE RELIGIONS IN AMERICA (1993);
PETER W. WILLIAMS, POPULAR RELIGION IN AMERICA (1989).
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involvement with houses of worship will witness a decline.
The link between religion and civic engagement must be further qualified by
research showing that the link is complex and not uniformly present across religions or
religious denominations.  For example, although there is a strong correlation between
religious engagement and civic engagement in general, several studies have found
significant differences in the extent and type of civic activity characteristic of different
religions and denominations within religions.  Some early studies found that Catholics
participated less than Protestants in civic and service organizations.186 Data from the
early 1970's, in contrast, show that Catholics, Jews, and Episcopalians volunteered
significantly more than other religious groups and denominations as well as people
claiming no religious affiliation.187  According to data from 1991, Catholics were much
more likely to join a nonreligious voluntary association than were evangelical
                    
     186  See MURRAY HAUSKNECHT, THE JOINERS: A SOCIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 76-77 (1962) (distinguishing
between Protestants and Catholics)); see also Hall, Organizational Population Trends
and Civic Engagement in New Haven, supra note 179, at 233-34 (distinguishing
between liberal and conservative Protestants and Roman Catholics in New Haven).
     187  See Wilson & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra
note 180, at 143.
94
Protestants, whereas mainline Protestant denominations were much more likely to join
such associations than were Catholics.188
                    
     188  See Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 177, at 341, 343.  See
also ON GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN AMERICA, supra note 169, at 2 (based upon 1993
data from Independent Sector, 22% of volunteers are Catholic while 54% are
Protestant).
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The disparity in civic participation as between Catholics and mainline
Protestants may come from the habits of mind that are imparted to congregants by the
different structures of the two denominations.  According to one interpreter of the data,
Protestant congregations tend to view the clergy as serving the members, whereas it is
more common for authority in Catholic churches to be hierarchical, with the
congregants at the bottom of the authority structure.189  This is consistent with the
findings of political scientist Robert Putnam, who studied numerous districts in Italy190
and found that high levels of religious observance or expressions of religious identity
were strongly correlated with low levels of civic activity.191  Putnam attributed this fact,
in part, to the Italian Church’s emphasis on ecclesiastical hierarchy, in which “[v]ertical
                    
     189  See HAUSKNECHT, THE JOINERS, supra note 186, at 54-55.  Verba, Scholzman,
and Brady give the same explanation for low participation rates in politics among poor
Catholics.  See  VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at
245.  Hierarchical structures are also considered a factor reducing the likelihood of civic
engagement in other contexts.  See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text
(describing the positive relationship between work that offers employees challenge and
discretion and their involvement in civic life).
     190  See ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993), who found that the difference in economic development in the northern
and southern parts of Italy was directly correlated to the differences in their civic
traditions and culture. To explain this correlation, he argued that, over time, civic
engagement produced trust and other bonds among neighbors, members of groups,
and people active in other types of communities. Through the trust and bonds thus
generated, according to Putnam, certain regions in Italy developed and maintained a
strong civic tradition, social capital, and other civic resources that enabled the residents
to work toward common goals and demand accountability from their local governments.
  Subsequently Putnam generalized his findings from Italy and concluded that
interpersonal trust and social capital are essential for all forms of cooperation, whether
economic, social, or political, in the United States and elsewhere.  See PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 21.
     191  See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 190, at 107-08.
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bonds of authority are more characteristic...than horizontal bonds of fellowship.”192  The
demonstrated predictive value of religious affiliation for civic engagement may, then,
mask a more meaningful correlation between experiences in certain structural
environments and civic engagement that, in the case of religious institutions, rest on
basic characteristics of their underlying theologies.
                    
     192  See PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 190, at 107.
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A direct link between theology and civic engagement has been posited based
upon data showing that volunteering in community or secular organizations is higher
among mainline and liberal Protestants than among evangelicals or more conservative
Protestants or among Catholics.193  Researchers have speculated that this difference is
due to the fact that the former denominations tend to link their theological teaching
explicitly with social activism, whereas the latter are more likely to stress piety,
personal salvation, and volunteering to the church.194  One consequence, then, of the
increased popularity of fundamentalist congregations during the final third of the last
century may be a reduced level of involvement in secular (including civil and political)
organizations, as members are encouraged to direct their energies and financial
resources to their own churches and church-related organizations and activities.
In sum, it is certainly true that religious values may lead those who take them
seriously to be concerned about the well-being of people outside their own religious
communities and to be inspired to join and participate in civic organizations devoted to
helping causes or populations regardless of their religious orientation.  At the same
time, the positive civic impact of religious organizations appears also to depend on the
                    
     193  See Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 177, at 341-44; see also
Wilson & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note 180, at
143-44, 148 (finding Catholics volunteer at the same rate as liberal Protestants).
     194  See Wuthnow, Mobilizing Civic Engagement, supra note 177, 342-44; see also
Wilson & Janoski, The Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note 180, at
149-50; Hall, Organizational Population Trends and Civic Engagement in New Haven,
supra note 179, at 234;  PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK, supra note 190, at 107. 
Wuthnow also attributes the phenomenon to the fact that evangelical churches make
very great, time-consuming demands on the members of their congregations, and they
provide them with a wide assortment of opportunities to engage their energies.
98
content of the values that they inculcate.  If so, when people internalize civic values as
part of their religious life, their civic commitment will be strong.  When, in contrast,
religious teachings focus on the needs of specific religious communities or emphasis
the virtues of piety and the goal of personal salvation, the civic impact is likely to be
negligible or even negative.
3.  Job and workplace.  Scholars have long been interested in the degree
to which jobs or careers influence the likelihood that people will be active members of
civil society and influence the type of civic activities they choose.195  As a threshold
matter, research shows that spending large amounts of time on the job does not
necessarily interfere with a person's willingness to be engaged civically outside of
work.  In fact, according to some studies, “among workers, longer hours are often
linked to more civic engagement, not less” and people “with longer paid work hours are
actually more likely to volunteer.”196   Although it may seem counterintuitive, women
working full time for pay are more involved in formal and informal civic activities than
are women who do not engage in paid work.197  Women who work part-time for pay, 
however, are more involved in such activities than both full-time working women and
                    
     195  See, e.g., Graham L. Staines, Spillover Versus Compensation, A Review of the
Literature on the Relationship Between Work and Nonwork, 33 HUM. REL. 111 (1980)
(hereinafter Spillover Versus Compensation) and authorities cited there.
     196  See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 191 and authorities cited. 
Putnam here includes informal activities, such as having people to dinner and
“schmoozing,” in his measure of civic involvement. 
     197  See Kay Lehman Schlozman, Did Working Women Kill the PTA?, 11 AM.
PROSPECT 14 (Sept. 11, 2000) (emphasizing the positive aspect of paid work on
women’s political involvement); see also PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 200-
01.
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women who do not have paid jobs.198  This finding may suggest that working has a
strong positive effect on a person’s desire for civic engagement, even though it
reduces the amount of time available for civic activities, but that full-time employment
cuts excessively into the hours available for outside activities, at least for women.199
                    
     198  See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 201.
     199  Men who have been employed in structured work environments for a significant
period are more likely to be engaged in civic life than those who have not.  See C.
Muhammad Siddique, Orderly Careers and Social Integration, 20 INDUS. REL. 297
(1981).  See also Harold Wilensky, Orderly Careers and Social Participation: The
Impact of Work History on Social Integration, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 521, 530-32 (1961) (on
the basis of an analysis of upper working class and lower middle-class men, finding that
men who have had orderly horizontal or vertical careers will have more memberships in
formal associations, attend more meetings, spend more time in associational activities
(other than church activities), interact more frequently with persons different from
themselves, be exposed to more of the major institutional spheres of society, and have
stronger attachments to the community than men lacking such orderly careers).
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There is considerable interest in the relationship between characteristics of work
and the type of civic activities that people engage in outside of work.  Researchers
have found that in general people choose civic activities that are similar to or build on
their work experiences more often than they choose non-work activities that contrast
with their work experiences.200   Empirical work studying the kinds of outside activities
preferred by working women, as contrasted with whether and how often they engage in
such activities, have found that many working women are joining professional groups
now whereas previously they tended to join service oriented groups to a greater
degree.201 To the extent that  women’s participation in professional groups is motivated
                    
     200  See Staines, Spillover Versus Compensation, supra note 195, at 112, 115, 116,
117, 123. When there are similarities between a person’s work and his leisure activities,
sociologists attribute this to a "spillover" or "generalization" effect, which presupposes
that the skills developed, attitudes created, roles played, and needs satisfied on the job
"spill over" or are generalized during leisure time outside the job.  See Staines, Spillover
Versus Compensation, supra note 195, at 115. A dissimilarity between work and non-
work activities is explained as a "compensation" or "competition" effect.  According to
this theory, people's experiences on the job satisfy some human needs but not others. 
As a result, in their leisure time people seek to compensate for the various voids that
are not satisfied through their work on the job.  See id. at 115 (citing work suggesting
that this causes people to seek involvement in voluntary associations in the first place
and implying that such people will seek activities unlike those performed at work). Cf. 
See Robert Hagedorn & Sanford Labovitz, Participation in Community Associations by
Occupation: A Test of Three Theories, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 270, 280 (1968) (finding
compensation only when the person experiences isolation in the occupation).  Some
studies show that people who have physically demanding jobs are not only less likely to
be physically active when they participate in activities outside work; they are less likely
to participate to begin with. See Staines, Spillover Versus Compensation, supra note
195, at 118. Alternatively, according to this view, people may be seeking variety in their
non-work activities to balance their work activities.  See id. at 116, and sources cited in
Wilson and Musik, Work and Volunteering, supra note 163, at 253.  In general, studies
have found a positive spillover effect more often than a compensation effect.  There
have, however, been a substantial number of studies that found a compensation effect
or no relationship between work and non-work activities at all.
     201  See Danny R. Hoyt et al., The Voluntary Association Memberships of Women,
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by the desire to refine skills necessary for their jobs or helpful for career advancement,
the motivation is not for civic engagement, except incidentally.  Alternatively, women’s
turn toward professional organizations may be due to a loss of interest in the types of
groups they formerly joined coupled with a new interest in different types of
associational activities.  In this case, a woman's job may have created a motivation for
civic engagement that did not exist previously.  In that event, the finding that women
working for pay are more involved in civic life than their non-working counterparts202
may be explained by women’s desire to balance work life with experiences outside the
workplace while taking advantage of expertise gained in the workplace.  Working
women may also be responding to exposure to social networks first encountered on the
job.  Either way, the influx of women into the workplace would be responsible for
expanding the variety of women’s civic commitments and introducing them to a range
of associational opportunities not previously encountered.
The likelihood that workers will join a union and engage in formal union activities
constitutes a special case of worker participation in voluntary associations.
Researchers have found that the propensity of workers to attend meetings or hold
office in their unions is a function of two variables: the degree to which individual
members see themselves as at risk and, second, the union’s perceived level of
                                                                 
paper delivered at the American Sociological Association convention in 1985 (a
summary of the paper is available in Sociological Abstracts, Inc.); see also Patricia
Klobus Edwards, John N. Edwards, and Ann Dewitt Watts, Working Women and Social
Participation: The Diminishing Importance of Gender, paper delivered at the American
Sociological Association convention in 1981 (Sociological Abstracts, Inc.).
     202  Supra note 197.
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effectiveness in promoting fairness in the employment relationship.  A recent study
found that ethnic-minority women were the most likely to participate in a union
perceived as effective in promoting fairness; non-ethnic minority women were the next
most likely, followed by non-ethnic minority men, and finally ethnic minority men.203  In
such cases, involvement in unions is pursued predominantly for instrumental (rather
than ideological or social) reasons.204
                    
     203  See Steven Mellor, Janet L. Barnes-Farrell, & Jeffrey M. Stanton, Unions as
Justice-Promoting Organizations: The Interactive Effect of Ethnicity, Gender, and
Perceived Union Effectiveness, 40 SEX ROLES: A JOURNAL OF RESEARCH  331 (1999).
     204  See Thomas Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of Civic Virtue,
36 B.C.L. Rev. 279 (1995), reprinted in SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE 113 (Mary Ann Glendon &
David Blankenhorn eds., 1995) (criticizing the decline in union membership and
attributing it to the fact that people tend to value autonomy and self-interest over other
values, thereby overlooking the potential of collective bargaining negotiations to be a
forum for responsible self-government).
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Highly placed individuals in corporate America often seek out civic opportunities,
including joining charitable groups, because it is made clear on the job that such
outside activities enhance the reputation of the company and thus may enhance the
individual's chances for promotion.205  Since voluntary organizations are often
“prestige-conferring,”206 people with a high level of occupational success may seek
parallel achievements in the institutions of civil society.  The widely recognized strong
positive correlation between high educational level and socio-economic status, on the
one hand, and the level of  civic participation, on the other, may also explain the
participation of such individuals.207
                    
     205  See Thomas Janoski & John Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism: Family
Socialization and Status Transmission Models, 74 SOC. FORCES 271, 273 (1995) (noting
that membership in voluntary associations is frequently “almost part of the job” for
people in high-status occupations); see also Wilson & Musick, Work and Volunteering,
supra note 163, at 253 and sources cited; Staines, Spillover versus Compensation,
supra note 195, at 115 and sources cited.
     206  Jack C. Ross, Toward a Reconstruction of Voluntary Association Theory, 26
BRIT. J. SOC. 20, 27 (1972 ).
     207  See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 189-
200.
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There is also evidence that workplace positions demanding qualities such as
autonomy, initiative, decision-making, discretion, considerable interaction with other
workers, complex tasks, and leadership correlate positively with civic involvement.208  It
is possible that the correlation between civic engagement and challenging jobs of the
kind described bears upon confidence more than on motivation, given that the
workplace is one of the most important place for learning and practicing skills useful for
civic engagement.209  However, given that a positive correlation between civic
engagement and challenging jobs exists even when the studies control for level of
education,210 it is more likely that such jobs are responsible for motivating employees’
involvement in civil society in addition to equipping them to participate with a variety of
experiences and well-honed skills.
                    
     208  See Wilson & Musick, Work and Volunteering, supra note 163, at 253-54 and
sources cited.  But see Steven L. Schweizer, Participation, Workplace Democracy, and
the Problem of Representative Government, 28 POLITY 359, 368-69 (1995) (arguing that
"the drift of empirical research suggests that workplace democracy does not increase
external political participation"). 
     209  See Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources, infra
note 264, at 476-78.
     210  See Wilson & Musick, Work and Volunteering, supra note 163, at 253-54. 
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Recent research has found that the correlation between participation in
nonpolitical civic activities and participation in political activities is far greater than the
correlation between participation in workplace activities and political involvement.211 
The disparity was the most pronounced in connection with time-consuming or
volunteer-oriented political activities, as contrasted with voting.212  This finding
suggests that  a person’s work is not as significant a factor in prompting civic
engagement, at least in the form of political participation, as is participation in voluntary
forms of associational life.  At the same time, the author of this research noted that the
causal element had not been proven: it is possible, given the results of the research,
that the time-intensive types of political activity might be causing the participant also to
engage in non-political voluntary associations.213
4.  Friends, parents, and social ties.  Friends are an important source of
motivation for getting involved in civil society.  People who are asked in person or
through a personal communication to join or volunteer, do so far more often than those
who learn of such opportunities from the newspaper or other print or broadcast
media.214  When questioned, such joiners often respond that the primary reason they
                    
     211  See Ayala, Trained for Democracy: the Differing Effects of Voluntary and
Involuntary Organizations on Political Participation, supra note 83 (analyzing the same
data base as Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, supra note 82, with some adjustments of
methodology).  The author notes that the result was the same for professionals as it
was for low-skilled workers.  Id. at 104.
     212  Ayala, Trained for Democracy, supra note 83, at 106.
     213  Ayala, Trained for Democracy, supra note 83, at 108.
     214  See S. Wojciech Sokolowski, Show Me the Way to the Next Worthy Deed:
Towards a Microstructural Theory of Volunteering and Giving, 7 VOLUNTAS 259, 272,
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joined was the personal solicitation of a friend.215  The powerful effect of solicitations by
friends may also explain why people who work and those who attend church have
higher rates of civic engagement than those who do not, since most workplaces and
church groups provide an assortment of networks of people with varying interests,
some of them eager to recruit fellow workers or worshipers.  Researchers have even
found that subjects in an experiment who do not have much interpersonal trust tend to
show a stronger preference for civic activities after writing an essay on the benefits of
friendship.216
                                                                 
275 (1996) (hereinafter Show Me the Way) (finding that solicitation increased
volunteering to philanthropic entities although it did not increase charitable giving). 
According to one researcher, direct recruitment at voluntary organizations and churches
does not explain the strong correlation between involvement in voluntary associations,
including churches, and voter turnout.  See Carol A. Cassel, Voluntary Associations,
Churches, and Social Participation Theories of Turnout, 80 SOC. SCI. Q. 504 (1999).
     215  See Arthur P. Jacoby, Personal Influence and Primary Relationships, 7 SOC. Q.
76, 77-81 (1966) (noting as well that personal influence was a much greater factor in the
decision to join expressive associations than in instrumental ones).
     216  See Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, Trust, Mood, and Outcomes of
Friendship Determine Preferences for Real Versus Ersatz Social Capital, 19 POL.
PSYCHOL. 527 (1998).
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 Children growing up in homes where one or both parents were active in civic
associations are much more likely than children with the same socioeconomic status
and education to join civic associations or to be civically active when they are adults.217
 When one or both parents engaged in helping behaviors and also had a nurturing
relationship with the children, the children were significantly more likely to become
committed activists or engage in sustained helping behaviors than children without
such backgrounds.218  The mechanism involved in socialization by parents is thought to
                    
     217  See E. Gil Clary et al., Volunteers’ Motivations: A Functional Strategy for the
Recruitment, Placement, and Retention of Volunteers, 2 NONPROFIT MGMT & LEADERSHIP
333 (1992) (noting the importance of family and friends as motivators); Janoski and
Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism, supra note 205, at 283.
     218  See E. Gil Clary & Jude Miller, Socialization and Situational Influences on
Sustained Altruism, 57 CHILD DEV. 1358 (1986) (finding, based upon data from adult
volunteers at a telephone crisis-counseling agency, that helping behavior was twice as
likely to extend through the six-month commitment period if the volunteer’s parents had
been committed activists and nurturing to their children than if the parents had not
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be role modeling, reinforcement of values, and possibly actual recruitment of children
by their parents.219
                                                                 
been).  However, the authors also found that partially committed adults, e.g., those
whose parents had preached but not practiced altruism and had been less nurturing
than the parents of the comparison group, achieved the identical level of altruistic
commitment as the others if they received highly cohesive volunteer training prior to
undertaking the volunteer work.  Id. at 1362.
     219  See Eric Uslaner, Producing and Consuming Trust, 115 POL. SCI. Q. 569, 572,
575 (2000); Paul Allen Beck and M. Kent Jennings, Pathways to Participation, 76 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 94, 98-101, 105 (1982); Janoski & Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism,
supra note 205, at 273-74, 289.
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At the same time, some researchers have found that the impact of family
socialization varies depending upon the type of voluntary association.  Parental
transmission of status has been shown to be better than parental socialization for
predicting children’s participation in “self-oriented” associations, such as business or
professional groups, unions, or veterans groups.  In contrast, family socialization
provided a better explanation of children’s participation in community-oriented
associations such as church, fraternal, neighborhood, and service organizations.220 
These findings are consistent with research on the pivotal nature of cultural, social, or
family values on levels of involvement in associations directed toward collective goals
discussed below.221
                    
     220  See Janoski & Wilson, Pathways to Voluntarism, supra note 205, at 279-286. 
The authors note that their distinction between self- and community-oriented
organizations is different from the more commonly used distinction between expressive
and instrumental organizations.  Id. at 274.  See also Wilson & Janoski, The
Contribution of Religion to Volunteer Work, supra note 180, at 137-38.
     221  See infra III.B.5.
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The desire for interpersonal social relationships is another reason for joining
associations.222  Some researchers have found that organizations with civic purposes
such as helping needy populations attract people looking for fellowship.223  In general,
members motivated to join for reasons of this kind tend to be committed to a group’s
internal activities but are less likely to engage in external activities connected to the
group than are those who join from altruistic or ideological motives.224  “Social ties” with
a philanthropic organization are also good predictors of volunteering and donations.225 
“Social ties” to a philanthropic organization include organizational membership, church
                    
     222  See Philip H. Pollock, III, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization: How Does
Group Activity Affect Political Participation?, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 485, 488 (distinguishing
between “solidary” incentives, such as fun or conviviality, and “purposive” incentives,
such as ideology or collective interest, for joining an association) (1982) (hereinafter
Organizations as Agents of Mobilization).
     223  See Pollock, III, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization, supra note 222, at 488.
     224  See David Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, 53 AM. SOC.
REV. 311, 326 (1988).
     225  See Sokolowski, Show Me the Way, supra note 214, at 275.
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attendance, or parents who volunteered.226
5.  Attitudes and values.  Since the pioneering work of Mancur Olson on
collective action problems, political and social theorists have often been pessimistic
about the likelihood that people will expend substantial resources to obtain a public
good in circumstances
                    
     226  See Sokolowski, Show Me the Way, supra note 214, at 269.
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where they can expect to share in the fruits of other people’s efforts regardless of their
own contribution.227  Subsequent studies, in contrast, have determined that people’s
motives for joining, volunteering for, and giving money to non-economic voluntary
organizations are usually mixed, and that altruism, ideology, and the desire for prestige
are better predictors of certain kinds of civic activity than are material motives.228  An
analysis based upon1990s survey data similarly found that the desire for material
rewards, such as career opportunities, was not a significant predictor of the likelihood
that adults would volunteer for philanthropic activities or make charitable donations,
whereas altruism (in the sense of desiring to help others) and the desire for self-
improvement were both positively correlated with rates of volunteering (although not
                    
     227  See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  Differently put,
Olson’s theoretical model “requires substantial private-good incentives to overcome the
tendency of public goods to induce free riding.”  David Knoke, Incentives in Collective
Action Organizations, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 311, 326 (1988).
     228  See Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, supra note 224, 227,
at 326 ( finding, based upon a study of professional, recreational, and women’s
organizations using 1980s data, that “[g]eneral normative principles, prestige, and
status enhancements are especially potent instigators of general commitment and
internal participation,” in contrast to selective benefit inducements, such as services or
finding job opportunities). Knoke found, however, that normative incentives do not tend
to induce participation in activities outside to the association, with the important
exception of women’s organizations.  Id.  It is possible to make distinctions among types
of values,  beliefs, or attitudes as motivators of behavior.  See e.g., Thomas Janoski,
March Musick, and John Wilson, Being Volunteered?  The Impact of Social Participation
and Pro-Social Attitudes on Volunteering, 13 SOC. FORCES 495, 498 (1998) (quoting
Paul Schervish’s distinction among general values, fundamental orientations, and
“causes we are dedicated to”); Carolyn L. Funk, Practicing What We Preach? The
Influence of a Societal Interest Value on Civic Engagement, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 601, 602
(1998) (distinguishing between values and attitudes). This essay does not make such
distinctions.
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with donations).229  Similar findings led one political scientist to conjecture that
organizations attempting to attract members with material or other individual benefits
would improve their success in recruitment and maintenance of members by appealing
to people’s societal values.230  Further, members who joined organizations in order to
obtain personal, utilitarian benefits tended to be more passive and less committed to or
involved in an organization than those who joined to influence public policy.231
                    
     229  See Sokolowski, Show Me the Way, supra note 214, at 268, 273.
     230  See Funk, Practicing What We Preach? The Influence of a Societal Interest
Value on Civic Engagement, supra note 228, at 611.
     231  See Knoke, Incentives in Collective Action Organizations, supra note 224, 227,
at 326.
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The preceding findings are consistent with the results reached by research
about the impact of family, friends, and social ties on levels of civic involvement,
discussed above,232 since frequently these are influential through instilling civic
attitudes and values.233  In fact, according to one sociologist, socioeconomic status has
its acknowledged profound effect on the likelihood of political participation because of
the attitudes and orientations associated with social and economic status.234  Even
when individuals join or volunteer simply in response to a personal appeal, they may do
so because of the value they place on friendship, itself a civic value as fulsome as
more obvious civic values such as voting.  Further, sometimes a person  joins a
voluntary group for one reason but acquires a different reasons for remaining in the
group,235 or joins a group independently of social or civic values and then acquires
such values as a result of participation in the group.236
6.  Conclusion.  Several themes recur in the preceding discussion of
reasons for people  participating in voluntary organizations.  First, the reason for joining
is often complex and multi-faceted.  Second, some reasons may themselves derive,
both conceptually and in actuality, from other reasons.  For example, church
                    
     232  Supra Part III.B.4.
     233  See supra Part III.B.1, 2, 4.
     234  Pollock, III, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization, supra note 222, at 484. 
     235  See CONWAY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 169, at
66.
     236  For the relative impact of self-selection as against group participation on the
likelihood that participants in a voluntary association will be active in other aspects of
civic life, see infra Part III.C.2-3.
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attendance is a strong predictor of participation in civic life more broadly, but the
difference in participation rates among denominations has led some researchers to
speculate that it is the civic attitudes conveyed at church or friendship ties with other
church members rather than the religious motive for church attendance that explains
the strong correlation between attendance and civic participation.  Again, the strong
correlation between level of education and degree of civic participation may derive from
the content of higher education (especially civic values), the friendship ties formed at
institutions of higher learning, or civic values learned from parents who also value
higher education.
As complex as these issues of cause and effect are, they are eclipsed by the
complexity of the counterpart issues raised by the proposition that participation in
voluntary associations is itself a “cause” of additional participation in civic life, whether
political or civil.  The next section explores the empirical research devoted to assessing
the role of associational participation as itself a  source, and not merely a reflection, of
an active civil society.
C.  Self-Selection, Socialization, and Mobilization
1. Introduction: methodological challenges.  One building block for much
of the civil society literature is the documented existence of a significant positive
correlation between active association membership, on the one hand, and civic
attitudes and values and other forms of civic activity, on the other.237  At the same time,
                    
     237  The discussion that follows does not apply, however, to dangerous forms of civic
activity such as characterizes racist, hate, and terrorist groups, unless otherwise noted.
 For groups of this kind, see supra note 109.
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a correlation between active association membership and other forms of civic
engagement is, as a theoretical matter, open to at least three interpretations: that
active association members were civically oriented before they joined an association
and joined, in part, because of that orientation (the self-selection  thesis); that such
members developed their civic orientation primarily as a result of their association
activities (through socialization238 or active recruitment by other members of the group);
                    
     238  The term “socialization” is also sometimes used to refer to the process whereby
childhood or cultural influences impart values or attitudes to people.  I used the term this
way in Part III.B.4, 5.  Used that way, the term refers to developments outside of
associational life.  See, e.g., Beck and Jennings, Pathways to Participation, supra note
219, at 94.  In this Part III.C, in contrast, I use the term to refer to the transformation that
a member may experience as a result of participating in the activities of an association. 
Following sociological terminology,  I use “self-selection” or “selection” to refer to the
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or that some combination of these two causal mechanisms is at work.239
                                                                 
impact on joiners of attitudes created independent of their participation in a specific
organization.  Some authors also speak of “selective recruitment” to refer to the process
whereby an organization recruits members who already display the attitudes, skills, or
other qualities useful to the organization.  See, e.g., Carla M. Eastis, Organizational
Diversity and the Production of Social Capital: One of these Groups Is Not Like the
Other, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 66, 71 (1998).
     239  See Marc Hooghe, Value Congruence in Voluntary Associations: A Social
Psychological Explanation for the Interaction between Self-Selection and Socialization,
76 MENS  EN MAATSCHAPPIJ 102 (2001) (examining the role of both pre-existing and post-
involvement attitudes in connection with feelings of ethnocentrism); John Brehm and
Wendy Rahn, Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social
Capital, 41 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 999 (1997); David L. Rogers, Gordon L. Bultema, and
Ken H. Barb, Voluntary Association Membership and Political Participation: an
Exploration of the Mobilization Hypothesis, 16 SOC. QUARTERLY 305 (1975) (examining
the impact of both self-selection and organizational involvement on engaging in political
activities such as writing elected or agency officials, meeting with agency officials, or
attending a public hearing).
The difficulty in identifying which causal relationships underlie a correlation is
complicated by the fact that empirical studies are not usually designed to assess the
relative roles of self-selection prior to joining an association as against socialization or
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mobilization after becoming a member.  Further, self-selection can be attributed to a
person’s unlearned predispositions or learned attitudes and interests, whether
ultimately traceable to formal schooling or informal educational experiences such as
occur in families, neighborhoods, schools,  or camps.  Mobilization, in turn, can be
either direct, through express recruitment, or indirect, through the process of
socialization.  Moreover, the existing research that measures and compares the
relative roles of pre- and post-joining influences is not uniform in the outcomes studied
(e.g., voting, volunteering, or some other civic activity) or the influences measured
(e.g., values, recruitment, role models).  This lack of uniformity in research design has
resulted in a patchwork of incomplete and often incommensurable findings.
Another impediment to achieving clarity about the respective roles of self-
selection in joining as against socialization and mobilization after joining is that
associational involvement, even in expressive and other nonpolitical organizations, is
itself a form of civic engagement.  As a result, there is a danger that some findings will
amount to a tautology, i.e., the equivalent of the statement that  “there is a significant
positive correlation between people who are civically engaged and people who are
civically engaged.”  Implicitly responding to this concern, some  research looks at
whether participation in one type of civic activity leads to subsequent involvement in
one or more additional types of civic activity.  Most often, research of this kind
examines whether involvement in nonpolitical associations leads to involvement in
political associations or in other forms of political activity.
2.  Provisional findings.  A few recent empirical studies have called into
question the proposition that there is a strong positive relationship between civic
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engagement (whether political or not) and the presence of or increase in interpersonal
trust on the part of those who were civically engaged.240  A survey by Andrew Kohut of
adults in Philadelphia and surrounding areas revealed that they exhibited high levels of
civic engagement, including volunteering, despite the fact that they possessed
relatively low levels of interpersonal trust.241   Kohut’s findings are inconsistent with the
view that civic engagement presupposes a significant level of interpersonal trust, and
they may also suggest that civic engagement does not necessarily generate or
increase interpersonal trust.242  Kohut’s results were largely replicated by a survey
prepared for AARP by analysts at the University of Virginia Center for Survey
Research.243  Consistent with, although distinct from, the Kohut and AARP findings is
research finding conclusion that increases in interpersonal trust among people do not
                    
     240  See supra Part II.C.
     241  See KOHUT, TRUST AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 4-5 (Pew Center for the People and
the Press 1997).   The survey measured interpersonal trust and found that 54 percent of
the people surveyed believe "You can't be too careful in dealing with others."  Id. at 5. 
At the same time 57 percent of those surveyed said that people usually try to be helpful
and 64 percent said "others try to be fair."  Id.  Thus, the report concluded that those
surveyed were more "wary" than distrusting.  The survey also found that the level of
distrust was higher in the city than in the suburbs and that the reasons for distrusting
others included people’s fear of other people's dishonesty, selfishness, lack of
consideration, and unpredictability as well as their fear of crime.  Id. at 5.  The study
found that parental warnings were the single most important factor determining whether
children, once adults, distrusted others. Id. at 7.
     242  For evidence to the contrary, i.e., that participation in voluntary associations can
increase civic attitudes and interpersonal trust, see infra notes 252-254 and
accompanying text.
     243  See THOMAS M. GUTERBOCK & JOHN C. FRIES, MAINTAINING AMERICA'S SOCIAL
FABRIC: THE AARP SURVEY OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT 84-85, 89-90 (Center for Survey
Research 1997) (hereinafter AARP SURVEY OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT).
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necessarily translate into increased participation by them in their communities.244
                    
     244  Dhavan V. Shah, Civic Engagement, Interpersonal Trust, and Television Use: 
An Individual-Level Assessment of Social Capital, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 469, 487 (1998).
121
At the same time, some revealing correlations have been found.  On the pre-
joining side, research done by one sociologist suggests that those who join voluntary
associations have more generalized interpersonal trust245 prior to joining than those
who do not join.246  This is the case even after controlling for education and
socioeconomic status, both of which are also highly correlated with high levels of
generalized trust.247  The author concludes that there is significant self-selection among
people who join voluntary associations.248  This conclusion does not contradict the
findings of the other researchers just discussed.  Rather it suggests that generalized
trust may be a sufficient but not a necessary cause of civic engagement.249
Although less studied than interpersonal trust, empirical research supports the
view that a person’s confidence or sense of political efficacy is an important cause of
civic engagement.  According to one analysis, the well-documented positive relation of
                    
     245  See supra pages 19-21.
     246  Stolle, Bowling Alone, Bowling Together: Group Characteristics, Membership,
and Social Capital, 19 POL. PSYCH. 497, 507-09, 515 (1998) (hereinafter Bowling Alone,
Bowling Together) (basing these findings upon recent survey data drawn from active
members of a variety of associations in Sweden and Germany).  Since Stolle was
unable to control for self-selection completely, he could not conclude definitively if
people are more trusting before they join an association or they become more trusting
with the decision to join.  Id. at 508.  He did not, however, find that people became more
trusting after joining.
     247  Stolle, Bowling Alone, Bowling Together, supra note 246, at 508 n.16, 515.
     248  Stolle also found significant effects on generalized trust as a result of
associational activity in certain instances.  See infra at 255.
     249  The reason is that it can be true that people with significant levels of
interpersonal trust are likely to join more often than those without such trust without it
also being true that a significant level of interpersonal trust is necessary for a high level
of civic engagement.
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socioeconomic status and education with civic engagement can be explained by the
fact that these factors create “a sense of political efficacy” in students.250  In his study
of civic engagement among adults in Philadelphia, Kohut also found that a large
percentage of people surveyed said they were confident they would be effective when
they involved themselves in community issues, even though many of these same
people expressed a high level of distrust of others.251  These studies suggest that in
some circumstances, individuals’ perception of their own or their organization’s efficacy
may be more important than interpersonal or generalized trust in leading them to
engage in civic activity.
Turning to post-joining effects, the results of some research suggest that
associational involvement can increase certain types of civic attitudes on the part of
participants.  One
                    
     250  See Paulsen, Education, Social Class, and Participation in Collective Action,
supra note 170.
     251  See KOHUT, TRUST AND CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, supra note 241, at 4.  Of course,
confidence and a sense of political efficacy can also result from, as well as lead to,
associational involvement.
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study found that associational involvement contributes significantly to the emergence of
interpersonal trust, even though the same research also revealed that interpersonal
trust does not contribute significantly to community participation.252  Three studies
based upon 1960s data found “positive changes in the altruist as a function of
volunteering.”253  In contrast, a recent study based upon European data concluded that
associational involvement did not usually increase members’ generalized trust.254 
However, when the data describing groups with a high proportion of foreigners was
isolated from the rest, there was an increase in generalized trust among members of
groups with many foreigners during the period of their involvement (as well as a
significant self-selection effect).255  This finding suggests that involvement in voluntary
associations with members of diverse backgrounds may further the level of tolerance
among members.  The lack of strong support for the belief that group participants are
likely to acquire or develop generalized interpersonal trust as a result of their activities
in the group could be due to the scarcity of research focusing on the issue.  At the
same time, the available research suggests that there is no generic association effect
and, thus, that substantial research measuring the impact of participation by type of
                    
     252  Shah, Civic Engagement, Interpersonal Trust, and Television Use, supra note
244, at 487-88.
     253  These are noted in Clary & Miller, Socialization and Situational Influences on
Sustained Altruism, supra note 218, at 1359.  The studies revealed increases in
empathy, nurturing, and self-confidence and self-acceptance.
     254  Stolle, Bowling Alone, Bowling Together, supra note 246, at 510 (basing these
findings upon recent survey data drawn from active members of a variety of
associations in Sweden and Germany).
     255  See Stolle, Bowling Alone, Bowling Together, supra note 246, at 516-18; see
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association will be necessary before public policy can be designed to promote civic
renewal through association involvement.  The available evidence also points to the
likelihood that, at least in this country, Putnam’s belief that expressive bonding groups,
like bowling leagues and choral societies, can lay the foundation for more complex
social, public-oriented bonds cannot claim the status of a rebuttable presumption.256
                                                                 
also Stolle & Rochon, Are All Associations Alike?, supra note 53, at 60-61.
     256  For a different view of the civic contribution of members of bowling leagues, see
The Big Lebowski, available at most Blockbuster stores.  For a comparison of the pre-
and post-joining attributes of members of two choral groups, one organized to perform
the sacred music of a fifteenth century Flemish composer and the other to perform an
evening of songs from Broadway musicals, published by a participant observer, see
Eastis, Organizational Diversity and the Production of Social Capital, supra note 238.
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Also on the post-joining side of the equation, there is a significant amount of
empirical research devoted to measuring the effect of involvement in voluntary
associations on political participation.257  Although numerous studies have found a
strong positive correlation between involvement in nonpolitical voluntary associations,
including attending church, and political participation as a generic category,258 the
results are more ambiguous when voter turnout–a single measure of political
participation--is examined separately.  One study found that participation in both
religious and nonreligious voluntary groups was a “moderately important predictor” of
turnout, and that the “participatory predispositions” toward civic engagement of those
that joined these groups explained very little of the correlation.259  The inference is that
their engagement in associational activities (socialization or recruitment) caused
                    
     257  There is also research exploring situations in which social interactions other than
organizational involvement increase the likelihood of political activity, and some have
argued that social environment can influence political involvement even in the absence
of concrete social interactions. See Anderson, Political Action and Social Integration,
supra note 170, at111.  Marvin Olsen, in contrast, found no correlation between informal
social interactions and voter turnout after controlling for other participation factors.  See
Marvin E. Olsen, Social Participation and Voting Turnout: A Multivariate Analysis, 37
AM. SOC. REV. 317, 323 (1972).  Because of te focus of this Article on associations, this
research is not considered.
     258  See VERBA SCHLOZMAN & BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 338-39;
ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
supra note 175, at 83-88; DAVID KNOKE, ORGANIZING FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF ASSOCIATIONS 17, 193-95 (1990); Olsen,  Social Participation
and Voting Turnout, supra note 257.
     259  See Cassel, Voluntary Associations, Churches, and Social Participation Theories
of Turnout, supra note 214, at 509-10, 514 (based upon her analysis of National
Election Study (NES) data, and controlling for other influences, finding that only
education and age had more of an effect on voter turnout in presidential elections from
1972-1992 than did predispositions).
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members to vote, in those cases where they did.  Other research has concluded that
only engagement in religious institutions, but not other forms of associational
involvement, has a strong effect on the likelihood that association participants  will
vote.260  The latter view, i.e., that only a weak link exists between participation in
nonpolitical associations (other than churches) and voting, is consistent with empirical
work by two political scientists who found that more than half of the decline in voter
turnout in presidential elections between 1960 and 1988 was due to a “decline in
mobilization” of voters through personal contacts in favor of media, especially
television, advertising; the increasing numbers of primaries, which diluted scarce
resources; and states changing their elections for governor to off-years.261 
                    
     260   See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, AND BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY, supra note 82, at 359;
cf. Pollock, III, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization, supra note 222, at 500 (finding
that there was a causal relationship between the SES of people who joined solidary
organizations and their voting, but finding no effect on people’s voting behavior because
of their participation in such associations, whether by unintentional or intentional
mobilization of members). 
     261  See ROSENSTONE AND HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND AMERICAN
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DEMOCRACY, supra note 175, at 183-84, 214-18.  “Mobilization” is used by this author to
refer to the efforts of people (whether or not affiliated with associations) to get citizens to
vote and not as the term is used in this section, i.e., for  the efforts of some members of
an association to recruit others or the more subtle socializing effect of an organization
on its members.  See also Richard M. Valelly, Couch-Potato Democracy?, in 7 AM.
PROSPECT 25 (1996) (agreeing with Rosenstone and Hansen and emphasizing that
“parties, groups, and movements” used to make personal contact with voters and draw
them into elections, as did unions, which have also declined).
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A study of the relationship between nonpolitical voluntary associations and what
the researchers classified as “intermediate” political activity, namely, attempts to
influence government officials, as contrasted with lower levels of political activity, such
as voting, reading about politics, or discussing politics262 concluded that both self-
selection and organizational involvement explain the extent of people’s intermediate
forms of political participation, but that mobilization within an association accounts for a
larger effect.”263  This is consistent with the view of those who credit the positive impact
of associational involvement on subsequent political engagement to the information
and skills members acquire through participation in the activities of an association.264 
The connection between participation in voluntary organizations and political
engagement may also be a result of the fact that people who participate in voluntary
associations are more likely to see themselves as having control over their lives,
develop the ability and the desire to think through issues and problems that affect
                    
     262  See Rogers, Bultema, and Barb, Voluntary Association Membership and Political
Participation, supra note 239, at 309.
     263  See Rogers, Bultema, and Barb, Voluntary Association Membership and Political
Participation, supra  note 239, at 314.  This study is one of the few to compare the post-
joining outcomes with the parallel relationship between self-selection (a combination of
SES and political attitudes).  See also Ayala, Trained for Democracy, supra note 83, at
104, 108, 109 (finding that the impact of participation in voluntary associations on
political participation rivaled the effect of SES).
     264  See Jan Leighley, Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political
Participation, 58 J. OF POL. 447, 448, 453 (1996); cf. Sidney Verba, Schlozman, &
Brady, Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States, 23
BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 453, 473-78 (1993) (reporting the results of empirical studies showing
that membership in a nonpolitical organization imparts civic skills to members but noting
that people are much more likely to acquire such skills in the workplace).
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them,  assume responsibility to solve such problems, be willing and able to work with
others to implement their decisions, and have more and more enriched interpersonal
relations than their counterparts who do not participate.265  Whatever the mechanism of
this causal process, for it to occur members must be active participants, at least for a
significant period of time, for beneficial effects of association membership to occur.266
                    
     265  See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, supra note 175, at 14-15, 79.
     266  See SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 184 (1972) (concluding that members must be active
in an organization in order to acquire the skills that make increased political
engagement likely); Stolle, Bowling Alone, Bowling Together, supra note 246, at 515. 
For the view that there is no meaningful difference between the level of social capital
displayed by active and passive members, see Dag Wollebaek and Per Sell, Voluntary
Associations and Social Capital: Does Face to Face Interaction Really Matter, paper
presented at the ECPR Workshop “Social Capital and Interest Formation,” Copenhagen,
2000.
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In contrast to the data relating nonpolitical civic engagement to engagement in
political organizations and activities, the evidence is much clearer that involvement in
advocacy, political, or politically-oriented organizations causes additional political
engagement.  This is probably because leaders within such groups deliberately seek to
mobilize the members to engage in political activity outside the group to promote the
groups’ objectives.267  Empirical work has found such direct efforts to be effective.268  In
short, empirical work has found mobilization within a political association  to be an
effective mechanism for promoting more and subsequent civic involvement, especially
involvement in politics.
In sum, based upon current empirical studies, there is some evidence that
participation in a voluntary association will induce or cause additional civic activity on the
part of the participant, but the causal link appears to be far weaker than is often
assumed.  Further, where a causal link between the two has been documented, the
                    
     267  See ROSENSTONE & HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, supra note 175, at 83. The efforts of leaders of an association to encourage
the political participation of members may extend beyond the members’ original
incentives in joining in the first place.  See also Leighley, Group Membership and
Mobilization, supra note 264, at 452.
     268  See KNOKE, ORGANIZING FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 258, at 203-205;
Pollock, III, Organizations as Agents of Mobilization, supra note 222, at 500-01. Pollock
 examined primarily people who were active in purposive organizations, such as
“political action groups, lobbying organizations.” He found that such people got involved
in campaign activity because of mobilization rather than because of their political
attitudes. Noting that voting has not increased with educational levels (as would be
expected), whereas campaign activity and contacting have exceeded projected levels,
Pollock speculates that the increased preference for intense modes of political
participation, at the expense of voter turnout, is related to the decline in “system
supporting attitudes, such as political efficacy and political trust” [which would connect
with voting] and heightened activity in purposive organizations.  Id.
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effect seems to be attributable to mobilization by group members, especially group
leaders, to a far greater degree than it is to skills, confidence, or civic attitudes acquired
through participation in the “first” association.  In addition, confidence in a person’s own
or her organization’s political efficacy rather than generalized interpersonal trust appears
to be the attitude most likely to prompt civic engagement.  Given the embryonic stage of
empirical research in this area utilizing a high degree of methodological rigor, for the
time being it seems prudent to assume that future research is likely to find that the
relative importance of pre- and post-association factors will turn out to be context
dependent and not uniform.269
                    
     269  See, e.g., Marc Hooghe, Value Congruence within Voluntary Associations :
Ethnocentrism in Belgian Organizations, November 2001 (paper on file with the author).
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3.  The role of integration in socializing members of associations. 
Sociologists have also studied  the relationship between participation in voluntary
associations and civic attitudes.  Central to this research is the concept of “integration,” a
term of art referring to the way in which bonds form among people.  Voluntary
associations can be viewed as integrative in two ways.270  First, when members of
voluntary associations271 develop bonds with one another through their common activity
and goals, the process is referred to as “social-psychological integration.”272  The bonds
thus created constitute what Putnam calls the interpersonal trust of “bonding groups.”273
 Since people who bond  with each other through expressive associations,274 such as
weekly bridge games or square dancing, are not likely to be concerned with community
issues by virtue of their group bonds, the expectation is that their social-psychological
integration within the group would prompt little or no social integration outside the group
and, similarly, little or no civic engagement.275  As was noted in Part II, some
                    
     270  See Babchuk & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis, supra note 160, at 149
n.1.
     271  See supra notes 159-[plus 2] and accompanying text.
     272  See Babchuk & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis, supra note 160, at 149
n.1.
     273  For this term, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
     274  For the distinction between expressive and instrumental associations, see supra
Part III.A.
     275  Of course, their participation in expressive or bonding groups does not preclude
that they also participate in other types of groups.  For evidence that calls the
expectation referred to in the text into question, see infra notes 280-81 and
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commentators have argued that intra-group bonds may actually interfere with the
formation of bonds to the larger community.276
                                                                  
accompanying text. 
     276  See supra notes 51-52.
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It would seem that intra-group integration will also occur in instrumental
associations, but that social integration with a larger community will occur as well, since
by definition such groups aim at influencing people or policies external to the group to
gain the objectives they seek.277  As a consequence, members of such groups need to
recognize and operate in accordance with external cultural norms and practices, and
they may also develop certain "activist-type" skills, including a sense of the effectiveness
of working together as a group to accomplish their common purpose.  Belonging to
instrumental voluntary associations should, therefore, both dispose and equip enable
members to be civically active.278  Empirical research confirms this expectation to some
extent, but it suggests important limits on the type of social integration members acquire.
                    
     277  See Babchuk & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis, supra note 160, at 149
n.1. 
     278  See Jacoby, Correlates of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations, supra note
161, at 165; see also Bartolomeo J. Palisi & Perry E. Jacobson, Dominant Statuses and
Involvement in Types of Instrumental and Expressive Voluntary Associations, 6 J.
VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 80, 86 (1977) (hereinafter Dominant Statuses).  The data in
both articles were based upon student responses to questionnaires.
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An early study of students designed to test the proposition that members of
instrumental associations were more likely to be oriented toward “community activities
that may not provide much immediate gratification but which are generally considered
worthwhile and desirable,” in contrast to activities of members of expressive groups,
found that student subjects who joined associations for instrumental reasons were in fact
more likely than their expressive counterparts to be civically engaged, e.g., to vote,
watch educational and documentary television programs, and read newspapers and
news magazines thoroughly and daily.279  Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, however,
the instrumentally oriented students did not participate more in service organizations or
give blood in greater numbers than did students in expressively oriented groups.280 
Based upon this and other findings, the study raised the possibility that “[t]he
instrumental association member may well be an interested and concerned citizen, but
the interest and concern appears to be self-oriented and rather impersonal in nature. 
People are important primarily as objects to be manipulated to serve one's own ends.”281
                    
     279  They were also more likely to receive good grades and feel disappointed when
they did not get them.  Id.
     280  See Jacoby, Correlates  of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations, supra note
161, at 171.
     281  See Jacoby, Some Correlates  of Instrumental and Expressive Orientations,
supra note 161, at 172.  The data also showed that students who joined expressive
voluntary associations lived  with other people significantly more and reported having
many more friends than did students who preferred instrumental associations.  Id. at
166.  The author opined that people who join expressive associations or view the
associations they join as expressive do so because they value or need human
relationships, in contrast to loners, who appear not to possess such values and needs
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 If accurate, participation in voluntary associations is unlikely to facilitate the creation of
generalized interpersonal trust even if it succeeds in causing members to be civically
active.
                                                                  
to the same degree.  See Jacoby, Personal Influence and Primary Relationships, supra
note 215, at 82.  This is consistent with the possibility that people who participate in
expressive voluntary associations may be more civic minded than they would be if they
preferred solitary recreation, like watching television or computer games, because
group activity develops or reinforces personal ties and, as a consequence, a form of
social trust or social capital.  See Babchuck & Edwards, The Integration Hypothesis,
supra note 164, at 150, 151; see also PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 149.
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Several studies exploring the relationship between association participation and
social integration discovered that associational life often replicates and reinforces
socioeconomic inequalities.  In one, the data showed that associations made up
primarily of high status individuals are more influential than those whose members are
low status282 and that voluntary associations "which have high levels of affiliation also
appear to allocate that affiliation in ways which reinforce, rather than counteract, the
distribution of inequality in society."283  Other research showed that dominant status
students284 were more likely to be members of instrumental associations than were
subordinate status students; dominant status individuals were much more likely to join
voluntary associations whose goal was to obtain benefits for their members than groups
devoted to accomplishing some goal for the community outside the members; and when
dominant status individuals did join instrumental voluntary associations with a
community orientation they participated at a rate lower than the average participation
                    
     282  See McPherson, A Dynamic Model of Voluntary Affiliation, supra note 169, at
720. 
     283  McPherson, A Dynamic Model of Voluntary Affiliation, supra note 169, at 721,
724; see also id. at 720.  In the article, McPherson still acknowledges the integrative
effect of voluntary associations, even though he argues that the case has been
overstated.  Id. at 705 (citing studies that demonstrate societal integration).  He refines
his reservations in Pamela A. Popielarz & J. Miller McPherson, On the Edge or In
Between: Niche Position. Niche Overlap, and the Duration of Voluntary Memberships,
101 AM. J. OF SOC. 698 (1995) (hereinafter On the Edge or In Between).
     284   They distinguish "dominant" status people from "subordinate" status people,
based upon income, education, occupation, gender, age, marital status, and religion. 
See Palisi & Jacobson, Dominant Statuses, supra note 278, at 82-83.  The authors
develop the distinction in Lemon et al., Dominant Statuses and Involvement in Formal
138
rate for instrumental associations overall.285  The status reinforcing aspects of voluntary
associations may be due to their tendency 286 to be "overwhelmingly homogeneous,"
which inhibits contacts among dissimilar people.287  According to the authors of research
on the composition of voluntary associations,
[V]oluntary association homogeneity magnifies social differences,
rather than mitigating them.  When people are segregated into
homogeneous groups, access to the important resources that these
groups afford inevitably becomes concentrated in small social circles
rather than dispersed in the population.  These resources include
new social network ties (and the information and support that they
provide), as well as other forms of social capital and political
influence.288
Voluntary association homogeneity, in turn, is the norm because "new members
                                                                  
Voluntary Associations: A Systems Approach, 1 J. OF VOL. ACTION RES. 30 (1972).
     285  See Palisi & Jacobson, Dominant Statuses, supra note 278, at 82-83, 86.  
Because this study was of students, the level in school, major, and grade point average
were also components of dominant and subordinate status.  The study found that they
participated more in "for self" voluntary associations than for "for other" associations. 
The study also determined that the students were no more likely to participate in such
organizations than other people.  Id.
     286  See Palisi & Jacobson, Dominant Statuses, supra note 358, at 86 (citing Chapter
3 of EDWARD BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY REVISITED (1974)).
     287  See Popielarz & McPherson, On the Edge or In Between, supra note 283, at
698-99 and works cited there and 704.
     288  Popielarz & McPherson, On the Edge or In Between,  supra note 283, at 699.
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replicate the sociodemographic characteristics of old ones."289  Even when people
relatively dissimilar to existing members are in fact recruited, members at the periphery
of an association’s “niche” tend to leave the association sooner or at a higher rate than
those in its core.290  Thus, if homogeneous when first organized, they are likely to remain
                    
     289  Popielarz & McPherson, On the Edge or In Between, supra note 283, at 701.  To
test their hypothesis, the authors used gender and education, two easily identifiable
dimensions of network ties.  They also conjecture that future studies will show that
different dimensions exert different amounts of pressure on members.
     290  See Popielarz & McPherson, On the Edge or In Between, supra note 283, at
699-703.  The authors' explanation of this phenomenon is that "[f]or individuals at the
center of the niche, the group is an integral part of the social structure of relations.  But
for those at the edge of the niche, the group divides the social world rather than
reinforces it."  Id. at 704.
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that way, thereby limiting the possibility of "cross-category contact."291 
                    
     291  See Popielarz & McPherson, On the Edge or In Between, supra note 283, at
717.  The authors also found that competition among the groups for members was most
successful when a competing group sought to lure away members of another
association that were most dissimilar from those at the center of the target association,
assuming the members on the periphery of the first organization also happen to be in
the niche of the competing organization (the "niche overlap" effect).  Id. at 704-705. 
The authors found that the people are especially vulnerable to being lured away are
those who are at the periphery of the niche of group one and also within the niche of
group two ("niche overlap").  Id.  The consequence of competition among groups is thus
that the duration of memberships for those on the periphery is shorter than the durations
for those at the core.  In short, both the effect within associations and the effect among
associations act as homogenizing mechanisms for voluntary associations.  Id. at 715.
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In contrast to the preceding, research based upon Belgian survey data showed
that associations “catering for a highly educated part of the public, like environmental
groups, school boards, or human rights organizations” tended to be less ethnocentric
than other associations and reduced the level of prejudice among members even after
controlling for the effect of the higher educational levels of the members.  In contrast,
associations dominated by blue collar workers did not have a democratizing effect even
though they voiced explicitly anti-discrimination policies.292  The study concluded that
interaction among members by itself does not reduce prejudice; rather, “[a]ssociations
simply offer an amplification of the values the members bring into them.”293  These
findings are consistent with Swedish and German data that showed increased
generalized interpersonal trust in groups with a large percentage of foreigners
accompanied by significant self-selection.294
                    
     292  See Marc Hooghe, Socialization, Selective Recruitment and Value Congruence:
Voluntary Associations and the Development of Shared Norms, paper delivered at
Workshop 13 (“Voluntary Associations, Social Capital and Interest Mediation: Forging
the Link”), ECPR Joint Sessions 2000, Copenhagen, April 14-19, 2000 (based upon
original Belgian survey data, concluding that there is “value congruence” under such
conditions).
     293  See id. at 7.
     294  See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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In sum, empirical research thus suggests that the expectation that voluntary
associations will perform an important function integrating individuals within a group into
a diverse larger community has probably been overstated.  To the extent that a
voluntary association exhibits homogeneity or favors dominant status people, it is not
very likely to create generalized interpersonal trust, i.e., social bonds connecting its
members to people outside the group.  It is possible to speculate that this is because
interpersonal trust within an organization is in fact based upon an expectation of recipro-
city, however inchoate.  If that expectation is based upon a member’s experience with
other members of the group and an awareness of their common goals, there is no
reason to suppose it would spontaneously lead to a form of interpersonal trust extending
to individuals outside that member’s experience and not necessarily sharing those goals.
 The theories that attempt to bridge the gap between interpersonal trust specific to an
organization and generalized interpersonal trust by positing norms and networks
somehow common to both do not seem to be borne out by the empirical data.  Again
speculatively, it would seem that norms of cooperation are less suited to bear the weight
of these theories than would be norms further along the continuum between self-interest
and altruism, i.e., norms with moral content.  In any event,  for voluntary associations to
have the effect hoped for by optimistic civic renewal advocates, their composition and
dynamics need to be studied in greater depth, and stratagems need to be designed to
counteract the tendency of associations toward homogeneity and high-status influence
so that participation may reduce the stratification of people by education, income, status,
and so forth  that already exists in other areas of life.
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IV. CIVIC RENEWAL AND THE REGULATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
The civic renewal debate is a work in progress.  There is evidence pointing to a
long pattern of decline in significant areas of civic life, yet there is also evidence that the
decline has been sporadic, limited in scope, misinterpreted, or turned the corner.295 
Thus, civic life may have deteriorated since the 1960s or, alternatively, it may simply be
not as robust as we would want or expect in a country of widespread economic
prosperity and increasing levels of education.  There is also evidence that the locus of
civic engagement has shifted, not declined, as many individuals have come to view civic
engagement predominantly in terms of civil or social involvement or other face-to-face
encounters,  rather than political activity. 
Among those who believe that civil society has in fact witnessed a decline or
displays a lack of robustness, there is disagreement as to the causes, with political
institutions, social movements, restructuring of the labor force, growing disparities in
income and wealth, television, new technologies, individualism, materialism, and other
cultural ideas and changes among the frequently mentioned candidates.  Although there
is general agreement that civil society and civic life would benefit if people were more
civically engaged, the ultimate goal of civic reform (civic health) is also subject to varying
interpretations.
                    
     295  See supra note 1.
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Under conditions of uncertainty of this magnitude, it is difficult to chart a direction,
much less design concrete steps, for improving civic life.  In addition to this uncertainty,
there is a deep disagreement among those who concur on the need for civic life to be
more robust as to the appropriate roles of governmental and private actors.  Some view
government action in general and specific government actions in the last century as a
large part of the problem.296  Others believe that whatever the source of the problem,
legal enactments are not part of the solution.297  Still others argue that laws and other
government actions inevitably influence social, economic, and political norms, even if
that it is not the intent of those who drafted them.298  If so, it is irresponsible to ignore the
potential impact of government action at the national, state, or local levels; instead,
attention must be paid to the many ways in which government action and norms interact,
so that public actors play a constructive role in helping to ensure that the interactions
benefit rather than undermine civil society.299  Finally, there are civic renewal advocates
who believe that public and private actors working together or working concurrently in
                    
     296  See supra Part II.A.
     297  See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U.L. REV. 553 (arguing that law
“does not increase” either the strong or semi-strong forms of trust) (2001).
     298  See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021
(1996).
     299  See Richard Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2055, 2067-2076 (1996) (arguing that law and policy can destroy social capitol
by designing streets and neighborhoods without informal places for people to
congregate, by violating norms of fair dealing in its interactions with citizens, and by
injudicious attempts to incorporate social norms into law in situations where social
enforcement of them is preferable) .
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their respective spheres are a necessary part of the solution.300
                    
     300  See, e.g., PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1; Jane E. Schukoske,
Community Development Through Gardening: State and Local Policies Transforming
Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 351 (1999/2000) (arguing that state
or local legislation could greatly facilitate private transformation of vacant urban land
from dangerous eye-sores to community gardens conducive to community development
by authorizing access to resources and protecting gardeners from the threat of legal
liability) .
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This Part focuses primarily on one aspect of the role of law and civic renewal,
namely, the legal regulation of nonprofit institutions.  In particular, this Part will analyze
the Federal income tax rules governing the status and activities of what are called
“exempt organizations” in the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).301  The decision to
concentrate on this subset of a much larger topic is based on four considerations.  First,
many civic renewal advocates believe that participation in voluntary associations can, in
certain circumstances, improve civic life, whether because such participation is
intrinsically valuable, because of its instrumental value in furthering the goals sought by
associations, or because of the effects it has upon members.  Second, although the
subset of groups that request and receive exemption from Federal income taxation does
not exhaust the larger class of voluntary organizations,302 it accounts for a large
                    
     301  See supra note 4.
     302  Voluntary associations can be informal or formal. Informal voluntary
organizations may be subject to state law regulation, but they are not necessarily
required to file or register with the a state agency simply because they exist.  For
example, a duplicate bridge club or a garden club need not register or file unless, for
example they desire to solicit contributions subject to state solicitation laws.  Formal
voluntary organizations, in contrast, typically have some kind of organizing document,
such as articles of association, a charter, or articles of incorporation filed with a state
agency.  An organization seeking to be recognized as a nonprofit under state law is
usually required to file its organizing documents with the state and comply with any
other reporting requirements.  A copy of an entity’s organizing documents  must be
provided to the Internal Revenue Service as part of the process of applying for an
exemption from Federal income taxation or for charitable status.  See I.R.S. Forms
1023, 1024.  At the same time, most states make the receipt of Federal income tax
exemption a condition of receiving state income or sales tax exemption (although not a
condition of merely organizing as a nonprofit within the jurisdiction), or at least accept a
Federal determination letter as sufficient to apply for tax benefits in the state.  For an
overview of state law regulation of nonprofits and their staffs, see JAMES J. FISHMAN AND
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 60-316 (2d ed.
2000).
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proportion of all formal voluntary associations. Third, the regulation of exempt
organizations under the Code is the single most comprehensive regulatory structure
governing the character and content of the operations of these voluntary associations as
well as their structural and financial arrangements. Finally, Federal tax rules constitute
the primary source of regulation of exempt organization advocacy, lobbying, and
campaign activities–topics of obvious relevance for a discussion of the role of voluntary
associations in civic life and their potential utility as vehicles for civic engagement.303
A.  The Cooperation Perspective
As was discussed in Part II, one perspective animating the civic renewal debate
starts from the belief that a major purpose of an active civil society is to breed
interpersonal trust, social networks, and civic norms among people so as to facilitate
cooperation and collective action directed toward resolving societal problems and to
make government bodies responsive and accountable to citizens and citizen groups.304 
Participation in associational life is thus an instrumental good that derives its value from
the desirability of the economic, social, and political outcomes it furthers.
                    
     303  The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) is also important.  Its scope,
however, is much less comprehensive than the Code’s regulation of exempt
organization advocacy.
     304  Supra Part II.A.
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1.  Voluntary associations and cooperation.  As was discussed in Part III,
empirical research supports the thesis that voluntary associations can facilitate the twin
goals of cooperation and effective collective action associated with the first perspective
on civic health discussed above,305 even though their impact on the development of civic
attitudes has been exaggerated.  Small, instrumental voluntary associations may provide
a forum for people already predisposed to undertake a community-based or public
mission to come together, develop a plan for influencing those outside the group who
are in a position to further their mission, and allocate among the members tasks
conducive to persuading and motivating outside parties to act on their behalf.  The
internal dynamic of such associations leads the members to have a reasonable
expectation that the other members are committed and willing to expend their personal
resources to achieve the goal they share.  As a result, the members are likely to acquire
confidence in their own ability and the ability of their organization to influence decisions
related to the group’s concerns.    
Based upon the empirical research discussed in Part III, the basis of this
expectation is not yet understood.306  It may be a calculation that relies heavily on the
face-to-face character of members’ interactions and the visibility of members’ actions in
a small group.  It may be a sense of trust that members had prior to joining the group, or
one that arose or was strengthened from interactions within the group.  It may be a
transitory sense of common norms coupled with the confidence, based upon experience
                    
     305  See supra Part II.A.
     306  Supra Part III.C.
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with that or other groups, that the impact of unified and persistent groups is in general
far more effective than the efforts of a single person, however knowledgeable and
sophisticated. 
Large instrumental voluntary associations, including checkbook organizations or
“associations without members,” can also function as vehicles for effective collective
action by virtue of the financial resources they possess to spend on a paid staff,
professional lobbyists, Madison Avenue type advertising agencies, telemarketers, and
mass mailings to their members and others to galvanize them into an outpouring of
grass roots activity.307  Because of their greater resources, large associations may be
more effective at the national level or in circumstances requiring simultaneous,
coordinated action in a large number of states than are small instrumental organizations.
 Large voluntary associations can thus achieve a powerful external effect even if they
have little or no effect on the skills or civic engagement of their members apart from
eliciting financial support.  In fact, from the vantage point of “getting things done,” such
associations may frequently be more effective--especially at the federal, regional, or
state level--than small instrumental organizations made up of members who participate
actively.308
Small instrumental and large nonparticipatory organizations are thus well suited to
address and influence the resolution of many societal ills.  Even class action litigation
may be considered a voluntary association vehicle with great potential for cooperation
                    
     307  See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
     308  See Newton, Social Capital and Democracy in Europe, supra note 12
(distinguishing an organization’s internal impact from its external impact).
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and effective collective action, as can be seen from the many successes of civil rights,
environmental, and tort class action suits brought in the second half of the twentieth
century.309  This is the case even though it is rare for more than a handful of the
members of the class to participate in the litigation in a way that would engender any of
the attitudes, habits, skills, or behaviors often attributed to involvement in voluntary
associations in the civic renewal literature. 
                    
     309  SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 1, at 249-252.  Most civic renewal
advocates, however, consider the American litigious culture as part of the problem, not
the solution.  See FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 5, at 51.
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Civic renewal advocates writing from the cooperation perspective also expect that
participation in associations will increase the generalized interpersonal trust of the
members, i.e., that it will extend their intra-group interpersonal trust to trust of people
and groups outside the group, thereby enhancing the reservoir of social capital in the
larger communities of which they form a part.  The emergence of some kind of  ripple
effect is a critical component of the cooperation perspective argument, even if it is not
stated explicitly, because it is the predicate for believing that participation in voluntary
associations will lead to more efficient and effective cross- or inter-association
cooperation and correspondingly broad community outcomes.310
                    
     310  Some kind of ripple effect would explain Putnam’s conviction that there are
bridging effects of certain bonding associations such as choral societies and bowling
leagues.  See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 22-23.
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We have seen, however, that some empirical research supports the premise of
social integration or the emergence of generalized interpersonal trust resulting from
associational involvement, but that much research does not.311  One possibility
discussed in the preceding sections is that people join voluntary organizations because
they are predisposed to join, i.e., they already have the attitudes or habits disposing
them to civic engagement.312  To the extent that this is the causal sequence, in order to
ensure a robust civil society civic renewal efforts need to focus on the process whereby
such attitudes or habits are formed prior to joining.  Research to date has revealed that
education, social class, and attitudes and values learned at home, from friends, and at
schools are the most important sources of the disposition to join.313  Another finding was
that, where voting was concerned, direct mobilization by friends or activists in face-to-
face encounters was the most successful strategy, and that this was true regardless of 
the associational involvement of the person recruited.  Direct mobilization within groups
also tended to generate civic engagement outside the groups if members were
specifically recruited for that purpose.  Such mobilization occurred primarily in
instrumental voluntary associations, where a common, relatively specific goal rather than
a deep-seated or generalized norm of cooperation seemed to be the motivating force. 
At the very least, empirical research has so far failed to document that there is a
significant transformative effect on participants in most instrumental voluntary
                    
     311  See supra Part III.C.
     312  See supra notes 175-176, 180-194, 219-221, 228-234 and accompanying texts
and generally supra Part III.B.
     313  See supra Part III.B.
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associations, i.e., that members active in one association develop such habits of mind
and behaviors that they come to view civic engagement as an integral part of their
lives.314  Similarly, there have been conflicting accounts of the potential of non-
instrumental or expressive groups for generating generalized interpersonal trust  outside
the group.315  Thus, based upon the current state of research, civic renewal measures
embodying the first perspective should aim at increasing the amount of mobilization
within and by groups and other face-to-face requests for all kinds of civic engagement. 
In addition, future research should focus directly on which non-associational factors
create the disposition in people to join which types of groups .
                    
     314  See supra Part III.C.3.
     315  See supra Part III.C.3.
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2.  The regulation of exempt organizations.  The general contours of the
current system of regulation of exempt organizations are largely consistent with this
understanding.  First and foremost, the Code affords exemption from income taxes to
mutual benefit organizations as well as to charities and other entities dedicated to
enhancing social welfare.  Mutual benefit organizations include associations that
represent an industry (thus indirectly benefitting individual members of the industry) as
well as groups that benefit individuals directly.  Examples of the former are trade
associations and chambers of commerce; examples of the latter are certain fraternal
lodges, recreational groups, cemetery companies, and  veterans organizations.316  Labor
unions, which are exempt under section 501(c)(5) of the Code, can be seen as
benefitting both individual union members and the industries the unions represent.317
                    
     316  See I.R.C. §501(c)(6), (7), (8), (13), (19).
     317  See Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic
Virtues, 36 B.C.L REV. 279, 298-300 (1995) (arguing that unions, especially their
collective bargaining negotiations, benefit members by enabling them to engage in self-
governance as well as by affording them economic benefits).
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Some might question the rationale for giving a tax-favored status to mutual
benefit organizations, given that they exist to provide direct or indirect material and other
benefits to their members rather than to improve conditions of the disadvantaged or
otherwise confer a public benefit.  From the cooperation perspective, however, group
membership is presumptively beneficial for civic life, and groups that enable people to
combine to achieve a collective purpose that improves the members’ lives is an
important part of a robust civil society, both because of its accomplishment of the goals
of members and because of the emergence of an ethic of reciprocity, interpersonal trust,
or confidence among the members.  These organizations may act more efficiently on
behalf of and be more responsive to the needs of their members than would 
comparable government programs.  In addition, mutual benefit organizations often
sponsor informal, as well as formal, activities, both of which can be effective in creating
social ties.  The fact that mutual benefit groups primarily further the economic or social
interests of their members, rather than engage in charitable or community endeavors,
should not bar their favorable tax treatment given that civic life, according to the
cooperation perspective, should be the main vehicle for groups to address collective
problems in a mutually beneficial and cooperative fashion.318 The cooperation
                    
     318  Of course, some mutual benefit associations do engage in charitable endeavors
that help people outside the group; however, that is not the primary reason for their
creation and maintenance.
156
perspective thus affords a strong justification for this feature of the tax law treatment of
voluntary organizations.319
                    
     319  A second major respect in which the Code’s treatment of exempt organizations
other than charities furthers objectives of the cooperation perspective involves the
advocacy rules, discussed infra notes 333-347 and accompanying text.
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Although the broad structure of exemption from taxation under the Code for
certain kinds of noncharitable and charitable nonprofit organizations thus gains support
from the cooperation perspective, other features of Federal tax regulation of exempt
organizations do not necessarily further the vision of civic health assumed by that
perspective and some may actively obstruct its attainment.  The most important
illustration of the former category is the failure of tax law to distinguish between
organizations whose members are passive and those in which members are active
participants.  As was noted earlier, recent decades have seen an expansion of what
Theda Skocpol calls “associations without members,” i.e., associations whose members
“participate” primarily by writing checks to fund activities carried out exclusively by the
organization’s professional staff and paid contractors, such as advertising,
telemarketing, and lobbying firms.320  Members of such organizations are kept apprized
of issues of importance through the organization’s newsletter or other mailings.  They
thus have information for acquiring some expertise about these issues, the positions
taken by the organization, and its efforts to influence public policy, private actors, and
the legislative process.  However, they are not expected to participate in any of these
efforts unless the leadership asks them to write letters or make phone calls as part of a
grass roots lobbying campaign, vote, or send a check to the organization.  All of these
are activities that people can undertake as private individuals and, with the exception of
voting, while remaining at home.  Thus, at their most active, members of such
organizations acquire information, write checks, contact officials or individuals (often
                    
     320  See supra notes 151and accompanying text.
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using boilerplate messages conveyed to them by the organization), and vote.321  They
may acquire confidence in the ability of élites within their groups or professionals hired
by their groups to achieve certain goals on their behalf, but they will not participate in a
manner calculated to build interpersonal trust, social networks, the ethic of reciprocity, or
the habit of cooperation with one another, much less generalized interpersonal trust.322 
In short, associations whose members participate in only a minimal way are unlikely
sources of civic engagement because the relationships among people that civic
engagement presupposes arise primarily in settings where people work together in
common activities toward common goals.
                    
     321  There is evidence that the flow of information from association leaders to
members can create significant member loyalty and that, in certain situations, it can
offset the effects of centralized decisionmaking power and oligarchic staffing in an
association.  See David Knoke, Commitment and Detachment in Voluntary
Associations, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 141, 143-44, 153-54 (1981).
     322  See Jeffrey M. Berry, The Rise of Citizen Groups, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 177, at 367.
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For the tax law to encourage the development of civic engagement according to
this point of view,  it would have to acknowledge the importance of participation, as
contrasted with mere membership.323  The Code could do this by favoring through tax
benefits organizations in which significant participation is a prerequisite of membership
or those in which, as an historical matter, a significant portion of members do participate
actively.  Alternatively, the tax law could favor through tax benefits the individuals who
participate, or who participate significantly in exempt groups.  Under the present system,
individuals are entitled to deduct from their gross income the dollar value of contributions
of property, in cash or in kind, made to organizations acknowledged as charities by the
Service.324  There is no contribution deduction, however, for rendering services to or
volunteering for a charitable entity except for documented expenses incurred while
volunteering, e.g., for transportation or purchases.325
The reason for this disparity is often stated in terms of the administrative difficulty
of valuing people’s services.  For example, how would the Service value one hour of a
                    
     323  Under current tax law, a member of a charity is someone who pays dues, makes
a donation that is not nominal, or volunteers for more than a nominal amount of time. 
Treas. reg. §56.4911-5(f)(1) (applying to a public charity with a section 501(h) election
in effect).  See also Treas. reg.  §1.170A-9(e)(7)(iii) (defining a charity’s support, in part,
in terms of membership fees made “to provide support for the organization rather than
to purchase admissions, merchandise, services, or the use of facilities”).
     324  See I.R.C. §170(a).  The amounts that can be deducted as charitable
contributions by individuals are limited to a percentage of an individual’s adjusted gross
income and are restricted by the type of property contributed and by certain attributes of
the charitable donee.  See I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1).  The charitable contribution deduction for corporations is similarly limited. 
See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). 
     325  See Treas. reg. §1.170A-1(g); Levine v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1987-413, 54
T.C.M. 209.
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lawyer’s time donated to a charity?  By the going market rate? If so, which market rate? 
The market rate for entry level attorneys?  For attorneys with the same qualifications as
the attorney-donor?  For attorneys with the same qualifications as the attorney-donor in
big firms?  In small firms?  Based upon averages in big cities? In all cities?  Including
average rates for attorneys with similar experience in the public sector? 
Although this valuation problem is real, the argument against a tax benefit for
participating in or volunteering for charities that is based upon administrative difficulty is
not as persuasive as it first seems once one considers the counterpart difficulty of
valuing many forms of in-kind contributions of property, e.g., works of unknown artists,
libraries of used and out-of-print books, stock in closely-held corporations, or second-
hand clothes–the value of all of which are entitled to a charitable contribution deduction
under the Code.  To avoid administrative difficulties in valuing services donated, tax law
could allow those who volunteer in charitable organizations serving the disadvantaged,
for example, to receive a tax deduction in acknowledgment of the time and effort
donated using a standard rate per hour set by the Service perhaps based upon the
average hourly compensation for Americans workers.326  Using a single flat rate would
have the effect of assigning an equal value to one hour of anyone’s efforts as a
volunteer in such a charity.  Some charities already keep records of the number of hours
                    
     326  Such a flat rate option is currently available for certain business deductions.  See
Rev. Proc. 2001-54, 2001-48 I.R.B. 530 (permitting taxpayers to calculate the deduction
using the I.R.C. standard mileage rate or actual costs).  The proposal in the text would
not permit an “actual costs” option.
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worked by volunteers for various purposes327 and they would probably find such
recordkeeping cost effective if it elicited a higher rate of member participation.  The
provisions of charitable tax law as currently structured, in contrast, appear to favor the
value of property over the value of work.328  In any event, since data show that people
                    
     327  For example, some states require students to engage in community service for a
certain number of hours in order to graduate from high school.  See Code of Maryland
Regulations, Title 13A, Subtitle 03, Chapter 01.02.F(11) (providing that each local high
school system should include activities, programs, and practices that “provide
appropriate opportunities for students to participate in community service”) and infra
note 422. Since students are required to document their service with a written statement
from each facility where they volunteer, these charities have already established
procedures for record keeping.    
     328  Arguably this favoritism is compounded by the tax-favored status of charitable
gifts of appreciated property.  See I.R.C. §170(e)(1).  Ellen Aprill argues, in contrast,
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who volunteer and their households contribute significantly more in financial terms than
their nonvolunteering counterparts,329 both the goal of increasing revenues donated to
charities and the value of appearing evenhanded as between the societal importance of
volunteering and making a financial contribution to charity suggest adopting public
policies that somehow encourage the former as well as the latter.
                                                                  
that from the perspective of dollar efficiency and price elasticity, which could influence
taxpayer behavior, those who itemize experience a tax neutral outcome, whereas for
those who do not itemize, “the income tax system creates a distortion in favor of “gifts of
time.”  Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42
B.C.L. Rev. 843, 863 (2001).  My argument, however, assumes a decision made by
someone who works full time for pay and is trying to decide to give money or time to a
charity.  Assuming the taxpayer is not also an economist, the contribution alternative
may look superior because it generates a contribution deduction.  (Economists are
themselves in disagreement as to the likelihood that the contribution deduction actually
affects the level of charitable contributions, especially among low and middle-income
taxpayers with relatively low marginal rates.  See id. at 856-61.)
     329  Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra note
328, at 863-64.
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A second argument against allowing a charitable contribution deduction for
volunteering at a charitable organization rests upon notions of tax neutrality.  The
existing deduction provisions are neutral as between someone who volunteers at a
charity for a day and someone who works a day and donates her earnings to the charity
and then takes a  deduction.330  Were tax law to authorize charitable contribution
deductions for volunteering, in other words, it would upset the existing tax neutrality.331 
The neutrality upon which this argument is constructed, however, is in regard to dollar
efficiency, so that the Code is neutral as between two equally efficient uses of dollars. 
The civil society argument, in contrast, would not take its bearing by dollar efficiency
exclusively.  Rather, it would seek to compare the direct impact of a tax provision in
creating inefficiency with the potential indirect positive civic impacts, one of which would
be increased cooperation, leading to increased civic outcomes, including an increment in
                    
     330 See Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra
note 328, at 862-64.
     331  In contrast to the situation described in the text, the Code is not neutral if the
hypothetical taxpayer is a nonitemizer.  See Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the
Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra note 328, at 863.
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effective collective action.  Depending upon the outcome of this calculation, instituting a
charitable deduction for contributions of services might further the goals of the
cooperation perspective.332
                    
     332  Ellen Aprill, Mark Gergen, Mark Hall, and John Columbo have all considered,
and rejected completely or as unproven, an economic efficiency argument in favor of a
charitable contribution deduction for contributions to churches.  See Aprill, Churches,
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra note 328, at 864-67; Mark A.
Hall & John D. Columbo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); and Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988). 
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Another area where the tax law fails to further the cooperation perspective on
civic health, one in which the tax law arguably obstructs the attainment of cooperation, is
its regulation of lobbying and political campaign activities by charities.  Under current
law, public charities are permitted to attempt to influence legislation only if their lobbying
is not “substantial,”333 and private foundations are not permitted to lobby at all.334  There
is an absolute prohibition against either public charities or private foundations are in
political campaign activities.335  Other exempt organizations, in contrast, are in general
permitted to engage in lobbying or take part in political campaigns, although some
restrictions may apply to individual categories of exemption.336  Given the importance for
                    
     333  See I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (requiring that “no substantial part of [such an entity’s]
activities is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)).  Treas. reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)
elaborates on this restriction, as do I.R.C. §§ 501(h) and 4911 and the regulations
thereunder.  I.R.C. § 501(h) and § 4911 apply the “no substantial part” test by
establishing a maximum percentage of an organization’s expenditures for its exempt
purposes that can be spent on attempting to influence legislation.  An organization must
elect to have its legislative activities judged under this test.  Otherwise, the Service and
the courts will assess the substantiality of an organization’s attempts to influence
legislation under the case law, possibly including the centrality of such attempts relative
to the organization’s purpose(s) and the extent of volunteer activities as well as the
amount of its expenditures in the calculation.
     334  See I.R.C. § 4945.
     335  See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4945, 4955, Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i), (iii).  For
an analysis of this prohibition from a  civil society perspective, see infra notes XX-YY
and accompanying text.
     336  See Melissa Waller Baldwin, Comment: Section 501(c)(3) and Lobbying: The
Case for the Local Organization, 23 OHIO N.U. LAW. REV. 203, 212-213 (1996); Galston,
Lobbying and the Public Interest, supra note 155, at 1276-77 (summarizing the lobbying
regulations for exempt organizations other than charities).  The Code and Treasury
regulations are silent on political campaign activities undertaken by non-charitable
exempt organizations other than those described by section 501(c)(4).  See Treas. reg.
§1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).  This implies that any restrictions on the lobbying or political
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the collective action perspective of learning civic, including political, skills, attitudes,
habits, and practices and of being able to engage in cooperative efforts to influence
public policy, this aspect of the regulation of charitable organizations seems to leave a
vacuum in those organizations dedicated to providing public goods, like the environment
or education, or improving the lives of disadvantaged third-parties rather than the lives of
their members.  The consequence is to deprive people desiring to engage in public-
spirited or altruistic behaviors of an important collective opportunity for influencing the
political process, It also impairs the ability of non-affluent people to influence the political
process through churches, which are often their primary associational affiliation.  Finally,
these restrictions deprive charitable institutions desirous of promoting the special
interests of the disadvantaged from engaging in advocacy to the same degree as their
self-interested, mutual benefit or recreational exempt counterparts can.  Given that high-
wealth individuals can exert influence on political decisionmaking through their personal
campaign  contributions or through noncharitable exempt organizations, such as trade
associations or social clubs, that are not subject to the lobbying and campaign
restrictions restricting charities, the existing tax law limitations on charities appear to
create an unfair playing field against organizations presumptively acting in the public
interest or for disadvantaged populations and in favor of the affluent and the
associations they support.
The lobbying restrictions on public charities and private foundations are, of
                                                                  
campaign activities of noncharitable exempt organizations would thus be derived
exclusively from the nature of their exempt purposes and thus would not be likely to
intrude on their ability to pursue their missions.
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course, a product of several public policies embodied in the tax law,337 which might
outweigh the public policy implications of cooperation perspective on civic health.  A
major stumbling block to assessing the competing policy claims arises from the fact that
the tax law advocacy restrictions were evolving and becoming codified during the first six
decades of the twentieth century, in a period  prior to the time during which a decline in
civic engagement is said to have occurred.338  It is thus unlikely that the need to adopt
                    
     337  See, e.g., Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency:
Designing A Nondiversion Constraint, 56 S.M.U.L.REV. 675 (2003); John D. Colombo,
The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating
Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 657, 667-89
(2001); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy, supra note 158, at 585; Nina J.
Crimm, Evolutionary Forces: Changes in For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Health Care
Delivery Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C.L. Rev. 1
(1995); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Non-Profit
Organizations, 31 B.C.L. REV. 501 (1990); Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit
Corporations, 80 MICH L. REV. 999 (1982); Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for
Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
     338  For the development of the policies underlying the lobbying restrictions, see
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measures to encourage civic engagement and advocacy was a factor in the policy
considerations.
                                                                  
Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 215-20 (1987); Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest,
supra note 155, at 1282-85 (describing the evolution of the neutrality justification for the
restrictions on lobbying by section 501(c)(3) organizations).
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Before concluding that the current restrictions on the advocacy by public charities
and private foundations should be relaxed, several additional aspects of tax regulation of
these entities should be considered.  First, public charities are already permitted to
attempt to influence  lawmaking as long as such activities do not constitute a substantial
part of their operations.339  Thus, one question is whether the existing regulation of
lobbying by charities affords them sufficient opportunity to enable their members to
engage in cooperative practices and effective collective action in pursuit of their goals. 
The answer may well depend on the size and other characteristics of the organization. 
For example, consider a  public charity with an annual budget of no more than $500,000.
 It is possible that the current section 501(h) election expenditure limit of 20 percent of
the charity’s annual expenditures would be adequate to enable its members to lobby
lawmakers effectively, especially if the lobbying were done by staff or volunteers rather
than by hired lobbyists.340  To stay within the lower grass roots lobbying expenditure
limit,341 however, would be difficult since this limit is permitted to be no more than one
                    
     339  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
     340  For this limit, see I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2).  Exempt purpose expenditures include
most of an organization’s annual expenditures other than certain expenses of fund-
raising.  See I.R.C. §4911(e)(1).  The costs of informing organization members about
legislation of direct interest to the organization are not in general considered lobbying
(or grass roots lobbying) expenses unless the organization also urges its members to
communicate with lawmakers or to urge others to do so.  Thus, the charities in question
could inform their members about legislative matters of interest to them without
incurring costs that count as lobbying expenditures. In addition, lobbying actions that
members take without having been urged to do so are unlikely to be attributed to their
organizations.
     341  See I.R.C. § 4911(c)(4) (calculating the grass roots lobbying cap for electing
charities as one-fourth of the overall lobbying cap).
170
fourth of the overall lobbying limit.  The organization would have to restrict the frequency
of its mailings, use volunteers to phone or canvass neighborhoods, use the internet for
many of its communications, or avail itself of some combination of these methods and
still might exceed its grass roots lobbying limit.  This circumstance points to the
desirability of recently introduced  legislation that would eliminate the distinction between
direct and grass roots lobbying, enabling an electing charity to use any or all of its
permissible lobbying expenditures for grass roots lobbying.342
Would restricting a hypothetical organization with a $500,000 annual budget,
$100,000 of which could be spent on lobbying, interfere with its potential as a breeding
ground for habits of cooperation and an ethic of reciprocity among its members?  This
question is impossible to answer without knowing the histories, operations, and
dynamics of actual organizations with the annual exempt purpose expenditures
described and in the absence of research on the relative effectiveness of expensive,
professional as against inexpensive, volunteer and internet communications.  In
principle, the lobbying expenditure caps imposed on a charitable organization making
the section 501(h) election could have a salutary effect by forcing it to rely on its
members and provide them with opportunities to participate actively in its internal and
external affairs.  To be effective grass roots lobbyists, volunteers would have to be
informed enough to answer the questions posed by their neighbors or others whose
votes they seek to influence.  If they were to go door to door or button hole people at the
supermarket to communicate their message, they would be more actively involved in
                    
     342  H.R. 7, S. 256, 108th Cong. § 303 (CARE Act of 2003).
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face-to-face discussions than they would be watching the news or campaign
advertisements on television at home or even writing a letter to the editor of the local
newspaper.
The desirability of the lobbying limitations on charities cannot, however, be
determined in a vacuum.  Organizations entitled to a charitable exemption are not the
only players seeking what are often scarce public resources.  Non-charitable
organizations  frequently devote extremely large sums of money to lobbying campaigns,
and they avail themselves of professional lobbyists, buy radio or television time, hire
telemarketing firms, and the like.343  Although legislative battles are not always won by
the biggest spenders, it would nonetheless not further the goals of the cooperation
perspective if collective actions by engaged and active citizens were routinely
overwhelmed by the sophistication and financial resources of professional élites. 
Whether the lack of symmetry in the tax law restrictions on lobbying in fact has this
effect is an empirical question, and the answer may depend on the legislative forum
(local, state, national), the subject matter of the legislation, or the type of decision maker
                    
     343  This discussion is limited by including lobbying only by exempt organizations. 
The implications are, however, broader than first appears because corporate funds in
legislative battles are frequently funneled through exempt organizations, especially
section 501(c)(6) trade associations and section 501(c)(4) advocacy organizations. 
Business interests use them for advocacy because this enables businesses to pool their
funds and coordinate their efforts so as to maximize their impact.  Business interests
may prefer exempt advocacy groups even when the legislative issues involved are at
the state level and the trade association, for example, is national, since members of an
industry in all parts of the country are frequently concerned about the fate of legislation
or a referendum in one state.  As a result of legislation passed in 1993, there is no
longer a business expense deduction for the cost of lobbying.  See I.R.C. § 162(e). 
When business interests contribute to (noncharitable) organizations, they are permitted
a business expense deduction for the amount contributed except for any portions of the
contribution that are earmarked for or in fact used for lobbying.  See I.R.C. §162(e). 
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involved, e.g.an official, a  formal body, or the public itself, as in an initiative or
referendum.
To a certain extent, the Federal tax law already addresses the potential problems
arising from asymmetries in the regulation of lobbying by charities as compared with
other exempt organizations.  As was noted above, section 501(c)(4) organizations are
permitted to lobby without limit, as long as most of the lobbying is related to the groups’
exempt purposes.344  Public charities and private foundations are permitted to establish
section 501(c)(4) affiliate organizations, and the latter can for the most part share their
name,345 board of directors, officers, premises, and so on, as long as no funds of the
charity are used to assist the section 501(c)(4) organization in any way and the officers
and directors of each organization satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities to the groups as
separate legal entities.  Thus, a section 501(c)(4) organization must pay fair market
value to its affiliated section 501(c)(3) charity for such things as rent, the use of office
support, and the use of the charity’s list of contributors and board meetings for the two
entities must be kept wholly separate even if the directorates are overlapping.346 
                    
     344  See Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2); see also Rev. Rul. 71-530, 1971-2 C.B.
237, 237-38 (holding that a section 501(c)(4) organization may have lobbying for social
welfare as its sole purpose).  Although the amount of such an organization’s lobbying is
not limited, its character is: to qualify for section 501(c)(4) status, it s activities must be
primarily directed toward “promoting in some way the common good and general
welfare of the people of the community.”  Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i). 
     345  Under state law, the names of the two entities must be sufficiently distinct that
third parties will not be confused.  Save the Long-Haired Chinchillas, Inc. and Save the
Long-Haired Chinchillas Advocacy, Inc. would satisfy this requirement.
     346  For examples of the possible relationships between section 501(c)(3) and
501(c)(4) organizations, see GREGORY L. COLVIN & LOWELL FINLEY, THE RULES OF THE
GAME:  AN ELECTION YEAR GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 42-44 (1996)
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Affiliations of this kind are very common.  Less frequently, an established section
501(c)(4) entity creates a companion 501(c)(3) organization to engage in useful non-
advocacy activities, such as issues research, distribution of issues information, and
other educational endeavors that can be funded with charitable contributions.347  Thus,
as long as the regulations governing the various relationships between the two entities
are carefully observed, charities can influence the public policy process through their
sister section 501(c)(4) advocacy organizations.
                                                                  
(hereinafter RULES OF THE GAME).  There are detailed regulations governing such
relationships, including the use section 501(c)(4) organizations can make of the
research or work product of section 501(c)(3) organizations without jeopardizing the
charity’s exempt status.
     347  See COLVIN & FINLEY, RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 346, at 45-46.
In short, the limitations on lobbying by charities do not seem to prevent them from
engaging in legislative advocacy.  Rather, the primary effect is to deprive such entities of
the ability to lobby a substantial amount with funds favored by the charitable contribution
deduction.  Where the Code is deficient is in its failure to privilege associational
participation over mere membership.  To encourage participation through tax incentives,
the tax law could privilege exempt organizations that are predominantly participatory,
even if they are not exempt as charitable entities, or it could offer a deduction to the
people who participate, possibly requiring a minimum level of participation within a
specific time frame (an average of five hours a week for forty weeks, for example) to
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increase the likelihood that participation will promote civic objectives.  Alternatively, tax
law could limit the amount of legislative activity engaged in by all exempt organizations,
i.e., by the non-charitable associations currently under minimal or no restrictions, for
example, by creating dollar or percentage caps.  These suggestions could have the
salutary effect of encouraging noncharitable exempt organizations to rely to a far greater
degree on volunteers and other low-cost personal contacts rather than television
advertising, telemarketing, and professional lobbyists.  The last suggestion, however,
would be virtually impossible to implement for political reasons, since noncharitable
exempt organizations already have an entrenched interest in the current regulatory
scheme.  The suggestion could possibly raise constitutional issues relating to the right of
free speech and free association.
B.  The Self-Governance Perspective
1.  Voluntary associations and self-governance.  The notion of civic health
as cooperation and effective collective action is consistent with the theoretical view that
the purpose of political life is to translate the wishes or preferences of citizens into public
outcomes–be they laws or policies or allocations of resources--as faithfully and
efficiently as possible.  An active citizenry is important for the cooperation perspective to
achieve this end.  According to the self-governance perspective,348 in contrast, to be
meaningful civic engagement should expose people to participatory and deliberative
endeavors rather than merely to cooperative and collective ones.  Participatory
associational activities are necessary because self-governance presuppose that citizens
                    
     348  See supra Part IV.B.  For the meaning of self-governance in the civic renewal
perspective, see Part II.B.
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engage in the decision making, whether formal or informal, that will structure and give
content to important aspects of their lives.  Deliberative communications are also
important, according to this perspective, to assure that people’s decisions are informed
and that discussions take into account a variety of interests and points of view, and not
just those of a single part.  This perspective thus assumes that, in connection with some
issues, people’s understandings of their own purposes may change through discussion
and deliberation.  In some situations, deliberation will expose not only conflicts of interest
among separate interests, but also conflicts between some or all of the separate
interests (and coalitions of such interests) and what is arguably the public interest, for
example, fair allocations of resources, intergenerational justice, and justice between
developing and developed nations.
From the self-governance perspective, then, the goal of cooperation and effective
collective action would fall short of the civic ideal if it only influences social or political
outcomes by exerting pressure on communities, institutions, and leaders without at the
same time providing an occasion for citizen participation and reflection on both means
and ends.  Small voluntary associations are thus in general preferable to large or
checkbook organizations because the former are more likely to provide opportunities for
participation by members than the latter.  Large and other nonparticipatory organizations
usually have small boards relative to the size of the membership, professional staffs,
and contracts with lobbyists and even public relations companies to help them achieve
their goals.  Although “associations without members”349 may be extremely effective
                    
     349  This is the phrase of Theda Skocpol.  See supra note 151 (referring to large,
bureaucratic voluntary associations with very large membership rolls that require little of
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vehicles of collective action, they provide few opportunities for members to contribute to
or learn from the association’s decision making process.
There is little empirical research devoted to the deliberative character of
participation in voluntary associations.  However, the proposition that voluntary
associations in general, and small organizations in particular, tend to be homogeneous
and to recruit members that share one another’s views has been confirmed
empirically.350  This fact suggests that deliberative opportunities within small
organizations will tend to be circumscribed because of the similarity of the members’
views on the issues importance to the organizations.  The homogeneity of members
views, especially as relates to an organization’s purpose, in turn, virtually ensures that
discussions will be about means, rather than ends, and even discussions about means
may be limited by a common orientation on the part of the members (ethnic, religious,
liberal or conservative, or consumers versus business).  
                                                                  
their members beyond writing a check to help support the organization's activities).
     350  See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, many voluntary associations disseminate newsletters to their
members that contain information useful for gaining an informed understanding of the
organizations’ positions and many organize lectures, panels, and debates.  Some
voluntary associations engage in efforts to disseminate information on a range of topics
in an accessible way, including the use of web sites that can reach shut-ins and
others.351  Were these associations to undertake to host, publish, or otherwise provoke
“a wide range of competing arguments” in circumstances capable of eliciting “careful
consideration,”352 they could contribute to the creation of a culture of deliberation among
their members and other audiences.  Absent a deliberate effort to promote balanced
information and discussion, however, voluntary associations are likely to produce a
stream of information that is not calculated to encourage debate and that could
discourage it if the “facts” and “arguments” presented in communications are targeted to
members or recipients already sharing or sympathetic to the organization’s views and
goals.  The latter possibility is, in fact, what most  organizations intend when they buy
the mailing lists of other groups known to target comparable populations.
2.  The regulation of exempt organizations.  As was noted above,
participation in certain types of voluntary associations--such as neighborhood
organizations and parent-teacher groups as well as some local chapters of labor unions
and trade organizations--appears to further civic health understood in terms of autonomy
and self-governance by providing a forum for members of geographical or other
                    
     351  See infra notes 364-368 and accompanying text.
     352  See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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communities of interest to debate, design, and promote specific public policies and
public practices that they consider beneficial to their respective groups.353  Although
there is obvious overlap with the ends and means characteristic of the collective action
perspective, the fulcrum of the self-governance perspective is nourishing problem
solving at the community or local level in a manner that maximizes thoughtful and
responsible decision making.354
                    
     353  See supra Part II.B.
     354  This is not inconsistent with the collective action perspective, but neither is it
required by it.  See infra [last paragraph this section].
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The Federal tax law regulating exempt associations makes possible the formation
of community groups capable of solving local problems on their own by providing a
mechanism for pooling individuals’ resources without certain adverse tax consequences
that would apply, were it not for their exempt status.  For example, without exempt
status, charities, fraternal societies, veterans organizations, social welfare groups, and
other mutual benefit organizations  would be unable to collect and invest dues from
members for funding long-term projects without being subject to income taxation on their
annual net income.355  Exempt status thus enables individuals to pool their financial
resources efficiently, i.e., without penalizing members for saving pooled amounts.  The
ability to save pooled amounts makes it possible for exempt entities to aggregate larger
amounts than would be possible on an ad hoc basis at the time an actual expenditure was
under consideration and to engage in long-term planning, such as creating a sinking fund for
capital expenditures by a homeowners’ group or accumulating unemployment or strike funds
                    
     355  See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(1)-(28).  Homeowner groups are similarly exempt on such
income, although their exemption is not authorized by I.R.C. section 501(a).  See I.R.C.
§ 528.
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for union members.356 
                    
     356  Some commentators have argued that not much tax is actually forgiven as a
result of the exemption under section 501(a) as long as an organization’s revenues can
be offset by administrative and program expenditures.  See John Simon, The Tax
Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 67 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).  Recent
statistics based upon Forms 990 and 990EZ suggest the opposite.  See Paul
Arnsberger, Charities and Other Exempt Organizations, 1997, in 20 STAT. OF INCOME
BULL. 47, 50 (2000) (Figure D).   The “excess of revenue over expenses” in Figure D
does not include investment income, which is a substantial source of income to some
charities, such as colleges and foundations. 
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These features of tax law do not guarantee the development of self-governance in the
comprehensive sense discussed earlier, i.e., as including both a sense of obligation and
informed deliberation.357  In fact, the very same features of tax law facilitate both the
existence of well-endowed groups with no sense of or inclination for deliberation or
community-oriented decision making as well as other groups with the purpose and ability to
devise thoughtful and long-term plans to strengthen a community.  However, without the
ability to form associations with substantial and dependable resources, it would be difficult for
private parties to undertake and coordinate long-term, community-wide solutions to local
problems.  Further, without this ability, it would impossible for such groups to dilute the power
of centralized government bodies and to prevent  them from imposing solutions on local
communities from above.  In short, organizations often need the opportunities provided
through Federal income tax exemption to perform both functions deemed critical to the self-
governance perspective, i.e., informed deliberation about community-wide policies and
serving as a counterpoise to centralized government actions.
                    
     357  See supra Part II.B.
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The Federal income tax treatment of charities, in contrast, does have the potential to
further these two goals.  In particular, it gives section 501(c)(3) organizations the ability to
raise money through charitable contributions that afford deductions to the donors from their
income subject to taxation.  The charitable deduction provision encourages private
individuals who itemize deductions to support charitable entities engaged in the type of
public benefit considered important to them, e.g., education, health, social services, religion,
or cultural activities.358  The charitable contribution deduction is frequently defended on the
ground that the support of private individuals enables charities to undertake different kinds of
projects than would government decision makers.359  Specifically, charities can take risks,
consider novel, experimental, or unpopular ideas, and in other ways enhance the diversity of
efforts to improve social welfare.360  Correspondingly, association members can also have
                    
     358  The extent of the incentive effect is extremely controversial.  See CHARLES T.
CLOTFELDER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING (1985); Aprill, Churches,
Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra note 328, at 856-67; R.
Rickert and P. Westfall, New Evidence on the Price Elasticity of Charitable
Contributions, 90 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N 1 (1993) (finding that charitable contributions are
affected by the contribution deduction but not by tax rate differences); LOUIS A. TALLEY,
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS: PROS AND CONS OF DEDUCTIBILITY (1990); George McCully,
Charitable Tax Incentives Are Worth Fighting For, PHILANTHROPY (May/June 2002)
(finding that states with an income tax but without charitable tax incentives scored
among the lowest in charitable giving) .
     359  See JAMES DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY? THE CASE FOR A THIRD SECTOR
133-36 (1983) (arguing that foundations are not subject to the same time constraints as
government actors); John Simon, Foundations and Public Controversy: An Affirmative
View, in THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS 58, 82 (Fritz F. Heimann ed., 1973)
(arguing that the need to be reelected frequently prevents lawmakers from sponsoring
controversial projects).
     360  See DOUGLAS, WHY CHARITY?, supra note 359, at 133-37; Cheit & Theodore E.
Lobman III, Private Philanthropy and Higher Education: History, Current Impact, and
Public Policy Considerations, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 453, 492, 493
(1977) [hereinafter FILER COMMISSION]; Albert M. Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy:
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the luxury of making decisions slowly, if necessary, and seeking out information without the
political pressures that can overwhelm public officials, as can the donors who fund them.361 
To the extent that these possibilities are realized, charitable associations will contribute
importantly to informed and thoughtful collective actions both because of donors who
scrutinize the goals and operations of potential recipients and the ability of recipient
organizations to be more deliberative and innovative than government officials.
                                                                  
An Institutional View, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 524, 531 (1960).  Not all commentators agree
that charities are especially open to innovation and experimentation.  See Gergen, Case
for a Charitable Contribution Deduction, supra note 332, at 1410.
     361  Supra note 359.  Of course, there can be pressures involved in meeting the
demands of large private donors as well.
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The preceding discussion highlights the opportunities for enhancing self-governance
that the tax law governing exempt organizations may facilitate.  However, the charitable
contribution deduction rules do not guarantee such outcomes or even predisposes
organizations and their members and donors in that direction.362  In contrast, in one area the
                    
     362  The tax rules impose financial accountability standards, and other organizational
and operational requirements, but they do not in general require qualitative judgments
as to the desirability of specific charitable purposes or specific projects undertaken by
charitable entities.  See Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1. When the IRS departs from
substantive neutrality in applying the exempt organization rules, it always gets in
trouble, sometimes deservedly so (in this author’s view), as when it denied charitable
status to associations devoted to issues concerning homosexuals.  See Tommy F.
Thompson, The Availability of the Federal Tax Exemption for Propaganda
Organizations, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487 (1985).  In the last two decades, the IRS’s
battles with the Church of Scientology have been widely documented.  See Frank Rich,
SCIENTOLOGISTS SCARE EVEN IRS, SO. BEND TRIBUNE (Indiana) Mar. 20, 1997, at
A15; Intimidating the IRS, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 11, 1997, at 12A (Editorial);
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regulations are drafted so as to encourage informed and deliberative consideration of issues.
 As was noted earlier, tax law prohibits lobbying by private foundations, permits lobbying by
public charities with a section 501(h) election as long as lobbying expenditures do not
exceed a percentage of exempt purpose expenditures, and permits lobbying by non-electing
public charities as long as it does not constitute a substantial part of the organization’s
activities.363  The tax law also provides that a certain kind of informational communication
made by private foundations or public charities to their members, lawmakers, or the public in
general is not considered  lobbying, even if the communication goes so far as to advocate a
particular position or viewpoint on specific legislation,
so long as there is a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts to
enable the public or an individual to form an independent opinion or
conclusion.  The mere presentation of unsupported opinion, however, does
not qualify....364
                                                                  
Todd Woody, War of Words; The Scientology church wants filings containing 'atrocious
lies' sealed, THE RECORDER, Nov. 22, 1995, at 1; Lisa Stansky,  Scientology Tax Case
Before 9th Circuit; IRS is demanding tens of thousands of documents; church calls it
harassment, THE RECORDER, May 6, 1992, at 3.
     363  See supra notes 333-336 and accompanying text.
     364  Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c)(1)(ii).  The regulation also provides that
communications that are published or broadcast as part of a series will usually be
judged together to determine if the nonpartisan standard has been met.  See Treas. reg.
§56.4911-2(c)(1)(iii).  Thus, if a charity produces a two-part series on the effect of
pesticides on agriculture, and the first program develops the case in favor of pesticide
use and pending legislation approving its use while the second portrays the conflicting
research and arguments opposing the legislation, the series will qualify for the
186
                                                                  
nonpartisan study, analysis, or research exception, assuming that the two programs
occur within six months of one another and during comparable television time slots. 
See Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c)(1)(iii), (vii) (Examples 6, 7).
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This is known as the exception from the definition of lobbying for “nonpartisan
analysis, study, and research.”  To qualify for such favorable characterization, a charity is
required to convey full and fair information about both the case for and the case against the
legislation in question in its communication.365  There is an additional exception from the
definition of lobbying for communications by charities that examine or discuss broad social,
economic, or similar issues, even if the discussions are directed toward the public or the
communications are with lawmakers, and even if “the general subject...[discussed] is also
the subject of legislation before a legislative body.”366  This exception does not require a
charity to meet the standards associated with the exception for nonpartisan analysis, but it is
not applicable if the communication mentions the merits of specific legislation  along with its
discussion of broad issues or the communication in question urges people to take action with
respect to legislation.
Because of the dollar and other quantitative restrictions on their lobbying activities,
                    
     365  See Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c)(1)(vii) (Example 2).  Although the communication
is also allowed to contain a view for or against specific legislative proposals under
consideration by lawmakers, it is not allowed to encourage lawmakers or the public to
take action with respect to the legislation favored by the charity, e.g., it cannot say
“Write Congressman X and tell him to vote against HR 66.  The organization is,
however, free to identify public officials in support of or opposed to the legislation.  See
Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c)(1)(vi).  These regulation provisions apply to charities making
the section 501(h) election.  For the counterpart exception for nonelecting charities, see
Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213, Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138.  For the
counterpart exception for private foundations, see I.R.C. § 4945(e), (f).  Both the IRS
and the courts have used the definitions in the regulations for private foundations and
electing public charities when they analyze parallel issues for nonelecting public
charities.  See Gen. Couns. Mem. 36127 (Jan. 2, 1975); Haswelll v. United States, 500
F.2d 1133, 1141-44 (Ct. Cl.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1974).
     366  See Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c)(2).  For the counterpart exception for nonelecting
charities, see Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210.  For the counterpart exception for
private foundations, see Treas. reg. §56.4945-2(d)(4).
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charities typically strive to have as many of communications to their members, the public,
and public officials as possible qualify for one of the lobbying exceptions.367  If they are
successful, the associated costs of the communications will not be counted as lobbying
expenditures against their lobbying limit, and these costs may even enlarge the baseline
against which the extent of lobbying will be compared.  In the case of private foundations,
which are not permitted to engage in any amount of lobbying, the lobbying exceptions
constitute the sole means available to them for communicating with lawmakers and the
public with respect to legislative matters without  risking the loss of their exemption.  Thus,
                    
     367  See Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c)(2).  There is also an exceptions from the definition
of lobbying for responses to requests for technical assistance made by lawmakers to
charities at the lawmakers’ initiative, even if a charity makes a recommendation in
support of or in opposition to specific legislation as part of its communication.  See Rev.
Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 C.B. 112; Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(c); §53.4945-2(d).  In addition,
public charities and private foundations can lobby on any issue affecting the entity’s own
survival, powers, or tax status without it counting as lobbying.  For this “self-defense”
exception to the lobbying rules, see I.R.C. § 4945(e), Treas. Reg. §53.4945-2(d),
§56.4911-2(c)(4), Gen. Couns. Mem. 34289 (May 8, 1970).
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whatever the underlying rationale for the lobbying exceptions,368 their effect is to encourage
charitable organizations to strive towards reasonably balanced presentations of topics
associated with ongoing legislative efforts.
                    
     368  It would seem that the examination and discussion of broad social, economic,
and similar issues should not be considered lobbying even without the exception, given
that, by definition, the exempt organization does not express a view with respect to
specific legislation.  Perhaps the exception is intended to preclude implying that an
organization has expressed a view when it discusses broad issues, inasmuch as there
is often specific legislation on important issues pending or under consideration.  In the
case of the exception for nonprofit analysis, study, and research, in contrast, there
appears to be a clear conflict between the desire to avoid Federal subsidies of
advocacy and the desire to permit and even encourage the dissemination of materials
that portray the pros and cons of important issues in a careful and even-handed way.
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By the same token, one of  the great weaknesses of the tax law governing exempt
organizations from the self-governance perspective on civic health is that it imposes no
restrictions encouraging balanced presentations on the part of any exempt organizations
other than charities.  The usual justification for this discrepancy is that charities alone are
restricted in the amounts and kind of lobbying permitted because they are the main exempt
entities entitled to receive contributions that are deductible to their donors.369  Historically, the
coupling of the entitlement to charitable contributions and the limited entitlement to lobby
(and the absolute prohibition against intervention in political campaigns) was justified by the
view that charitable contributions constitute a government subsidy and the government
should not be in the business of subsidizing private advocacy.370   However, this rationale
                    
     369  See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2).  Also entitled to receive deductible contributions are
government units, if the gift is exclusively for public purposes, I.R.C. § 170(c)(1); certain
posts or organizations of war veterans, I.R.C. § 170(c)(3); fraternal lodges, if the
contribution is to be used exclusively for charitable purposes, I.R.C. § 170(c)(4); and
certain member owned cemetary companies, I.R.C. § 170(c)(5).
     370  See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512 (1959); see also Slee v.
Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930), aff’g 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929); H.R. Rep. No.
391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1624-25 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1,
2313-1204 to 2313-1206).
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overlooks the circumstance that exemption from Federal income taxes by itself is also a
subsidy and that the exemption subsidy is often critical to the survival and effectiveness of
many exempt organizations that have no entitlement to charitable contributions.371
                    
     371  See Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest, supra note 155, at 1289-1302
(arguing that the difference in the situations of charitable and noncharitable exempt
organizations does not justify the extent of the differences in the lobbying regimes
applicable to them).
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Another anomaly in the taxation of exempt organizations from the self-governance
perspective is the fact that the lobbying restriction for charities includes only attempts to
influence “legislation,” i.e., action to be taken “by the Congress, by any State legislature, by
any local council or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, initiative,
constitutional amendment, or similar procedure.”372  As a definitional matter, communications
made to influence actions of administrative, executive, or judicial bodies, are not considered
lobbying.373  Administrative and executive bodies include “school boards, housing authorities,
sewer and water districts, zoning boards, and other similar Federal, State, or local special
purpose bodies, whether elected or not.”374  For purposes of the self-governance
perspective, the definition of lobbying would be more beneficial to civil society interests if it
included communications with federal and state entities within the purview of lobbying while
                    
     372  Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii). 
     373  See Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(d)(3).  Note, however, that lobbying includes
contacting “any official or employee...who may participate in the formulation of the
legislation, but only if the principal purpose of the communication is to influence
legislation.” Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii).  (Emphasis added.)  By its terms, the
former regulation applies only to charities that have made the section 501(h) election,
and the latter regulation applies only to private foundations.  But see supra note 365
(last sentence).
     374  Treas. reg. §56.4911-2(d)(4) (stating the rule for electing public charities).  See
also Treas. reg. §53.4945-2(a)(1) (stating the rule for private foundations).
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excluding county and other local officials and bodies.  So defined, public charities would be
able to engage in attempts to affect public outcomes more or less freely in a local context,
which is precisely the forum most suited to making decisions directly affecting the affairs of
association members.
In regard to the self-governance perspective, as was discussed in connection with the
collective action perspective, charities can avoid the need for nonpartisan analysis and
communication by establishing a section 501(c)(4) advocacy organization with strong
ideological ties to the charity to lobby on its behalf.375  Thus, the Code enables groups to
acquire the resources necessary for productive civic engagement, but it only encourages
informative and balanced communications in the limited situation where an organization
seeks to engage in advocacy using funds that are charitable contributions deductible to the
donors.  In practice, this does not create any incentive for noncharitable exempt entities to
relinquish their ability to engage in one-sided, sometimes inflammatory or misleading,
communications in the heat of a legislative battle.
To transform the current culture of partisan advocacy would require changes in
attitudes and values far beyond the powers of the Code.  The most that the tax law could do
would be to require all legislative advocacy by all exempt organizations to meet certain
informational or educational criteria, such as those required to meet the exception for
nonpartisan study, analysis, or research or a looser standard requiring reasoned argument in
support of or opposed to specific viewpoints.376  In the absence of such a radical change, the
present Federal income tax regulation of voluntary associations does not further, and may
                    
     375  See supra notes 344-347 and accompanying text.
     376  See the proposal in Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest, supra note 155, at
1343-46.
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well thwart, the kind of civil association hoped for by adherents of the self-governance
perspective of the civil society debate.
As a theoretical matter, the principles and aspirations of the self-governance
perspective are not inconsistent with the aspirations of the collective action perspective. 
Indeed, some civil society writers adopt both perspectives and some do not seem to
recognize that the underlying premises and ultimate aspirations are distinct.  However, the
collective action strand emphasizes the character of individuals (trusting and connected) and
casts intermediate steps in terms of an ultimate value that is social (effective action and
solving problems), whereas the self-governance strand emphasizes the cognitive attributes
of individuals (informed and deliberative) and considers collective activity as an intermediate
step in making possible the desired outcome for individuals (that they live as autonomous
and self-governing beings).  Further, the two perspectives could lead to conflicting
recommendations.  Although the collective action perspective is not necessarily at odds with
the self-governance perspective, the latter perspective identifies more rigorous conditions as
preludes to civic health than does the former.  For example, if it could be shown that the
preference for nonpartisan analysis and communication in the regulations of advocacy by
charities tends to obstruct the ability of groups to act effectively and achieve their purposes,
then the collective action perspective would not endorse those regulations.
C.  The Representative Institutions Perspective
1.  Voluntary associations and representative institutions.  As was discussed in
Part II, according to the representative institution perspective, civic health presupposes
political equality in the sense of a system of representation that is not biased in favor of or
against any citizen or class of citizens, the dispersal of decision making power, accountability
of governmental officials to citizens, institutional stability, and attitudes supporting all these
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goals.377  The empirical research reviewed in Part III.C suggests that voluntary associations
can further several of these objectives.
                    
     377  See supra Part II.C.
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Political equality is unlikely to be achieved in practice until political participation and
political representation become more egalitarian.  This can occur through the increased input
of those who currently fail to exercise their legal rights as well as through the increased
responsiveness of representatives to populations that are currently underrepresented 
because of their silence, their ineffective modes of communication, or their lack of influence
even when they do communicate.378               Voluntary associations are well suited to
alleviate some of these circumstances.  Empirical evidence shows that small, participatory
voluntary associations, or small group settings within larger associations, provide
opportunities for members to learn communication and organizational skills.379  Such settings
may also instil confidence in individual members in their own or the organization’s ability to
make their point of view heard by others, including public officials, or actually to influence the
formation of public policy.  Research also shows that this kind of confidence may be a
condition, and possibly a cause, of civic engagement, even in the absence of interpersonal
trust,.380  The combination of skills and confidence learned through participation thus has the
potential to prompt previously inactive people to become more politically active, e.g., by
                    
     378  See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
     379  See supra notes 174, 178, 264, 178, 264.
     380  See supra notes 250-251 and accompanying text.
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writing or otherwise contacting lawmakers and other officials, joining grass roots initiatives,
serving on political committees, and working in their own neighborhoods to encourage others
to register, vote, or become civically active in other ways.381
                    
     381  However, an increase in voting among those who currently do not vote without
increases in other forms of political participation is unlikely to achieve the amount and
kind of democratic outcomes essential to the democracy enhancing perspective.  See
supra page 28.
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Voluntary associations can also play an important and direct role in improving the
socioeconomic status of disadvantaged populations by providing services like job training
and placement, low-cost housing, day care, transportation, shelters for the homeless and
victims of domestic abuse, and health care for the poor, sick, or disabled.  Although only a
small portion of the wealth and income of charities is currently devoted to such activities,382
such assistance improves the lives of the needy in a direct and tangible fashion.  In addition,
some voluntary associations have historically championed causes of underrepresented
populations, especially children and  others who do not themselves participate or have
political clout with lawmakers.  Such efforts can be very successful in giving voice to the
concerns of these populations in a politically effective fashion.  Thus engaged, voluntary
associations have the ability to make political institutions more representative and improve
the living situations of targeted beneficiaries even when they do not operate in a fashion
valued by the cooperation or self-governance perspectives, i.e., by involving the beneficiaries
in the process of procuring goods and services.  It is possible, however, that such efforts by
associations will, over time, enhance the representative character of institutions in other
ways, given that empirical research has demonstrated a strong positive correlation between
education and socioeconomic status on the one hand and civic engagement on the other.
                    
     382  See EBERLY, AMERICA’S PROMISE, supra note 1, at  67-70 (citing statistics
suggesting that most volunteering never reaches the poor and homeless and that a
large part of the funding of charities engaged in social services comes from
government, not private sources).
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Although research suggests that the act of participating in an association will probably
not create civic attitudes in favor of participation as such,383 it has been shown that
participants in instrumental and advocacy organizations are likely to be mobilized to engage
in civic activities outside the group, if only to advance the group’s mission.384  Since empirical
evidence also shows that people join associations or participate in their activities when
others solicit their participation,385 participation in a voluntary association may beget more
participation even without a major change in civic attitudes, e.g., when those who are
civically engaged ask their friends, neighbors, co-workers, and family members to help out. 
However, such a ripple effect can augment the egalitarian character of the political process
only if, and to the extent that, the organizations in question seek out participation by or
further the interests of underrepresented groups.  Churches and community organizations in
poor neighborhoods are especially likely candidates for activities of this kind, as are parent
associations in districts with substandard or poorly served schools.  In short, even though the
evidence shows that voluntary associations are typically the beneficiaries of civic attitudes
rather than their source, it is also the case that the recruitment and mobilization functions of
voluntary associations can promote more representative institutions by dra wing larger
numbers of nonparticipants into civic life.
                    
     383  See supra notes 252-255.
     384  See supra notes 259-261and accompanying text.
     385  See supra notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
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On the negative side, empirical research has so far failed to show that voluntary
associations have potential for creating or strengthening democratic values, however,
because of the frequency with which participants self-select for organizations that share their
values and organizations themselves engage in selective recruitment.386  In addition, the
composition of most voluntary associations will tends to be especially homogeneous along
dimensions related to the organizations’ purposes,387 further reducing their utility as “schools
for democracy”388 in the sense of teaching participants values different from those they
possessed when they joined.389  There is even a danger that encouraging greater
participation on the part of citizens generally (as contrasted with targeted increases in the
participation of politically underrepresented groups) could accentuate existing distortions in
                    
     386  See supra notes 246-248 and accompanying text.
     387  See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text.
     388  For this idea, see PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 1, at 338-39.
     389  But see ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS, supra note 112 (arguing, based
upon her own experience researching the effect of membership on members’ morals,
that belonging to groups and participating with like-minded people in common
enterprises furthers democratic values even if the values and practices of the groups
are not themselves democratic).
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representation.390  Finally, voluntary associations that are successful often grow large and
hierarchical, hire professional staffs, and rarely solicit the input of their own constituencies,
thereby reinforcing their tendency to speak for more educated and higher status individuals. 
In short, voluntary associations have the potential to promote more representative institutions
and democratic norms and practices, but pursuing a more “robust civic life,” without more,
does not adequately capture their usefulness for these purposes.
                    
     390   See VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, & BRADY, THE BIG TILT, supra note 83, at 75 (noting that
the policies favored by the dominated groups are different from those favored by the
dominant groups).
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2.  The regulation of exempt organizations and representative institutions.  
There are several ways in which the current regulation of exempt organizations affects the
goal of reducing inequalities in participation and representation.  First, many exempt
organizations are active in registering voters and encouraging and enabling them to get to
the polls.  Federal tax law permits most exempt restrictions organizations, other than
charities, to engage in registration and get-out-the-vote activities without restrictions.391 
Charities are excepted from the general rule by virtue of being prohibited from engaging in
any political campaign activities whatsoever.392  However, tax law permits registration and
get-out-the-vote activities on the part of public charities,  as long as a charity’s efforts are
“nonpartisan,” i.e., not biased for or against a political party or a  candidate for office.393  This
means, among other things, that registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) assistance cannot
be confined to potential voters of a single party or for a specific candidate or candidates, and
public charities must encourage people to register and vote based upon “neutral” reasons,
e.g., a person’s civic duty to vote, his or her self-interest.394  However, it is possible to target
                    
     391  Among the non-charitable exempt organizations, only social welfare
organizations are limited in registering voters and getting them to vote since only these
are subject to limitations on the amount of campaign activities permitted to them.   See
Treas. reg. §1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (stating that the political campaign activities of
organizations described in section 501(c)(4) cannot be considered part of their exempt
purpose and requiring that their exempt purpose be their primary purpose).
     392  See supra notes 333-334 and accompanying text.
     393  See Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations Continuing Professional
Education Technical Instruction Program 427, question 7 (1992) (hereinafter “1992 CPE
Text”); Milt Cerny, Current Issues Involving Lobbying and Political Activities As They
Affect Exempt Organizations, 98 Tax Notes Today 130 (1998).  For a clear and
nontechnical description of the rules for charities engaged in registration and get-out-
the-vote activities, see COLVIN & FINLEY, THE RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 346, at 21,
and infra note 396.
     394  For a detailed account of acceptable target groups, see Cerny, Current Issues,
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students, minorities, immigrants, low-income groups, or women, despite the likelihood that
voters in these groups will tend to favor a particular party or candidate.395  It is also possible
to call attention to specific issues and highlight the importance of the election for their
resolution.396  Private foundations are also required to act in a nonpartisan fashion in
registering voters and encouraging or enabling them to get to the polls.  However, the
guidelines for their activities were laid out by Congress and are more restrictive than the
IRS’s rules for public charities.397
                                                                  
supra note 393.
     395  See Cerny, Current Issues, supra note 393 (citing IRS Priv. Let. Rul. 9223050,
Mar. 10, 1992, and Gen. Couns. Mem. 39811, June 30, 1989).
     396  See COLVIN & FINLEY, THE RULES OF THE GAME, supra note 346, at 21.  According
to the IRS, the FEC criteria for determining whether registration and get-out-the-vote
activities are nonpartisan are similar to the factors used in the Service’s inquiry.  See
Internal Revenue Service, 1992 CPE Text, supra note 393, at 427-28 (citing 11 C.F.R.
§§114.4(b)(2), (c)(1)).
     397  See I.R.C. § 4945(f) and Treas. Reg. §53.4945-3.
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 By their terms, the voter registration and get-out-the-vote rules do not address the
problem of inequality of political representation because nothing requires charities or other
exempt organizations to target underrepresented populations.  In fact, the exempt
organizations most likely to register underrepresented populations and encourage them to
vote are charities; yet because of the prohibition against charities engaging in political
campaign activities,398 they risk losing their exemptions if their registration and get-out-the-
vote activities are found to be partisan under the tax law. 
                    
     398  See supra note 335.  There is no de minimis exception to the provision
prohibiting charities from participating or otherwise intervening in a political campaign. 
See United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981).  In practice,
however, the Service appears to take into consideration whether the violation is
intentional.  See Internal Revenue Service, 1992 CPE Text, supra note 393, at 418-19. 
See also Lee A. Sheppard, Big Bird Is a Democrat and the Consequences, 25 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 373, 375 (1999) (describing two Technical Advice Memoranda in which
organizations that violated the prohibition repeatedly were fined under section 4955
rather than losing their exemptions).
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It thus appears that the Code’s regulation of exempt organizations may as a practical
matter be tilted against increased representation of the needy in the political process.  The
asymmetry in treatment between charities and other exempt organizations is accentuated by
the fact that charities are not allowed to establish PACs or affiliated organizations exempt
under section 527 of the Code to engage exclusively in political activities.399  Thus, charities
do not have a vehicle for avoiding the prohibition against political campaigns, as do section
501(c)(4) organizations.  This apparent tilt against charities in the tax law regulation of
exempt organizations is, however, largely offset by the fact that a charity can usually form an
affiliated section 501(c)(4) organization to engage in political campaign activities or to set up
a PAC as long as the charity prevents any of its funds from being used by the affiliate of its
PAC.400  The net effect, then, of the asymmetry in regulatory regimes appears to be that
charitable contributions entitling taxpayer-contributors to deduction from income cannot be
used to fund political campaign activity directly or indirectly, but they can be used by charities
to engage in nonpartisan voter registration and GOTV efforts.
                    
     399  See S. Rep. No. 93-1374, at 30 (1974).
     400  The leading case in this area involved lobbying, not political campaign activities. 
See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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One way for Federal tax law to create the socioeconomic conditions that are
correlated with participation would be to encourage the flow of funds to charitable entities
actively engaged in improving the lives of needy populations.  This could be achieved by
treating contributions to entities engaged in direct services to the needy more favorably than
other contributions, for example, by allowing a tax credit rather than a deduction for such
contributions or for charitable contributions earmarked for direct services to any charity
committed to thus using them.401  The Code already contains provisions favoring donations
to public charities as compared with private ones. Section 170 contains a two-tier system that
allows individuals to lower their taxable income by deducting a maximum of 50 percent of
their contribution base for donations made to public charities , as compared with 30 percent
of that base for private foundations.402  The rationale for the law as written appears to be
favoring charities with public support over those funded by a single high-wealth individual or
family.  In practice, however, it takes very little in the way of public support to qualify an entity
for public charity status.403  More importantly, nothing in any of the public support formulas
ensures that a charity thus funded will be devoted to activities on behalf of chronically
                    
     401  For a legislative proposal to this effect, see H.R. 673, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb.
14, 2001 (Charity To Eliminate Poverty Tax Credit Act of 2001).
     402 See I.R.C. §170(b)(1)(A), (B).  See also IRC §170(b)(1)(E) (authorizing the higher
limit for certain foundations).  For charitable contributions by corporations, see I.R.C.
§170(b)(2).
     403  See Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy, supra note 338, at 285 (noting
that public charity status can be obtained when there are fewer than 20 contributors
annually).  See also Treas. reg. §1.170A-9(e)(3) (providing that an alternative to the
usual public support formula can be satisfied if only 10 percent of the annual revenue of
a charity is from public support as long as certain facts and circumstances are met).  If
the facts and circumstances are met, the 10 percent public support test could be
satisfied with a minimum of five donors.
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underrepresented groups.404 
For political reasons it is unlikely that the present, generous treatment of charitable
contributions could be changed to privilege certain charities based upon their mission  rather
than their source of support.  Nonetheless, allowing tax credits rather than deductions for
contributions to charities devoted to helping needy populations might well be politically
feasible, as would linking an increase in the contribution cap to funding of such charities.405 
Similarly, a tax credit be linked to donations segregated by charities to fund direct services to
needy populations (earmarking), rather than requiring the charities themselves to devote
themselves to such services to the exclusion of other types of activities, could attract political
support. 
                    
     404  See Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy, supra note 338, at 284-87. 
Professor Chisolm’s proposal is to deny charities the ability to lobby unless they
represent underrepresented groups.
     405  If the charitable contribution deduction limit for people entitled to the credit was
correspondingly reduced, the savings would partially offset the cost of the credit,
thereby shifting charitable dollars into charities for the needy from other charities
described exempt under section 501(c).
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Tax law could also encourage more direct service charitable activities by permitting
noncharitable exempt organizations to receive charitable contributions deductible to the
donors for funding direct assistance to needy populations groups as long as such funds were
segregated from the organizations’ other funds and used only for such purposes.  A chamber
of commerce exempt under section 501(c)(6) would, then, be able to use tax favored
contributions to establish or assist a training program for unemployed or unskilled workers, a
food program, a homeless shelter, or the like.  The Code already contains a precedent for
conferring special tax treatment on funds targeted for certain charitable activities by entities
that are not themselves charities.  Under current law, donors can take charitable contribution
deductions for contributing to certain types of fraternal societies  as long as the contributions
entitled to this treatment are earmarked for use exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.406  To
encourage charitable efforts to help needy populations, a comparable activities-based
deduction could be introduced and made available to select categories of noncharitable
exempt organization.
                    
     406  See I.R.C. §170(c)(2)(E)(4).
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The optimal strategy for encouraging exempt organizations and their donors to
address social and economic inequalities would thus be for tax law to connect the deduction
for charitable contributions as closely as possible to certain types of activities rather than to
certain types of entities, in particular, activities of direct assistance to the unemployed, the
working poor, the hungry, the homeless, the abused, the disabled, and the sick.  For efforts
of this kind to have long-term effects, they should be designed to enable the recipients to
acquire the skills and experience necessary to become self-supporting, increase their job
and income levels, and have more stable homes.  Social service programs in the wake of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
provide a few models of comprehensive support, including transportation, health, and child
care subsidies during the transition from welfare to work, that have enabled large numbers of
individuals and families formerly receiving welfare payments to improve their standard of
living.407
                    
     407  See, e.g., <http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/dws/w2> (describing Wisconsin’s benefits
program available to employed or engaged in employment-related activities individuals
and their families; and <http:/www.mdrc.org/PressReleases/MFIPSummary.htm>
(summary by the Manpower Demonstration Research Project describing the Minnesota
Family Investment Program, Minnesota’s pilot welfare reform program in effect from
1994 to 1998).  The positive long-term effects of PRWORA on reducing poverty have
been mixed.  See CHRISTINE DEVERE, WELFARE REFORM RESEARCH: WHAT DO WE KNOW
ABOUT THOSE WHO LEAVE WELFARE? (2001) (Cong. Res. Serv.); Melissa G. Pardue,
Sharp Reduction in Black Poverty Due to Welfare Reform, BACKGROUNDER No. 1661,
June 12, 2003 (published by The Heritage Foundation) and sources cited, available at
<http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/bg1661.cfm>.  At the same time, the situation
of black children in extreme poverty has worsened.  See Children’s Defense Fund,
Analysis Background: Number of Black Children in Extreme Poverty Hits Record High ,
April 2003.  Of course, the fact that the minimum wage has not changed since 1997 and
the recession, among other factors, make it difficult for those at the bottom of the
economic ladder to climb up very many rungs.
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In sum, society as a whole and individual communities must address the types of
inequalities that undermine the representativeness of the political process.  Exempt
organizations, including but not limited to charities, are well suited to play an important role in
this effort.  Optimally, these organizations as a group need to be better educated so that they
recognize the potential they have to improve the circumstances of low-status individuals and
educate them about effective ways to influence the political process or other aspects of civic
life.408 
D.  Civic Reform and the Moral Foundation of Civil Society
                    
     408  For example, charitable entities desiring to help lessen economic and social
inequalities could add to in their mission statements increasing opportunities for
members of under-represented groups to acquire civic skills and attitudes, preferably
through participation in the management or operations of the charitable entities
themselves.
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According to the fourth perspective on civic engagement, civic renewal will never
succeed in the absence of concurrent moral renewal, and participation in voluntary
associations by itself is inadequate to develop the necessary moral foundation of civic life.409
 The moral renewal project is far more controversial than other aspects of civic renewal
because of the wariness in a democratic society of using legal institutions to encourage
values or attitudes linked to one or more specific understandings of human well-being or
fulfillment.  Democratic societies and especially liberal democratic societies tend to demand
substantive neutrality from public policy and government actors in situations where moral and
other human purposes  are at issue.410
Those who advocate invigorating the moral culture in the United States believe that
there exists a core of common values that the vast majority of Americans accept, or could be
persuaded to accept, without acting contrary to their existing beliefs, including those
associated with their  religion or other comprehensive views.411  As a consequence, these
thinkers seek to identify the elements of a secular moral consensus that is capable of
commanding widespread allegiance without sacrificing the country’s commitment to the
separation of church and state or imposing a specific idea of goodness or well-being on the
                    
     409  See supra Part II.D.
     410  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).  But
see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
     411  See supra 114-131 and accompanying text.
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population as a whole.  To be successful, these efforts must influence people’s behaviors as
well as their values and opinions.
The civic renewal perspective advocating moral renewal exhibits a range of views
concerning the degree to which government actions and public officials, as contrasted with
private parties, can or should seek to encourage particular moral beliefs and practices. 
Some civic renewal advocates emphasize the role of institutional or governmental actions.
Among these are efforts to use tax incentives and appropriations to encourage individuals
and companies to adopt practices deemed beneficial to the moral fabric of society, especially
in the area of family policy.412  The Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”), for example, has
been widely hailed for increasing employment among the poor and enhancing family stability
in addition to its direct economic effect of alleviating poverty.413  Since employment and
family stability are themselves civic goods with potential ripple effects on the noncivic and
civic well being of the individuals involved as well as on their families and neighborhoods,
                    
     412  Using the tax code to promote public policy has long been controversial.  See
Charles A. Borek, COMMENT: The Public Policy Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need for
Consistency in Denying Deductions Arising from Illegal Activities, 22 U. Balt. L. Rev. 45,
46-59 (1992)
     413  The credit provides a cash wage supplement to low-income working individuals
and families.  It was initially enacted in 1975, Pub. L. 94-12, Title II, § 204(a), 89 Stat.
30, § 43, and greatly expanded in 1993.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-66, §13131, 107 Stat. 312, 433-35 (1993) (codified at IRC § 32).   See
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, A HAND UP: HOW STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP WORKING
FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN 2001 6 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Dec. 2001)
(noting that EITCs have been enacted in states with Republican, Democratic, and
bipartisan leadership); Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations
of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995).
213
continuing and enlarging the program’s scope has attracted bipartisan support414 and
induced at least sixteen states to design similar credits.415 
                    
     414  See ROBERT GREENSTEIN, SHOULD EITC BENEFITS BE ENLARGED FOR FAMILIES
WITH THREE OR MORE CHILDREN? 1 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2000);
JOHNSON, A HAND UP, supra note 413.
     415  As of the end of 2001, sixteen states had enacted state EITC credits.  See
JOHNSON, A HAND UP, supra note 413.
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Marriage and divorce concerns have also given rise to repeated attempts on the
part of state legislatures to adopt family-friendly policies.  For example, Louisiana,
Arizona, and Arkansas have passed legislation creating an alternative, lifetime
commitment marriage license that requires those who elect it to undergo extensive
preparation before getting married, sign a legally enforceable document binding the
parties to seek counseling to preserve the marriage if marital difficulties develop, and
agree to an extended waiting period for a divorce except in extreme cases, e.g., when
one spouse abuses the other or the children or one spouse goes to jail for a serious
crime. 416  Less controversial417 are state efforts to include a course on marriage skills as
part of the high school curriculum.418 In one county in Michigan, the mayor, college
                    
     416  See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9-272 to 9-273 (covenant marriage), 9-307 (divorce from
a covenant marriage) (enacted in 1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§25-901 (covenant
marriage), 25-903 to 25-904 (dissolution; decree of separation) (enacted in 1998); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 et seq.  See generally Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage
Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47
EMORY L.J. 929 (1998); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social
Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63 (1998).  Similar bills have been
introduced in numerous state legislatures, so far with little success. See id. at 973
(noting twelve states in which covenant marriage bills were introduced in 1998); H.J.
Cummins, Lawmakers Push Vows to Make Marriages Last, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 12,
2000, at 9 (noting that bills were considered by the legislatures in 17 states in 1999,
although none was enacted). For a current and comprehensive list of bills introduced,
see <http://www.divorcereform.org/cov.html#anchor1274910>.  Estimates are that only
three percent of couples marrying in Louisiana or Arizona have chosen covenant
marriages.  See Pam Belluck, States Declare War on Divorce Rates, Before Any ‘I Dos’,
 N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2000, at A1.  Ten percent of those who participate in state
sponsored counseling break the engagement, and in one town, the divorce rate
dropped forty percent in ten years.  See Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law, at 977.
     417  The Louisiana law has been criticized by clergy, feminists, the ACLU, and
constitutional scholars.  See Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law, supra note
416, at 952-67.
     418  In Florida, for example, a course on marriage and relationship skills is a
requirement for graduation.  See Marilyn Gardner, An ‘I Do’ that Lasts, CHRISTIAN SCI.
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presidents, judges, attorneys, business leaders, and clergy have established a
community marriage policy that seeks to raise public awareness regarding the value of
marriage as well as to provide counseling and other services similar to those provided in
other states.419  Perhaps the most well known legislative efforts to strengthen families
are the various federal and state family and medical leave laws.420  Government efforts
to increase civic values directly through education have also been undertaken repeatedly
in the last two decades, especially at the local level, through changes in the curriculum421
and public service requirements.422
                                                                  
MONITOR, June 23, 1999, at 15.  Utah insures that marriage education courses are
available in high schools, but does not make them mandatory. See Belluck, States
Declare War, supra note 416, at A1 (discussing efforts in several states to strengthen
marriage through educational measures).  One state currently offers financial incentives
to encourage low-income married couples to stay married by relieving some of their
financial distress.  See W. Va. Stat. § 9-9-6 (authorizing an extra $100 a month in aid to
married parents who receive cash assistance from the state).  In its 2001 budget
request, the Bush administration included $100 million for state programs to encourage
welfare recipients to get or stay married.  See WORKING TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 19-21
(2002), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-
announcement-book-all.html>; H.R. 4 (§ 103), S.5 (§ 103).  Opponents of such
programs believe that the financial incentives may lead abused wives to stay in abusive
relationships.  Supporters argue that the marriage education classes funded by the
programs will reduce the amount of domestic abuse.  See Patricia Harrison, Marriage
Initiatives Deserve Our Support, Greenville News, Oct. 6, 2002, at 3G.
     419  See Roger Sider, Grand Rapids Erects a Civic Tent for Marriage, 6 POL’Y REV. 1
(1998).  This marriage strengthening project is unusual in concluding that success
depends in part on persuading professionals to recognize their role in strengthening or
weakening marriages.  The Michigan effort has asked divorce attorneys to reflect upon
the potential tension between their economic self-interest and the interests of children
and other members of the community, and it has sponsored educational events for
mental health professions to increase their awareness of their potential role in educating
their clients about their responsibilities to other members of their families.  See id.
     420  See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq (federal law)
and <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/employ/fmlachart.htm> (digest of all state laws).
     421  One trend in this connection are proposals to increase character education
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among children by expanding the moral content of school curricula, e.g., by introducing
service learning as a component of the curriculum  See KEVIN A. RYAN AND KAREN E.
BOHLIN, BUILDING CHARACTER IN SCHOOLS: PRACTICAL WAYS TO BRING MORAL INSTRUCTION
TO LIFE (1998); B. DAVID BROOKS, FRANK G. GOBLE, FRANK GOBLE, THE CASE FOR
CHARACTER EDUCATION: THE ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN TEACHING VALUES AND VIRTUE
(1997); Thomas Lickona, The Decline and Fall of American Civilization: Can Character
Education Reverse the Slide?, 11 WORLD & I MAGAZINE 284 (1996) and sources cited. 
See also <http://www.ceai.org/character.html> (listing links to web sites with character
education materials).  Character education has been described as “not a separate
course...rather, it’s a whole school effort to create a community of virtue where moral
behaviors, such as respect, honesty, and kindness are modeled, taught, expected,
celebrated, and continuously practiced in every-day interactions.”  Lickona, Decline and
Fall, supra, at PIN.
     422  Hundreds of school boards or municipalities now have mandatory public service
requirements for students in primary or secondary school.  See Sumathi Reddy, Helping
Out Is Required to Graduate,  NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), May 22, 2000, at B3;
Marina Dundjerski & Susan Gray, A Lesson in Mandatory Service, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, September 10, 1998, at 1.  See also Thomas Janoski et al., Being
Volunteered?  The Impact of Social Participation and Pro-Social Attitudes on
Volunteering, 13 SOC. FORCES 495, 516 (1998). To date, the only state to mandate
community service as a condition of graduation is Maryland.  See Code of Maryland
Regulations, Title 13A, Subtitle 03, Chapter 01.02.F(11) (providing that each local high
school system should include activities, programs, and practices that “provide
appropriate opportunities for students to participate in community service”).  This
mandate, passed in 1992, was first applied to the high school classes graduating in
1997.  In implementing the mandate, the Maryland State Board of Education gave all
twenty-four school districts the option of having students complete seventy-five hours of
service, including “preparation, action, and reflection components and that, at the
discretion of the local school system, may begin during the middle grades” or devising
their own student service program, subject to approval by the Superintendent of
Schools.  See <http://www.mssa.sailorside.net/require.html> , which also includes
details of the variety of models chosen by the local school districts.
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Many advocates of moral renewal prefer private solutions to civic concerns,
whether on grounds of efficiency or ideology.  Legislation and other official acts seem
especially unsuited to the core problem of increasing the pervasiveness of public spirited
attitudes.423  This strand of the moral renewal perspective views parents as potentially
the most potentially effective and the appropriate repository of moral education of any
kind.424  Groups of concerned parents have, in fact, been the driving force behind
numerous projects to improve the moral climate of the neighborhoods in which they live
and their children grow up.  Regardless of whether they turn to market425 or legal426
                    
     423  For example, many camps, scout groups, and little league teams communicate
the importance of good character and behavior by conferring honors upon children who
are known for their tendency to help others alongside of those who excel in sports or
other skills. Many primary and secondary schools similarly reward with public praise or
a trophy children who stand out for their helping behaviors alongside of those who excel
in academics.  It is hard to imagine a governmental entity competing successfully with
the opinion of one’s peers.
     424  See NAT’L COUNCIL,  NATION OF SPECTATORS, supra note 114, at 6, 8, 9-10, 12-13;
COUNCIL,  CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 111, at 7, 19-20; supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
     425  The software industry has responded to parents’ desire to keep pornography,
violence, or other offensive material out of the surroundings of their children by
marketing special computer filtering software. Examples of such efforts include rating
systems for movies, records, books, television, and computer games to enable adults to
screen these items before permitting their children to see or hear them.  See
<http://www.parentalguide.org> for links to voluntarily adopted ratings systems for
movies, television, records and CDs, and computer, video, and internet games.
     426  The Federal Trade Commission monitors annually the entertainment and other
industries’ compliance with their self-regulating standards, including the standards
against advertising R-rated products in magazines and other media with a significant
under-age audience.  See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, MARKETING VIOLENT ENTERTAINMENT
TO CHILDREN: A TWENTY-ONE MONTH FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE
MOTION PICTURE, MUSICE RECORDING& ELECTRONIC GAME INDUSTRIES (2000).  The State
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strategies, such efforts are animated by a belief that some materials are inappropriate
for non-adults if they are to grow into morally healthy adults.  Another recent private
initiative, the public journalism movement, resulted from a collaboration among parents,
community leaders, and the media.  By making a commitment to give more prominent
coverage to topics such as community efforts to solve local problems and profiles of
individuals who are active on behalf of their communities, this movement has attempted to
combat public cynicism and increase people’s sense of responsibility, awareness of public
problems, and confidence in their ability to influence the quality of their surroundings.427
These brief observations illustrate how complex and multidimensional the civic
response to any aspect of child, family, or moral public policy must be.  They also raise in a
concrete fashion a question as to utility of participation in voluntary associations in
contributing to the moral renewal enterprise.
                                                                  
of Michigan and some Federal entities fund an internet site listing alphabetically
commercial and noncommercial filtering software for a variety of purposes.  See
<http://mel.lib.mi.us/internet/INET-filtersoft.html>.
     427  See, e.g., Peter Levine, Public Journalism and Deliberation, in READINGS FOR
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Theodore Lowi, ed. 2000).  On the subject of public journalism
generally, see ASSESSING PUBLIC JOURNALISM (Philip Meyer, Edmund Lambeth, & Esther
Thorson eds. 1998).
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1. Impact of voluntary associations on  moral values and practices.  The
empirical evidence relating to the impact of participation in voluntary associations on the
moral values and behaviors of participants lends support to the view of civic renewal
advocates who believe that participation in voluntary associations (other than families) does
not necessarily produce or nurture moral values and practices of members.  Rather, it
appears that people’s moral values and attitudes are learned primarily at home or in school
and then become a significant determinant of the likelihood that people will participate in civic
life.  Helping and community oriented behaviors in particular, as contrasted with self-
interested behaviors, were found to be  the product of friendship and other social ties as well
as socialization by parents.428  Research also showed that altruistic and ideological
motivations were better predictors of civic activity than was economic self-interest or
professional advancement.429
Research did, however, confirm the correlation between participation in nonpolitical
associations and certain types of involvement in political life.  In general, however, the causal
link turned out to be not values or attitudes of public spiritedness or citizen responsibility
learned from participation in civil associations.  Rather, it seems that self-selection by those
who join civil associations in the first place coupled with mobilization of members after they
                    
     428  See supra pp. 72, 75.
     429  See supra pp. 74-75.
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join a group by other members are the primary reasons for the correlation between
participation in civil associations and political participation.430 
                    
     430  See supra Part III.C.2-3.
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Nonetheless, there is some evidence that participation in voluntary associations can
have a positive impact on members’ moral values or public spiritedness, in particular, those
whose mission includes character building. First and foremost, churches and religious
institutions typically teach congregants the importance of helping those in need, whether
within or outside the religious community.431  Several studies showed that, as a result of
participation in non-religious voluntary associations, participants experienced an increase in
empathy, nurturing, and self-confidence, although this effect was found only in participants
exhibiting altruistic behavior prior to joining.432   Further, other studies have concluded that
through associational life members pre-joining attitudes can be amplified and that members’
attitudes change only when a significant majority of the other members of the group exhibit a
particular attitude.433  Thus, moral socialization within voluntary associations depends on the
                    
     431  See supra III.B.2.  Faith-based institutions also provide occasions for adults with
children to have the values instilled at home reinforced by other members of the
community and for adults to meet socially with others who share similar moral values. 
Sometimes such entities organize mixed social and helping activities geared especially
to pre-teens or teens, further reinforcing these values.
     432  See supra note 253 and accompanying text.  See also supra notes 280-281
(empirical data suggesting that self-interested people are more likely to join instrumental
voluntary associations, whereas people with helping orientations are more likely to be
members of expressive organizations).
     433  See supra notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
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prior existence of moral values outside of organizations, i.e., members’ pre-joining attitudes
and values.  Based upon the empirical evidence to date, in other words, given its goals the
fourth perspective is correct in focusing predominantly on the creation and cultivation of
moral and community-oriented values and practices outside associational settings.
In sum, although the importance of participation, as such, for character building has
not yet been demonstrated, voluntary associations can have a positive effect on the
cultivation of moral values, both directly and indirectly.
2.  The regulation of exempt organizations.  The previous section has argued
that voluntary organizations are most useful for the maintenance or cultivation of civic health
from the fourth perspective to the extent that they assist members of families and schools in
conveying the basic moral norms essential for civic life.  Apart from religious or religiously
affiliated institutions, very few voluntary associations further this goal directly.  Similarly, the
policy of the Internal Revenue Service is to refrain from evaluating applications for charitable
or other categories of exempt status based upon substantive moral considerations.  Thus,
both organizations that  support and those that oppose a position or objective with moral
implications will receive exempt status, unless they advocate violence, criminal behavior, or
other forms of lawlessness.  The few occasions in the past when the Service did deny
charitable or exempt status based upon its notion of moral norms, it was widely condemned
and eventually retreated.434  Given the pluralistic nature of American democracy, the
Service’s present practice can be defended as moral as well as administratively and
politically realistic.  In this respect, to tinker with federal tax law and its enforcement would
                    
     434  See supra note 362.
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risk weakening the regulatory regime’s contribution to the commitment to pluralism that is
part of the moral foundation of civic life in the United States.
Given that churches and other faith-based institutions are voluntary associations that
engage in character building, some might consider that federal tax law should privilege them
as compared with other voluntary associations.  In point of fact, the Code already does
privilege churches in various ways, e.g., by not requiring them to apply for recognition of
exempt status,435 exempting them from certain unemployment taxes,436 restricting the
government’s ability to examine financial records,437 exempting them from the requirement to
file annual information returns,438 among other exceptions to the rules governing other
charitable exempt organizations.439 
                    
     435  I.R.C. § 508(c).
     436  I.R.C. § 3309(b).
     437  I.R.C. § 7611.
     438  I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i).
     439  For other examples of federal and state tax law exceptions for churches and
certain religious institutions, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits for Religious
Institutions Constitutionally Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C.L. REV.
805 (2001) and sources cited .
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Privileging religious organizations always raises concerns, and lawmakers must walk
a fine line between the establishment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. 
The most heated controversy at present has to do with what is known as “charitable choice,”
i.e., legislative authorization permitting faith-based entities to compete for federal social
service contracts alongside of other charitable organizations.440  In regard to the taxation of
exempt organizations, the most controversial proposal is to relax the rules on advocacy
engaged in by religious organizations.  As is the case with other organizations described in
section 501(c)(3) of the Code, religious organizations are only permitted to lobby if their
lobbying activities are not substantial.441  They are not permitted to make the section 501(h)
lobbying election; however, their exclusion from this provision was requested by the
organizations themselves.442  Bills have been introduced to enable churches and other
religious entities to lobby up to an annual expenditure cap of 20 percent of gross revenues,
but none has been enacted.443  Like other charitable exempt organizations, religious
institutions are absolutely prohibited from engaging in electioneering or campaign activities. 
                    
     440  See H.R. 3734, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 101 Stat. 2105 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C.
601-1399 (1996)) (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996).
     441  See supra notes 333-336 and accompanying text.
     442  See H.R. REP. NO. 1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976); James H. Nix,
Limitations on the Lobbying of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations–A Choice for the Public
Charities, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 407, 415-16 (1979).
     443  See H.R. 2931, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) (Bright Line Act of 2001)
(permitting such organizations to spend a maximum of 20 percent of gross revenues for
all forms of advocacy, i.e. for lobbying and electioneering combined).  The limit for
charitable exempt organizations making the section 501(h) election is 20 percent of the
organization’s exempt purposes expenditures, up to a maximum of $ 1,000,000 for
organizations with exempt purpose expenditures in excess of $10,000,000.  I.R.C. §
4911(c).  There was no dollar maximum proposed in H.R. 2931.  Thus, the bill would
authorize religious institutions to engage in more lobbying than is possible for other
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There have also been recent attempts to except these organizations from this restriction as
well.444  
 It is doubtful whether these bills are desirable from a civic renewal perspective that
emphasizes the foundational role of moral renewal.  Although a reasoned evaluation of such
measures must await research into the likely effect of allowing churches and other religious
entities to devote a substantial amount of time, effort, and money to partisan advocacy,445 it
would seem to risk drawing such organizations away from their spiritual mission and draining
resources that might otherwise be devoted to religious activities, direct services, and
educational programs.
VII.  CONCLUSION
                                                                  
exempt charities.
     444  See H.R. 2357, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001) ((Houses of Worship Political
Speech Protection Act) (introducing a “no substantial part” political campaign activity
standard for churches); H.R. 2931, supra note 443 (permitting religious institutions to
spend 5 percent of their gross revenues on campaigns, but prohibiting aggregate
spending on lobbying and campaigns in excess of 20 percent of gross revenues).
     445  As was noted earlier, if legislative advocacy is nonpartisan, it is not counted as
lobbying for federal tax purposes.
This article has argued that the civic renewal movement contains within itself multiple
understandings of the nature of civic health.  It has also taken the position that these
understandings are sufficiently distinct that civil society theorists need to reflect more on the
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precise nature of their goals before advancing public policy objectives, especially in light of
the potential conflict among the goals given priority by the different perspectives.  Further,
given the empirical findings explored in this article, it no longer seems reasonable or useful
for civic renewal advocates to continue to portray associational life as critical for cultivating
public spiritedness in individuals or promoting attitudes and practices necessary for reflective
self-governance.  In general, voluntary associations can at most serve as a vehicle for
harnessing and directing their members’ existing public spirited orientations; and small,
highly participatory associations may provide a forum for deliberation in some civil and
political settings.  Thus, those who give priority to the deliberative or public spirited aspects of
civic health would do well to revise their expectations of the potential benefits of voluntary
associations and recognize that increases in the “robustness of civic life,” without more,
could contribute to a civic climate at odds with the substantive civic values they seek to
promote.
